Hargeisa and Mogadishu's Visa Feud Deepens
Relations between Mogadishu and Hargeisa continue to plumb fresh depths. Already grimly strained by the formalisation of Villa Somalia's proxy as North Eastern State (NES) in Laas Aanood, the continuing dispute over airspace and e-visa requirements has ratcheted up again in recent days. With both pronounced expressions of Somaliland's de facto sovereignty, these issues have repeatedly been the site of Mogadishu's political vandalism across successive administrations.
Since the abrupt launch of a new 'e-visa' system for Somalia on 1 September, Mogadishu and Hargeisa have traded public barbs over the onerous new requirements. Immediately rejected by Puntland as well, the e-visa announcement has already been mired in sleaze and political contestation. In particular, controversy continues to swirl around the cost of the e-visa — USD 64 — and reports that a company linked to President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's family will personally profit from the new system. Rather than easing the notorious chaos and corruption of Aden Adde airport, it has instead further complicated and accentuated the rupture between Mogadishu on one hand and Puntland and Somaliland on the other. Technology experts have also warned about the flaws in the data protection systems currently used to store sensitive personal information of those entering Somalia.
Further, the introduction of the e-visa has generated consternation amongst the many diaspora Somalis without a Somali passport, hardly an insignificant number considering the mass expulsions of people over decades of persistent insecurity. Still, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud defended the reforms in mid-September during a routine mosque sermon, stating that "a foreigner – or a Somali with a foreign passport – cannot enter Somalia without a visa." The charging of ethnic Somalis' visa fees has stuck in the craw for many. Furthermore, airwaves and social media have been filled with reports of others travelling to Puntland and Somaliland being denied boarding without a federal e-visa.
The Puntland administration is furious as well at the attempt to further monopolise yet another income stream, as part of the broader abrogation of the principles of fiscal federalism and resource-sharing that it is supposed to tie together the assorted Somali administrations. Last week, Puntland announced the development of its own distinct visa process, setting the price at USD 60 and insisting that the system has no administrative linkages to Mogadishu-- further distinguishing the divergences between the central and devolved government. In turn, there have also been multiple reports of ethnic Somalis and foreigners being charged twice for federal and Puntland visas, a highly expensive dilemma that now seems likely to be formalised. Some airlines, however, have chosen to avoid the situation altogether. Flydubai and Ethiopian Airlines have not required passengers travelling to Somaliland to abide by Mogadishu's visa system, allowing visitors to still apply for a Somaliland visa upon arrival.
Seemingly frustrated by Puntland and Somaliland's unwillingness to bend the knee, the next salvo from Mogadishu appears to be the implementation of an Electronic Travel Authorisation (ETA) system later this month —intended to regulate travel across Mogadishu, Hargeisa, Garowe, and Bosaaso. Naturally, it is only Mogadishu that the federal government can exercise actual control over, but according to reports, the ETA process will again require all passengers to have prior clearance before travelling to any of these international airports. There are concerns that the new ETA system could enable Villa Somalia to arbitrarily bar people from travelling to Hargeisa or strive to prevent a coalition of opposition politicians from coalescing in Garowe. But more immediately, it may be that Flydubai and Ethiopian Airlines —by no coincidence, government-owned carriers of Somaliland's two closest allies —have no choice but to comply with the new system.
Even if Hargeisa cannot prevent it, that does not mean, however, that Somaliland will accept these e-visas, as reiterated by the government on numerous occasions. And so, pre-empting the arrival of the ETA, following a meeting between senior Somaliland officials over the weekend, including the president and foreign minister, it has been announced that from today, 10 November, all aircraft transiting through Somaliland airspace will require pre-approval. What this might mean in practice is unclear, with the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) recognising the Somali Flight Information Region (FIR) as a single entity, but ceding any further ground on visas and airspace to Mogadishu evokes painful recent history for Hargeisa. Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro has urged all international bodies, including the UN and ICAO, to recognise the dangers posed by Somalia's interference in Somaliland's airspace.
As a more structured administration gradually emerged in Hargeisa in the 1990s, customs began to be formally collected at Berbera, and immigration posts were established as well, marking the first glimmers of what has become a symbolic cornerstone of Somaliland's expression of independence from Mogadishu. Such progress was rewarded rather brutally by the international community in the 2010s, however, as it endeavoured to artifically giddy up the state-building project in the south by recognising the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) as sovereign. As part of fitful talks that followed in the subsequent years, led by the UK and Turkiye, among others, airspace remained near the top of the unbalanced agenda, supposedly to offer a possible 'win' to both parties.
But having been granted recognition in 2012 — and the accompanying juridical instruments with it — Mogadishu has wielded de jure power as a bludgeon, gradually clawing back the negotiated 'special arrangements' with Somaliland, including over airspace. Following the election of Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo as the Somali president, Hargeisa grudgingly consented to the return of airspace control to Mogadishu in December 2017 by the ICAO. But in return, the promise of a share of overflight fees —the costs paid by foreign airlines for transiting Somali airspace —was reneged upon by Mogadishu, which has since pocketed millions of dollars. Nor did the first Air Traffic Control Board office, a joint supervisory body intended to maintain aviation neutrality, materialise in Hargeisa, with Villa Somalia preferring to sabotage the limited progress made over the years of negotiations. Ironically, it was the restoration of de jure sovereignty to Villa Somalia in 2012 that has proven to be catastrophic for the prospect of reunification, leaving the deeply unsatisfactory limbo that endures to this day.
Coming in the wake of the significant Puntland-Somaliland security-political cooperation agreement, a potent symbol of how former rival administrations can collaborate on issues such as counter-terrorism, such petty politics from Mogadishu are unsurprising but ultimately disappointing. Perhaps no one has phrased it better than the incumbent president himself in 2019, when Hassan Sheikh Mohamud stated that "It's a sad situation, the government uses the management of the airspace as a political weapon that can have a serious ramification on the political stability and the unity of the country."
The Somali Wire
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