Issue No. 958

Deni and the Tough Road Back to Mogadishu

Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority. 

Coming so late into an entirely transformed game, Deni faces a critical dilemma: can a regional heavyweight dismantle a deeply consolidated federal order, or has his prolonged absence cost him the leverage needed to alter Somalia’s political trajectory?

Deni has been quick to put his skills to use in recent weeks in Mogadishu and to demonstrate his utility to the Somali opposition. By leading the Somali Future Council alongside former President Sharif during the 12-14 May talks, he brought a specific kind of heavyweight leverage the opposition has desperately lacked: the raw political mass to withstand HSM’s consolidation of power. However, when those high-stakes negotiations - closely mediated by the US and UK - abruptly collapsed, insiders were quick to blame Deni's notorious inflexibility for the breakdown. Yet, from the opposition's perspective, that refusal to bend is precisely the point: acting as a ‘tough bargainer’ willing to torpedo a bad deal. The central question is no longer just about his candidacy, but whether his brand of ‘obstructionist’ heft can actually dismantle HSM's rewritten rules, or if it will simply grind the federal machinery to a halt

A Weakened Hand, A Surge in Insecurity

Sa’id Abdullahi Deni hoped to relaunch his campaign for the presidency from a position of relative strength. His ideal strategy relied on three pillars: achieving a decisive military victory over ISIS/Daesh and Al-Shabaab; securing a unified and stable domestic base in Puntland; and normalising relations with Mogadishu while securing robust foreign financial backing. However, severe domestic, national, and geopolitical headwinds are forcing Deni to navigate difficult terrain back home and deploy a significantly weaker political hand in Mogadishu.

Puntland's counterinsurgency efforts yielded early successes, but military progress is now stalled. ISIS is regrouping and beginning to mount attacks. More seriously, piracy is resurging. Taking advantage of the massive geopolitical turmoil in the Middle East, Somali pirate action groups have launched a fierce comeback. With international naval assets heavily diverted to combat Houthi forces in the Red Sea and manage escalating tensions in the Persian Gulf, the Somali Basin has been emptied of its primary deterrent.

Maritime monitors have tracked at least 17 piracy-related incidents in Somali waters already this year. The crisis exploded into a full-blown surge this past April, when five major incidents occurred in a single ten-day window. Sophisticated networks have resurrected the ‘mothership’ tactic, hijacking local dhows to launch long-range assaults deep into commercial shipping lanes. High-value targets like the oil tanker Honour 25 and the cargo ship Sward have been boarded and seized. Strikingly, these groups are operating out of new hubs like Gara’ad - a clear sign that piracy networks are decentralising and moving into areas where local government authority has completely broken down due to the political warfare between Garowe and Mogadishu.

The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) has rightly raised the threat level to ‘Substantial’; a move that will inevitably drive up maritime insurance premiums and force global shipping lines into longer, more expensive detours.

 The Reshuffle

On 31 March, Deni reshuffled his cabinet in a move linked to the twin goals of consolidating domestic support and positioning himself better to contest the national presidency. The reshuffle aims to accommodate perennial grievances of under-representation by the Warsangeli. The clan got four full cabinet posts – up from the previous two; four deputy/state ministers, and key civil service appointments. These concessions aim to strengthen Puntland’s power base and influence in Sanaag, limit the potential expansion of the FGS and Northeast State of Somalia (NES), and secure support for planned military operations against Al-Shabaab in the Golis Mountains and Sanaag.

Another major clan constituency - the Dhulbahante – also appears to have benefitted from the reshuffle: The Dhulbahante’s cabinet share was reduced from five to four ministers, but this was balanced by bringing in more influential leaders. The appointment of Deputy Minister Najiib Barkhad, a former Minister of Information of the NES, seeks to mollify regional opposition and counter Mogadishu’s influence in Laas Aanood.

Somaliland, Geopolitics

Puntland's relations with Somaliland - which gained diplomatic recognition from Israel in December 2025 - remain stable but face imminent strain. To build nationalist and unionist credibility among southern clans and political factions, Deni will likely be pressured to adopt a harder line against Hargeisa. This strategic shift is already visible: Deni recently removed a senior cabinet minister who was a vocal critic of Mogadishu and a staunch advocate for Puntland's autonomy, signaling a willingness to prioritise broader national ambitions over localised regional dynamics.

Still, Garowe would like to keep Somaliland on side – Deni’s appointment of a former Minister of Water and Energy, Dr. Arshe Mohamed Muse, new Chief of Staff would suggest as much. Arshe hails from the Osman Mohamud/Majerteen sub-clan. His appointment strengthens the president’s inner circle by broadening sub-clan representation in key leadership positions. Arshe is a brother-in-law of President Abdirahman Irro of Somaliland and a dual-national with a Finnish passport. He could serve as an important bridge between Deni and Somaliland, helping to manage strained bilateral relations, coordinating policy insecurity in the disputed Sool and Sanaag, and promoting a concerted response to perceived hostile policies by Mogadishu. 

On the geopolitical front, navigating foreign partnerships has grown increasingly complex. While bilateral ties with the UAE remain strong, regional instability from the Iran War and broader Middle Eastern turmoil introduces significant strategic uncertainty. In response, Deni initiated low-key, tentative talks with Turkiye in March 2026. This move represents a calculated effort to rebalance Puntland's foreign relations. It directly responds to Ankara's expanded influence and systemic consolidation in southern Somalia over the past two years.

 Uncertainty 

Somalia’s electoral calendar now remains even more uncertain as HSM begins a contested transition phase without an agreed national poll plan.

Deni is a formidable opposition leader and has a solid clan constituency but his fortunes will ultimately hinge on what type of elections are finally agreed. In a traditional 4.5 poll, his chances are good even though the Darood will likely split their vote between Deni and another strong Darood candidate – Abdi Farah Shirdon. The latter’s chances have recently been boosted when minor parties moved to his side to create the ‘Haybad Qaran’ alliance.

Deni will still likely be kingmaker even if his position weakens. In the meantime, the big question remains whether he can – on behalf of the wider opposition – engineer a deal with HSM on a new election roadmap and more crucially, if the shift toward national politics may divert his attention away from his home region’s mounting security and political challenges.