The Unfinished War for Lower Shabelle
Earlier this week, Defence Minister Ahmed Moalim Fiqi, Interior Minister Ali Yusuf Hosh, and the new Somali National Army (SNA) Commander Brigadier General Ibrahim Mohamed Mohamud toured the 'liberated' Sabiid and Aanoole districts of Lower Shabelle. Inspecting a handful of reconstructed buildings post-Operation Silent Storm last year and overseeing the distribution of humanitarian aid, federal officials reiterated the government's stabilisation plans to combine security with long-term development.
But there is another story at play; the persistent envelopment of the multi-clan Lower Shabelle —administratively part of South West State —into the Hawiye-dominated Mogadishu. And the presence of Fiqi — a Hawiye/Habar Gidir defence minister and former Islamic Courts Union leader — as the Somali National Army (SNA) clears coastal terrain for prospective Turkish oil drilling reflects a stabilisation dilemma far deeper than the reconstruction of a few buildings.
Sabiid, Aanole, and Awdheegle are oft-referred to as the three arterial 'bridge towns' of Lower Shabelle, jutting up against the River Shabelle below Mogadishu. Over the years, Al-Shabaab and the SNA have wrestled for control over them, with the jihadists ensconced in the banana plantations on the northern side of the river and rural areas post-2019 Operation Badbaadho that took the towns for the government. But in March 2025, as part of their sweeping Ramadan offensive, Al-Shabaab overran the three siloed Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) stationed along the river. Later that year, the Ugandan-led Operation Silent Storm, backed by Turkish air support, eventually retook the bridge towns, following gruelling weeks of fighting. It was the third such military adventure down the river, and with Al-Shabaab already increasing its numbers near Mogadishu, the strategic gains were dubious.
Much of the three bridge towns were heavily damaged in the fighting, with Awdheegle particularly suffering after Al-Shabaab dug in. Still, many of those displaced from the intense clashes along the bridge towns have gradually returned in recent weeks, upping sticks from their crowded camps near Afgooye and Mogadishu. Last December, Fiqi and Hosh visited the bridge towns again, inaugurating the Turkish rebuilt bridges in Aanole and Sabiid after the jihadists downed them after withdrawing. Houses, wells, schools, farms, and more besides, though, remain in severe disrepair. And the appetite amongst a retrenching international community towards funding stabilisation and reconstruction efforts has diminished, not least because much of this territory has repeatedly fallen back into Al-Shabaab's hands. Furthermore, while federal officials have claimed that stabilisation and reconstruction are at the forefront of their agenda, there is little coherence about their planning. Instead, like much of the government's agenda, this week's visit appeared primarily performative — an effort to project conciliatory credentials to international partners.
More fundamentally, though, the government's institutional architecture in these 'liberated' towns remains wafer-thin, with district commissioners parachuted in with limited local consultation. Taxation, too, remains limited or opaque at best, and the presence of courts is distant-- crucial for arbitrating the combustible issue of land disputes in Lower Shabelle. Controlling the Afgooye corridor, the principal Mogadishu food artery, is a key tactical priority for both the government and Al-Shabaab, with both intent on securing the lucrative taxation from the fertile Shabelle riverine belt, as well as those ruling on land claims as part of the capital's southward urban sprawl. The jihadists may cede the towns of Sabiid and others under pressure, but command over these rural areas and main supply routes is another matter altogether.
But to genuinely 'stabilise' Lower Shabelle, a reckoning with the region's historic diversity is required—and a shift away from Mogadishu treating it merely as an extension of the capital for security purposes. The principal conflict axis in Lower Shabelle lies between the 'indigenous' clans known as the asal and the 'newcomers' referred to as the farac. The Biyomaal (Dir) and Wa'daan (Hawiye) regard themselves as asal, grounding their claims in a 1907 agreement with the Italian colonial administration that formalised banana plantation concessions in the area. But in the decade after independence, Siyaad Barre's military regime nationalised the fertile plantations and land, distributing many of these productive farms to the capital's elite.
