A Pyrrhic Victory in Mogadishu
The Greek philosopher and historian Plutarch recounts that King Pyrrhus of Epirus, after defeating the Romans at Asculum in 279 BC, lamented, "One more such victory over the Romans and we are completely done for." After almost four torturous years, the same might be said for any more supposed 'victories' for the incumbent federal government of Somalia. To nobody's surprise, the constitutional 'review' process undertaken by Somalia's federal government was never about implementing direct democracy after all. It was, as widely anticipated, a thinly veiled power grab intended to centralise political power, eviscerate Somalia's federal system, and extend the term of the incumbent president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM). And so, at the 11th hour and with less than 70 days remaining in his term of office, HSM declared Somalia's new constitutional text 'complete' and signed it into 'law.'
On Sunday, the Somali president announced the "official end of the country's decades-old Provisional Constitution," asserting that the nation's new Basic Law "will now be implemented" and expressed hope that it will "guide Somalia toward lasting political stability." No reference was made to the brazen attempts to simulate a parliamentary quorum by grounding an aircraft full of MPs from Puntland who had planned to scuttle the vote by leaving the capital, nor to police roughing up and detaining a Puntland presidential adviser in the dead of night in Mogadishu on obscure charges. No attempt was made to gloss over the absence of Jubaland's parliamentary caucus or the imaginative use of "online voting" invoked by the Speaker of Parliament to compensate for absenteeism on the day of the vote.
The president's loyalists have hailed this step as cause for celebration — the long overdue resolution of Somalia's fitful, tortured state-building process, after millions of foreign dollars and innumerable scholars and experts were deployed to support it. Their constitutional model, they aver, corrects historical errors, such as devolving too much power to the Federal Member States and muddying the locus of executive authority between the president and prime minister. In their view, Somalia needs a strong central authority vested in a powerful presidency – conveniently overlooking the fact that these were among the primary causes of civil war and state collapse in the first place. The large proportion of Somalis who reject this glibly ahistorical argument are labelled as spoilers and even 'national criminals.'
A more widely-held view is that HSM's constitutional coup is the culmination of a sustained effort – by both his administration and that of his predecessor, Mohamed Abdillahi Farmaajo – to sabotage the federal project. Nothing has been left untouched —from the wildly unbalanced 2024 hydrocarbon agreement with Ankara, to the rampant politicisation of Somalia's security architecture, and the monopolisation of foreign aid by Mogadishu. Long gone are any pretences of elite-negotiated compromise or a balancing act between the major clan families, enshrined within the so-called '4.5 system' – all set aside in the name of a new constitution that serves a narrow clique of Damul Jadiid politicians in Mogadishu, their predominantly Hawiye constituents, and a few ornamental office-holders from other clans.
The Council for the Future of Somalia (CFS) has decried the apparent completion of the Constitution in this manner, which runs contrary to all best practices. They maintain that the president and parliament's terms will expire in the coming weeks, regardless of the political theatre in Mogadishu. And as so many predicted, the stage is now, no doubt, set for the establishment of a parallel national authority, formalising Somalia's division between two constitutional regimes and two rival political camps.
No doubt aware of its unpopularity, the government has been readying for discontent on the streets of Mogadishu. Hundreds more clan militia loyal to Villa Somalia have been trained up and deployed to the capital, alongside the heavily politicised, Turkish-trained Gorgor and Haram'ad forces. In particular, the National Intelligence and Security Agency Director-General, Mahad Salad, has overseen the securitisation of the capital in recent months, attempting to ban political meetings and to prevent the opposition from massing forces in Mogadishu against the government's agenda. Whether former president Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and other key Hawiye opposition leaders will call their supporters onto the streets remains to be seen, but the incumbents are taking no chances.
Fortunately for HSM and his retinue, they have some stalwart foreign allies. Türkiye, in particular, is determined to protect its considerable investments in Somalia – almost all of which are located in areas inhabited by the president's Abgaal clan. Egypt has also recently signed a new military co-operation agreement with Somalia, in a transparent effort to box in Ethiopia. And Qatar, the principal patron of Muslim Brotherhood movements around the globe, remains staunchly behind its Damul Jadiid clients in Mogadishu.
The only way to avoid the crisis deepening further is a return to the 2012 Provisional Constitution as a point of departure and a timely, credible, widely accepted electoral process. But with all eyes on the ballooning war in the Middle East and spiralling oil prices, HSM has been handed a deus ex machina and a temporary political cover. The president and his allies are now convinced that with the "completion" of the new Constitution, any pretence of talks can be abandoned and the opposition bulldozed into acquiescence or irrelevance.
The African Union Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government specifically decries the "manipulation of democratic processes to tamper with constitutions and effecting amendments to electoral laws within a short span before the elections and without the consent of the majority of political actors and in violation of the stipulated national democratic principles, rules and procedures for constitutional amendment."
