Somalia: The Cost of Not Learning
Today’s editorial in The Somali Wire is written by Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame, a prominent Somali political figure and former senior government official. The views expressed in this piece are his own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Somali Wire. We publish this contribution to provide our readers with insight into the arguments advanced by key protagonists in Somalia's ongoing public dispute and to encourage informed debate on issues shaping its political future.
Every four years, Somalia approaches a familiar crossroads. An election nears, deadlines tighten, mandates expire, tensions rise, and once again the nation waits for crisis to decide what leadership could have resolved through foresight and compromise.
Repeated crises demand reflection. Nations that fail to learn from experience risk institutional stagnation — or worse, regression. The question, therefore, is unavoidable: are we a nation unwilling to learn, or are we trapped in a structural cycle we refuse to confront? Some argue that the problem lies in institutional design — in federalism, clan-based power-sharing, parliamentary democracy, or even the holding of elections every four years. Yet repetition signals structure, and structure reveals character.
Somalia's Provisional Constitution clearly articulates separation of powers, checks and balances, judicial independence, federal balance, accountability, and fundamental rights. On paper, it reflects serious democratic ambition. The recurring instability is therefore not the product of constitutional absence or flawed drafting. Rather, it is the consequence of constitutional indiscipline — a persistent failure to internalise the limits that democratic governance requires.
The federal structure, negotiated power-sharing, parliamentary system, and periodic elections are not accidental arrangements. They are principles of a political settlement that emerged from conflict and compromise. They form the social contract underpinning peace and state-building. To dismiss them casually is to misunderstand the foundations of Somalia's fragile stability. Reform that sidelines key stakeholders or constitutional change pursued without broad political buy-in risks weakening legitimacy rather than strengthening it. Even well-intentioned reforms must be anchored in consensus, institutional readiness, and legal clarity. Systems do not repeatedly falter in identical ways unless those operating them fail to internalise their constraints.
The most corrosive feature of Somalia's electoral cycle is not disagreement — disagreement is intrinsic to democracy. The danger lies instead in a winner-takes-all political culture that has taken root. Electoral victory is often interpreted as license for consolidation rather than obligation to coordinate. As mandates approach expiration without early consensus, electoral rules are contested at the final hour; dialogue is postponed until pressure becomes unbearable; international mediation reappears as a substitute for domestic political maturity. Consequently, crisis becomes the method of decision-making.
In fragile states, institutions remain in consolidation and depend heavily on the moral discipline of those entrusted to lead them. Where institutional culture is weak, personal character becomes structural. When character is weak, institutions bend; when character is strong, institutions mature. Constitutional democracy is not self-executing. Separation of powers is protection, not obstruction; checks and balances are safeguards, not hostility; accountability is responsibility, not humiliation; and federal balance is negotiated unity, not fragmentation. Yet no clause can enforce humility, and no amendment can manufacture integrity. The discipline democracy requires must be cultivated within leadership itself.
Federalism demands tolerance of shared authority; parliamentary democracy requires negotiation and compromise; power-sharing requires patience and inclusion. When politics is approached as domination rather than stewardship, no constitutional architecture can compensate for the deficit in restraint. Thus, the recurring crisis is not technical — it is behavioral.
Somalia therefore requires a different caliber of leadership — not merely tacticians of political survival, but stewards of constitutional order.
The country requires leaders who treat power as a means to build institutions, strengthen the rule of law, deepen accountability, and entrench democratic norms. Leadership must prioritise meritocracy over loyalty, fairness over nepotism, transparency over corruption, and consensus over unilateralism. This is not abstract idealism; it is the precondition for stability.
Such leadership must also embody discipline and competence simultaneously. It requires character strong enough to restrain ego when power tempts excess; competence sufficient to manage the complexity of local politics and geopolitical pressures; clarity to articulate national direction beyond immediate electoral cycles; conviction anchored in principle rather than expediency; confidence without arrogance; capacity to build consensus across regions and political divides; moral integrity that withstands pressure; and honesty that earns public trust through consistency. In transitional democracies, energy and technical skill without character breed manipulation, while character without competence breeds paralysis. Somalia requires both.
At the center of recurring crises lies a fundamental question: is power viewed as survival or stewardship? If power is survival, every election becomes a threat. If power is stewardship, every election becomes a responsibility. Constitutional democracy ultimately requires leaders willing to lose power constitutionally — not merely exercise it legally.
The search for such leadership cannot be left to political elites alone, nor outsourced to foreign mediators. Elites often operate under short-term survival calculations, while foreign actors pursue strategic interests. Neither can substitute for a sustained national commitment to constitutional discipline.
