Issue No. 929

Published 23 Feb

Halane and Hunger: Somalia's Two Worlds

Published on 23 Feb 18:25 min

Halane and Hunger: Somalia's Two Worlds

It remains somewhat of a cliché to talk of the 'two worlds' of Somalia, the elite in Mogadishu and those outside the capital's green zone, i.e. most of the population. But perhaps nothing encapsulates the genuine divide more than the issue of the climate crisis. While days of fraught talks in AC-cooled rooms between the Council for the Future of Somalia (CFS) and Villa Somalia in the Somali capital heralded no progress, the impact of the latest punishing drought continues to wreak havoc across the country.

Successive failed rainy seasons last year, coupled with recurrent drought, have pushed Somalia back into extreme crisis, with substantial crop and pasture losses across the country. Puntland is particularly suffering, with reports of widespread livestock losses and drying up of water sources. By early 2026, a study by the Food and Agriculture Organisation estimated that 70–85% of cropland in key farming areas was facing severe drought, forcing an increasing reliance on diminishing international aid. Consequently, water prices have surged, with 200-litre barrels fetching USD 12–15 in some areas due to scarcity, while food costs are similarly rising as harvests come in well below anticipated yields. In turn, the numbers are staggering; 4.6 million Somalis are facing crisis levels of acute food insecurity or worse, and of these, there are nearly 1 million facing emergency levels.

All the more concerning, then, that the World Food Programme (WFP) on Friday warned that it might have to cease operations without emergency cash injections. The largest humanitarian agency operating in the country has already been forced to drastically slash its assistance from supporting 2.2 million people to just 600,000. WFP has compared the situation to the 2022 crisis, when another series of failed rainy seasons left Somalia teetering on the brink of famine; it was only averted by an influx of international assistance.

The nexus of climate-conflict has been well-understood for some time, with Somalia's climatic shocks accentuating everything from displacing impoverished rural communities off their land into the peri-urban displacement camps of Baidoa and Mogadishu to furthering inter-clan conflict. As in previous years, diminishing resources over arable land and water are heaping fresh pressure on strained clan relations across much of the country. And the drought today will go well beyond the confines of a single rainy season, likely to further decimate Somalia's beleaguered pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities. Between September and December alone, an estimated 120,000 people were displaced due to climatic shocks, contributing to the almost 3 million IDPs in the country and the rural-urban migration.

As ever, it is the most disenfranchised in Somalia that bear the brunt of the climate crisis, particularly the minority clans and the Somali Bantu in south-central Somalia. Having been violently displaced from their lands in the 1990s by rampaging clan militias, these communities have long comprised the peri-urban underclasses on the edges of major cities and been weaponised as 'humanitarian bait' in the accessible IDP camps. As such, they form a disenchanted, peripheral community in which Al-Shabaab takes ready advantage. And these communities continue to disproportionately suffer from the climate crisis, while reports of gatekeepers—those controlling the IDP camps—appropriating cash or aid are still concerningly commonplace.

It is alarming that the WFP may have to cease operations, with no other international partner likely able or willing step into the gap. But it is also worth further acknowledging the limitations and patterns of aid and development distributed across Somalia. Today, some of the most acutely drought-impacted areas in south-central Somalia fall under the control of Al-Shabaab, yet most international partners are unable or unwilling to work under the conditions imposed by the jihadist group. Qatar Charity—the humanitarian arm of the Qatari state—is one of the few charities that provides assistance to areas under Al-Shabaab control, having also been dogged by allegations of supporting various Islamist militant movements over the years.

Despite the ubiquitous reports of federal officials meeting with humanitarians every week and requesting greater support, it is difficult to argue that developmental or humanitarian programming has ever been a priority for this administration. The Environment Ministry and the Somali Disaster Management Agency (SoDMA)—two principal conduits of aid delivery and climate adaptation in Somalia—have a well-earned reputation for graft and rampant politicisation. For instance, SoDMA has led the charge in supporting the highly controversial creation of the North-Eastern State, while its head, Mahamoud Moallim, has been repeatedly accused of withholding development aid from administrations that have refused to comply with the government's centralising political ambitions.

Best summing up the government's externalisation of humanitarian aid and its lackadaisical approach, though, was the sudden demolition of a WFP warehouse containing 76 metric tonnes of food aid in early January. Not only did it bulldoze poor relations with Washington, but vast quantities of vital aid to vulnerable Somalis were also lost as part of the murky Turkish-backed expansion project of Mogadishu Port. The Somali government was eventually forced to back down, and the US has now resumed support for WFP operations, though for how long remains to be seen.

Still, the sorry tale sums up other, broader issues. Most prominent is the rapid reduction of humanitarian and development programming, most notably with the Trump administration's gutting of USAID last year. The heyday of billions of dollars of development assistance pouring into Somalia is over, and the influx of Turkish and Qatari money is a radically different proposition altogether. Tanks, jets, and hydrocarbon equipment are no substitute for a nutritional baby formula. And it is not just Somalia competing for the diminished aid budgets, but humanitarian emergencies across the Horn of Africa are eyewatering as well, with Sudan, South Sudan, and Ethiopia all mired in huge crises driven by conflict and climate. And yet at the same time, reports continue to circulate of Mogadishu pursuing a deal to obtain Pakistani fighter jets it cannot afford and, arguably, has no real need for, all while continuing to beseech foreign diplomats for more international assistance to feed its own people. In the meantime, millions of Somalis will be forced to reckon with yet another brutal bout of drought and hunger.

The Somali Wire Team

 

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