Somalia: The Cost of Not Learning
Today’s editorial in The Somali Wire is written by Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame, a prominent Somali political figure and former senior government official. The views expressed in this piece are his own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Somali Wire. We publish this contribution to provide our readers with insight into the arguments advanced by key protagonists in Somalia's ongoing public dispute and to encourage informed debate on issues shaping its political future.
Every four years, Somalia approaches a familiar crossroads. An election nears, deadlines tighten, mandates expire, tensions rise, and once again the nation waits for crisis to decide what leadership could have resolved through foresight and compromise.
Repeated crises demand reflection. Nations that fail to learn from experience risk institutional stagnation — or worse, regression. The question, therefore, is unavoidable: are we a nation unwilling to learn, or are we trapped in a structural cycle we refuse to confront? Some argue that the problem lies in institutional design — in federalism, clan-based power-sharing, parliamentary democracy, or even the holding of elections every four years. Yet repetition signals structure, and structure reveals character.
Somalia's Provisional Constitution clearly articulates separation of powers, checks and balances, judicial independence, federal balance, accountability, and fundamental rights. On paper, it reflects serious democratic ambition. The recurring instability is therefore not the product of constitutional absence or flawed drafting. Rather, it is the consequence of constitutional indiscipline — a persistent failure to internalise the limits that democratic governance requires.
The federal structure, negotiated power-sharing, parliamentary system, and periodic elections are not accidental arrangements. They are principles of a political settlement that emerged from conflict and compromise. They form the social contract underpinning peace and state-building. To dismiss them casually is to misunderstand the foundations of Somalia's fragile stability. Reform that sidelines key stakeholders or constitutional change pursued without broad political buy-in risks weakening legitimacy rather than strengthening it. Even well-intentioned reforms must be anchored in consensus, institutional readiness, and legal clarity. Systems do not repeatedly falter in identical ways unless those operating them fail to internalise their constraints.
The most corrosive feature of Somalia's electoral cycle is not disagreement — disagreement is intrinsic to democracy. The danger lies instead in a winner-takes-all political culture that has taken root. Electoral victory is often interpreted as license for consolidation rather than obligation to coordinate. As mandates approach expiration without early consensus, electoral rules are contested at the final hour; dialogue is postponed until pressure becomes unbearable; international mediation reappears as a substitute for domestic political maturity. Consequently, crisis becomes the method of decision-making.
In fragile states, institutions remain in consolidation and depend heavily on the moral discipline of those entrusted to lead them. Where institutional culture is weak, personal character becomes structural. When character is weak, institutions bend; when character is strong, institutions mature. Constitutional democracy is not self-executing. Separation of powers is protection, not obstruction; checks and balances are safeguards, not hostility; accountability is responsibility, not humiliation; and federal balance is negotiated unity, not fragmentation. Yet no clause can enforce humility, and no amendment can manufacture integrity. The discipline democracy requires must be cultivated within leadership itself.
Federalism demands tolerance of shared authority; parliamentary democracy requires negotiation and compromise; power-sharing requires patience and inclusion. When politics is approached as domination rather than stewardship, no constitutional architecture can compensate for the deficit in restraint. Thus, the recurring crisis is not technical — it is behavioral.
Somalia therefore requires a different caliber of leadership — not merely tacticians of political survival, but stewards of constitutional order.
The country requires leaders who treat power as a means to build institutions, strengthen the rule of law, deepen accountability, and entrench democratic norms. Leadership must prioritise meritocracy over loyalty, fairness over nepotism, transparency over corruption, and consensus over unilateralism. This is not abstract idealism; it is the precondition for stability.
Such leadership must also embody discipline and competence simultaneously. It requires character strong enough to restrain ego when power tempts excess; competence sufficient to manage the complexity of local politics and geopolitical pressures; clarity to articulate national direction beyond immediate electoral cycles; conviction anchored in principle rather than expediency; confidence without arrogance; capacity to build consensus across regions and political divides; moral integrity that withstands pressure; and honesty that earns public trust through consistency. In transitional democracies, energy and technical skill without character breed manipulation, while character without competence breeds paralysis. Somalia requires both.
At the center of recurring crises lies a fundamental question: is power viewed as survival or stewardship? If power is survival, every election becomes a threat. If power is stewardship, every election becomes a responsibility. Constitutional democracy ultimately requires leaders willing to lose power constitutionally — not merely exercise it legally.
The search for such leadership cannot be left to political elites alone, nor outsourced to foreign mediators. Elites often operate under short-term survival calculations, while foreign actors pursue strategic interests. Neither can substitute for a sustained national commitment to constitutional discipline.
Somalia's business community, religious scholars, civil society leaders, youth movements, and professional associations must therefore become active participants in shaping leadership standards. They cannot remain spectators in decisions concerning the nation's destiny. They must demand integrity, resist unilateralism, and defend constitutional norms. Without such collective vigilance, the country risks descending into repeated instability, deepening division, and permanent uncertainty. The Constitution provides the structure; however, character will determine whether it stands. The crossroads will return, as it always does. The decisive question is whether Somalia will continue to meet it with brinkmanship — or finally with political maturity.