Somalia's business community, religious scholars, civil society leaders, youth movements, and professional associations must therefore become active participants in shaping leadership standards. They cannot remain spectators in decisions concerning the nation's destiny. They must demand integrity, resist unilateralism, and defend constitutional norms. Without such collective vigilance, the country risks descending into repeated instability, deepening division, and permanent uncertainty. The Constitution provides the structure; however, character will determine whether it stands. The crossroads will return, as it always does. The decisive question is whether Somalia will continue to meet it with brinkmanship — or finally with political maturity.
The cost of not learning is not merely another electoral dispute. It is the erosion of trust in the very idea of constitutional governance.
Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame is a member of the Somali Federal Parliament, an opposition leader, the chairman of the Wadajir Party, and a presidential candidate in the forthcoming elections of 2026.
We would like to extend an invitation to others who may wish to contribute to The Somali Wire in the future. We appreciate insightful perspectives on topics concerning Somalia crafted as editorials. Please contact us for more information if interested.
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
On Tuesday, 14 April, the four-year term of Somalia's federal parliament ended, or rather, it didn't. Villa Somalia's (un)constitutional coup of a year-long term extension for the parliament and president in March remains in effect, leaving the institution in a kind of lingering zombie statehood. It is perhaps a fitting denouement for the 11th parliament, whose degeneration has been so thorough that its formal expiration means little in practice.
As global energy markets reel from the partial shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz and war insurance premiums skyrocket by nearly 4,000%, an unlikely maritime security provider is emerging as a critical stabiliser in one of the world's most vital shipping corridors. The Somaliland Coast Guard, operating from the port city of Berbera, has quietly begun providing maritime escort services, seeking to reduce shipping insurance costs—and consequently, the price of commodities and energy for consumers across the Horn of Africa and beyond.
Over the weekend, a flurry of viral posts on X (formerly Twitter) highly critical of Türkiye by the Ugandan army chief risked tipping the three-way relations between Somalia, Türkiye, and Uganda into a new tailspin. General Muhoozi - the son of Ugandan President Yoweri K. Museveni and the Chief of the Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UPDF) - accused Türkiye of disrespect, threatened to pull troops out of Somalia, and further demanded USD 1 billion in compensation from Ankara. Although the posts were deleted on Sunday, the storm the comments generated has not died down.
The 19th-century Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky wrote in his novel, The Brothers Karamazov: “Above all, do not lie to yourself. A man who lies to himself and listens to his own lie comes to a point where he does not discern any truth either in himself or anywhere around him.” In Somalia today, we are suffering because our head of state has lied to himself so much so, that Dostoevsky had alluded to, he has reached a point where he does not discern any truth either in himself or anywhere around him. However, before we delve into the nature or purpose of the lie and its grave national, regional, and international consequences, a bit of history is warranted on Somalia as a nation-state.
On Monday, a politician widely regarded as Ankara’s primary proxy in Somalia was inaugurated as a Member of Parliament (MP) under circumstances that Somali citizens and political observers are denouncing as a brazen institutional theft. This unprecedented case of electoral misconduct occurs in the twilight of the current parliament’s mandate, signaling a deep-seated crisis in legislative integrity.
In the 17th century, the Ottoman polymath Kâtip Çelebi penned 'The Gift to the Great on Naval Campaigns', a great tome that analysed the history of Ottoman naval warfare at a moment when Constantinople sought to reclaim maritime supremacy over European powers.
Villa Somalia has prevailed in Baidoa. After weeks of ratcheting tensions, South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen proved a paper tiger this morning, unable to resist the massed forces backed by Mogadishu. After several hours of fighting, Somali National Army (SNA) forces and allied Rahanweyne militias now control most of Baidoa and, thus, the future of South West. In turn, Laftagareen is believed to have retreated to the protection of the Ethiopian military at Baidoa's airport, with the bilateral forces having avoided the conflict today.
Last October, Al-Shabaab Inqimasin (suicide assault infantry) overran a National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) base in Mogadishu, freeing several high-ranking jihadist detainees and destroying substantial quantities of intel. A highly choreographed attack, the Inqimasin had disguised their vehicle in official NISA daub, weaving easily through the heavily guarded checkpoints dotting the capital to reach the Godka Jilicow compound before blowing open the gates with a suicide car bomb. In the months since, Al-Shabaab's prodigious media arm-- Al-Kataib Media Foundation-- has drip-fed images and videos drawn from the Godka Jilicow attack, revelling in their infiltration of Mogadishu as well as the dark history of the prison itself. And in a chilling propaganda video broadcast at Eid al-Fitr last week, it was revealed that among the Inqimasin's number was none other than the son of Al-Shabaab's spokesperson Ali Mohamed Rage, better known as Ali Dheere.
The Rahanweyne Resistance Army (RRA) did not emerge from a shir (conference) in October 1995 to defend a government, nor to overthrow it. Rather, the militia —whose name was even explicit in its defence of a unified Digil-Mirifle identity —arose from the ruin of Bay and Bakool in the years prior, and decades of structural inequalities.