Issue No. 914

The Geopolitical Siege of Somaliland

The dizzying churn of the geopolitical fallout from Israel's recognition of Somaliland continues apace. As anticipated, this week, Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro is expected to travel to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, pledging a close alliance with Israel and a grand accession to the Abraham Accords, the Trump-backed normalisation of relations between Israel and Arab powers. Less conspicuous, however, are the simultaneous moves by the anti-Israel-Emirati axis against recognition of Somaliland, both across the Horn of Africa and emanating from Mogadishu. But while Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Egypt, China, Djibouti, and more besides all have vested interests in stalling any progress on Somaliland recognition, few of these relate directly to Hargeisa's claim. And thus, the northern Somali peninsula faces becoming another fulcrum upon which the volatile geopolitics of the broader region is turning.

Hargeisa was well aware of the probable blowback from Israel's unilateral recognition, with the state's broader reputation much-tarnished by its prosecution of war in Gaza, as well as the 'dry-run' of the fallout from Ethiopia's Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland in 2024, driven by Mogadishu. Few harboured any illusions that Israel's recognition was motivated by anything other than realpolitik, an attempt to lay claim to a military outpost on the world's most strategic waterway and counter, particularly, Turkish and Iranian interests. But several factors have accentuated the coordinated geopolitical opposition to recognition since 26 December, most prominently the flare-up in the Saudi-Emirati rift. Simmering tensions over the enduring conflict in Sudan, where Riyadh and Abu Dhabi maintain vested interests in the duelling forces, exploded into view in Yemen following the Emirati-backed advance of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) last month. 

And so, Riyadh, which had largely avoided Somalia's pernicious politics after Mogadishu sided with Qatar during the post-2017 blockade, has manoeuvred itself firmly into Villa Somalia's camp and is now deploying its not inconsiderable regional heft. At the crux of this appears to be two rapidly forming alliances: one dubbed the 'Islamic NATO' —though perhaps a bad moment to draw comparisons to that particular embattled alliance —of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye, and the second comprised of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Somalia. Somaliland, one of the long-standing bulwarks of Emirati interests and host to the UAE's prized jewel of Berbera, falls squarely on the other side of the schism. 

Last week, too, Mogadishu expelled the UAE from the capital in rather calamitous scenes, partially at the behest of Riyadh and Ankara, with the Ethiopian spy chief Redwan Hussein forced to intervene to facilitate the Emirates' exit. And so is Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud expected to travel to Riyadh in the coming days, with a raft of security and diplomatic agreements anticipated in turn. The Emirates, which Somaliland counts among its closest allies and enabled Israeli recognition, now appears to be on the back foot and calculating its next moves across the grand theatre of the Red Sea. Thus, Somaliland, which may have expected public support from the Emirates, is still battling to move the needle beyond Israel.

Closer to home, the inauguration of North Eastern State (NES) President Abdikhadir Ahmed Aw-Ali Firdhiye in Laas Aanood last week represented more than nationalist pomp and circumstance. Beyond the cast of domestic Somali politicians and a raft of cabinet ministers, the broader list of foreign attendees encapsulates the uphill challenges Somaliland faces. Among others, ambassadors from Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, China, Djibouti, and Sudan attended the inauguration, all countries —bar Beijing—that lie firmly within the broader anti-Emirati axis across the region. And all —bar Djibouti —are motivated by interests far beyond stifling the campaign for independence amongst Somalilanders.

Mogadishu's most prominent and closest ally, Ankara, is seeking to dismantle Somaliland to deny Israel a foothold on the Gulf of Aden. Just days before Firdhiye's inauguration, Ankara had deployed warships off Laas Qoray in the Gulf of Aden, with Turkish officers reportedly coming ashore to conduct site surveys for a possible naval base in the Warsangeli-majority area. The agreement for such a base is believed to have been hammered out between Villa Somalia and Ankara in the days immediately after Israel's recognition of Somaliland. The prospect of rival Turkish and Israeli military bases on the short stretch of the peninsula further escalates the possibility of a proxy or live conflict, with untold consequences for the broader region in turn. 

Inland, TURKSOM commander, General Sebahattin Kalkan, who oversees the sprawling military complex in Mogadishu responsible for training Gorgor forces, similarly attended Firdhiye's inauguration. Kalkan's presence —alongside a raft of senior security officials —is highly suggestive of a continued politicisation of the Somali National Army (SNA) and the probable extension of Gorgor training to Laas Aanood. The presence of Chinese officials at the inauguration was also linked to plans for a new SNA base in the area.

In the past 18 months, Beijing has become increasingly forthright in its backing of Villa Somalia — and in its opposition to Somaliland, due to Hargeisa's relationship with Taiwan. Chinese-backed infrastructure is now dotted throughout Laas Aanood, with fresh pledges as well for a military base in the vicinity. Finally, Sudan's position, represented by its military government, aligns with those of its Saudi and Egyptian patrons in support of Mogadishu and is chiefly motivated by the linkages between the Emirates and Somaliland.

More appears to be yet to come in Somaliland's west as well, with Villa Somalia planning to incite and amplify Gadabuursi discontent in conjunction with Djibouti. Throughout the inauguration of Firdhiye, multiple speakers and dignitaries, including the Kenyan MP Farah Moallim, urged for a similar formation of 'Awdal State' and even for federal troops to be deployed. Unlike Laas Aanood, there is no immediate prospect of the SNA being sent to Booraame, but Ismail Omar Guelleh's administration in Djibouti, hand in hand with Mogadishu, is set on exploiting cross-border clan linkages and grievances to further muddy the waters and dissuade others from joining Israeli recognition.

Meanwhile, Irro is expected to announce his government's accession to the Abraham Accords either tonight or tomorrow, joining a short list of Muslim-majority countries that have normalised relations with Tel Aviv. Having received senior Israeli officials in Hargeisa earlier this month, talks are continuing between the two administrations over diplomatic relations, commercial flights, and economic partnerships. But it is apparent to all that the most significant element of the pact concerns the security component, with Hargeisa believed to have offered Israel a military outpost in Berbera. Further, Irro's endorsement of the Abraham Accords may ultimately precipitate a visit by the Somaliland president to Washington, with Trump having made the diplomatic effort a priority in his first and second administrations. Nevertheless, international opprobium over American and Israeli disregard for international law may – for now at least - constrain the ceiling to which Somaliland can aspire in the face of such concerted geopolitical and regional pushback.

Just a couple of weeks following Israeli recognition, Somaliland's decades-long quest has quickly degenerated into the far larger struggle over the Red Sea's future, with ascendant Middle Powers grappling for supremacy. But whether Hargeisa can navigate the choppy waters and emerge as a strategic prize or geopolitical casualty-- for the time being-- depends less on its case for statehood than on how violently these competing axes collide.

The Somali Wire Team