In the 1990s, warlords from central Somalia — particularly Hawiye/Habar Gidir factions — occupied the territory, razing non-Hawiye settlements and displacing already marginalised communities. And such grievances were further accentuated from 1998 onwards, when the budding Islamic Courts Union assumed control of much of Lower Shabelle, which, too, was considered a continuation of Habir Gidir's domination. The most-disenfranchised community in Somalia, the Somali Bantu also comprise a considerable proportion of the rural populations of Lower Shabelle, cultivating agricultural products such as rice and cassava. Yet few have access to land rights, and are routinely subjugated by the other, more powerful clans.
Nor has the state-building process of the 2010s alleviated these dynamics; rather, it has accentuated the polarisation that Al-Shabaab has repeatedly sought to exploit. In particular, the federal government's deployment of predominantly Hawiye SNA units —considered 'farac' —to Lower Shabelle has grated on the asal communities, a resentment that the jihadists have long exploited for their gains. Meanwhile, the Digil residents of Lower Shabelle similarly dislike the Hawiye sway over the region, but many within the community fear being lumped in with another marginalised group within the broader South West State. And as ever, money and arms flow from the affiliated business and political communities, accentuating the sporadic inter-clan clashes that are stoked by Al-Shabaab.
Unsurprisingly, the Digil-Mirifle political class-- already wary of both their demographic and political marginalisation-- distrusts the consolidation of Hawiye-dominated federal forces in Lower Shabelle, effectively bypassing state-level authority. And amid deep suspicion between the tentative allies of Abdiaziz Laftagareen's administration in Baidoa and those in Villa Somalia, reconfiguring the security forces and deploying the predominantly Digil-Mirifle 60th Brigade remain improbable. In turn, reconciliation remains intermittent, and the prospect of a cross-clan local defence force to secure the area has fallen by the wayside. And who needs reconciliation when there are Turkish drones to deploy?
With Sabiid, Anole, and Awdheegle held by the government, clearance operations in late 2025 and early 2026 have since sought to displace Al-Shabaab from coastal areas in Lower Shabelle. Though these operations are nominally within the remit of the UPDF —both bilaterally and as part of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) —it is apparent that the Turks are assuming increasing control. The rationale here, though, extends beyond simply limiting jihadist infiltration of Mogadishu or access to the coast-- both important strategic rationales.
Instead, Villa Somalia and its Turkish allies are attempting to dislodge Al-Shabaab as part of Ankara's interests in exploiting offshore oil and gas. With Turkish 3D seismic studies completed by the Oruc Reis research ship confirming substantial hydrocarbon deposits last year, Ankara has subsequently turbocharged its military and strategic investments in Somalia, including deploying F-16 jets and battle tanks in 2026. The Warsheekh air strip in Middle Shabelle remains their principal area of focus for the planned 'satellite' launchpad, but there are a handful of other areas scoped out, including in Lower Shabelle. All this, however, suggests a military and stabilisation agenda oriented toward securing strategic foreign assets rather than repairing the fractured political economy of Lower Shabelle itself.
Not all, however, are as giddy about Turkish investment as those in Villa Somalia. Earlier this month, a group of Sheekhaal clan elders from Jazeera and Gendershe conducted a press conference, cautioning the government and private companies from carrying out projects without consulting them, not least the construction of a port and possible oil drilling. Yet addressing the historic grievances between the Hawiye and marginalised clans around the capital has not been a priority for this administration, which has instead overseen the mass displacement of tens of thousands from disused public land.
Furthermore, though Turkish drones and air support have augmented clearance operations and inflicted significant casualties, Al-Shabaab maintains considerable numbers of fighters along and near this stretch of coastline. In a Ramadan message from the jihadist emir Abu Ubaideh, he explicitly called on his fighters to prepare for the targeting of foreign installations. Recent weeks, too, have seen Al-Shabaab steadily amplifying the number of fighters and assets in Lower and Middle Shabelle, with an expectation of an increase in attacks during the holy month. What form that takes, however, will have to be seen, and the series of spectacular attacks that swept central Somalia in 2025 may not be repeated. Certainly, though, reports indicate that Al-Shabaab has mobilised considerable forces, including suicide bombers and Jugta Culus-- heavy units, near Mogadishu.
For decades, Lower Shabelle has served as a microcosm of some of Somalia's most fraught issues, particularly land ownership and who benefits from the state. Until the government's stabilisation efforts confront these issues directly, each new military operation risks becoming simply one more cycle in the long militarisation of the Shabelle corridor.
The Somali Wire Team