The cost of not learning is not merely another electoral dispute. It is the erosion of trust in the very idea of constitutional governance.
Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame is a member of the Somali Federal Parliament, an opposition leader, the chairman of the Wadajir Party, and a presidential candidate in the forthcoming elections of 2026.
We would like to extend an invitation to others who may wish to contribute to The Somali Wire in the future. We appreciate insightful perspectives on topics concerning Somalia crafted as editorials. Please contact us for more information if interested.
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
Somalia’s opposition - frustrated by months of stagnant dialogue - has for the first time proposed a transitional mechanism to break the country's protracted political deadlock. In an open letter addressed to a crucial extraordinary summit of African Troop and Police Contributing Countries (TPCCs) which opened on Wednesday in Kampala, the Somali Future Council (SFC) said that a new transitional governance arrangement was vital and necessary and is hoping the initiative will gain traction among regional actors who have boots on the ground and share a vested interest in a durable political settlement.
In a significant symbolic blow to Somali unionism, Fahiima Yusuf Quuje - a prominent Dhulbahante activist from the Jama Siyaad sub-clan who was instrumental in mobilising grassroots support for the armed insurrection in Laas Anood - late last week declared she was repudiating Somali unionism and the ‘Greater Somalia’ ideology, tendering her resignation from her regional assembly seat in the fledgling, Mogadishu-backed Northeastern State of Somalia (NES) and would be returning to Somaliland. A day after the announcement, Quuje landed at Egal International Airport in Hargeisa, where she was greeted by high-ranking dignitaries, garlanded in the Somaliland flag, and serenaded with patriotic anthems.
Today marks exactly two months since Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) unveiled his unilateral one-year term extension. While it is too early to draw definitive conclusions, HSM has evidently survived, rebounded, and consolidated power in ways that defy earlier predictions. A leader whom many had been wont to dismiss as too tarnished to retain executive power beyond May 2026 remains firmly in the saddle, holding the political initiative and dictating terms. His opponents, meanwhile, are in deep disarray. Their cohesion is fracturing, they lack a coherent, unified strategy, and they are locked in a dialogue of attrition designed to wear down their will and force their capitulation.
The Somaliland–Ethiopia Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was hailed as a historic breakthrough. In reality, it was a strategic gamble built on contradictions—and its apparent failure may prove to be a blessing in disguise for Somaliland and Ethiopia.
For the first time in over six decades, Somalia has overhauled its foundational criminal law - the 1962 Law No. 5. Now awaiting parliamentary and presidential approval, the Draft Somali Penal Code (SPC) nonetheless struggles with multiple hurdles and will likely face significant objection, not least, from Somalia’s Western partners and liberal-minded younger generation of Somalis disappointed with the new text’s failure to break away from its historical illiberal roots.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has published a new Draft Somalia Penal Code (SPC) - marking its first comprehensive legal overhaul in 64 years. The 136-page draft was first submitted to Parliament in January 2026 and underwent its first reading but the process of endorsing it became entangled with the escalating electoral and constitutional dispute, forcing the government to shelve it. The changes aim to update the 1962 Law No. 5 Penal Code and codify Islamic criminal law (uqubat). If endorsed by parliament and approved by the President, they will formally embed the three pillars of the Sharia punitive framework into the statute - fixed punishments (hudud), retributive justice (qisas), and statutory judicial discretion (ta'zir).
Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro’s trip to Israel in June (from 14-17) was far more than symbolism. Not only was it a calculated strategic diplomatic play, and a chance for Somaliland to appear on the world stage, but also an opportunity for Somaliland to present itself as a fully-functional state, able to conduct foreign relations and cut bilateral deals. Irro, a seasoned former diplomat, navigated the intricate demands of state protocol with remarkable ease - cutting an immaculate, regal figure in his navy-blue suit. Accorded full head-of-state honours, he laid a wreath at the Theodore Herzl mausoleum, engaged in high-level talks with President Isaac Herzog and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, opened the new Somaliland embassy in Jerusalem and convened meetings with Knesset members, senior officials, and business leaders. For Israel, hosting President Abdirahman Irro in Jerusalem functioned to signal its strong commitment to deepening strategic ties while also countering perceptions of waning diplomatic momentum.
Never interrupt your enemy when they are making a mistake. Napoleon Bonaparte’s classic rule of combat seems to be the guiding doctrine behind Al-Shabaab’s sudden, uncharacteristic radio silence as Mogadishu’s political elite tear themselves apart. As the ‘government-in-waiting’, one would have assumed the militants would take full advantage of its adversaries’ internal divisions, maximising the propaganda opportunities this offers, and campaign for their own cause. Typically quick to weaponise any intra-Somali division, the militant group's decision to sit out the latest intra-Somali fracturing is intriguing. By withholding its usual blitz of propaganda, the group is playing a longer, quieter game - waiting for the federal house to implode further before stepping in.
While much international attention is on Mogadishu – understandably so - another electoral crisis is brewing in the regional state of Galmudug. Historically unstable, prone to Al-Shabaab violence and destabilisation and wracked by chronic inter-clan frictions and periodic armed hostilities, the looming vote appears likely to aggravate the situation and foment more divisions.