It would be hard to find a better description of what HSM and his cronies have just achieved, but the African Union – where Somalia currently sits on the Peace and Security Council and Peer Review Mechanism – is unlikely to take action. Sadly, it may not need to: the annals of history are littered with presidents, prime ministers, and despots attempting to rewrite a constitution to their advantage. More often than not, they succeed in consolidating authoritarian rule and entrenching patrimonial networks only in the short term, before political rot and determined opposition combine to overthrow them. HSM's constitutional victory is not only likely to prove Pyrrhic: it may well be the death warrant of the Third Somali Republic.
The Somali Wire Team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
Last October, Al-Shabaab Inqimasin (suicide assault infantry) overran a National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) base in Mogadishu, freeing several high-ranking jihadist detainees and destroying substantial quantities of intel. A highly choreographed attack, the Inqimasin had disguised their vehicle in official NISA daub, weaving easily through the heavily guarded checkpoints dotting the capital to reach the Godka Jilicow compound before blowing open the gates with a suicide car bomb. In the months since, Al-Shabaab's prodigious media arm-- Al-Kataib Media Foundation-- has drip-fed images and videos drawn from the Godka Jilicow attack, revelling in their infiltration of Mogadishu as well as the dark history of the prison itself. And in a chilling propaganda video broadcast at Eid al-Fitr last week, it was revealed that among the Inqimasin's number was none other than the son of Al-Shabaab's spokesperson Ali Mohamed Rage, better known as Ali Dheere.
In early 1987, the commander of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), John Garang, is reported to have issued a radio order, instructing his field officers to gather children to be dispatched to Ethiopia for military training. Garang's command conveyed the rebels' institutionalisation of a well-established practice of child soldiering; a dynamic that has been reproduced by virtually every major armed actor in Sudan-- and later South Sudan-- since independence. Today, as war has continued to ravage and metastasise across Sudan, few communities and children have been left untouched by the ruinous violence.
The Rahanweyne Resistance Army (RRA) did not emerge from a shir (conference) in October 1995 to defend a government, nor to overthrow it. Rather, the militia —whose name was even explicit in its defence of a unified Digil-Mirifle identity —arose from the ruin of Bay and Bakool in the years prior, and decades of structural inequalities.
War has been averted in Tigray-- for now. In early February, tens of thousands of Ethiopian federal soldiers and heavy artillery streamed northwards, readying themselves on the edges of the northernmost region for seemingly imminent conflict.
The battle for South West—and Somalia's political future—continues apace. With the brittle alliance between South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen and President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud having broken down spectacularly, the federal government is pouring in arms and forces to oust the Digil-Mirifle leader. Staring down the barrel of the formal opposition holding three Federal Member States and, with it, greater territory, population, and clan, Villa Somalia is looking to exploit intra-Digil-Mirifle grievances—and convince Addis—to keep its monopolistic electoral agenda alive. But this morning, Laftagareen announced a 9-member electoral committee to hastily steer his re-election, bringing the formal bifurcation of the Somali state ever closer.
The history of the contemporary Horn of Africa is littered with abandoned and abrogated peace agreements-- as well as a handful of successes. A petri dish (or Pandora's box) of issues related to sovereignty, inter- and intra-state conflict, and the nature of the state itself, the region has also been a laboratory for numerous forms of peacemaking and dealmaking. Yet in such a fractured regional order, 'peace' and 'conflict' should not be considered binaries, but rather as part of a sliding scale, where civilians may be targeted during the active fighting in South Sudan or suffer as part of a 'negative peace' in Tigray. Today, with predatory peace in South Sudan, Sudan, and perhaps now Tigray, having given way to renewed violence on a broad scale, what is the nature and future of peacemaking in the Horn of Africa?
The worm, it seems, has finally turned. After years serving as a prop for President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's monocratic aspirations, Abdiaziz Laftagareen, the leader of South West State, has clapped back against Villa Somalia, accusing the federal government of – among other things - dividing the country, monopolising public resources, colluding with Al-Shabaab, and leading Somalia back into state failure.
Six general elections in Ethiopia have been held since the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) implemented its ethnic-federal system in 1995. Each has delivered victory to the incumbent government of the day — including, most recently, the deeply discredited 2021 polls held in the shadow of the Tigray war. Once again, with Ethiopia's 7th elections — scheduled for 1 June 2026 — fast approaching, few anticipate anything other than a coronation in a country mired in raging insurgencies, state contraction, and the threat of broader inter-state conflict.
Last April, General Sheegow Ahmed Ali-- once the highest-ranking military officer hailing from the Somali Bantu-- died in ignominy in a Mogadishu hospital. A senior commander who had previously spearheaded operations in south-central Somalia, Sheegow had been summarily sentenced to 10 years in prison in 2023 for operating a militia in the capital. His death-- mourned widely and protested in Mogadishu and Beledweyne-- returned the spotlight to the pernicious issues of discrimination in the Somali National Army (SNA).