Somaliland - The Return of the Prodigal Daughter
In a significant symbolic blow to Somali unionism, Fahiima Yusuf Quuje - a prominent Dhulbahante activist from the Jama Siyaad sub-clan who was instrumental in mobilising grassroots support for the armed insurrection in Laas Anood - late last week declared she was repudiating Somali unionism and the ‘Greater Somalia’ ideology, tendering her resignation from her regional assembly seat in the fledgling, Mogadishu-backed Northeastern State of Somalia (NES) and would be returning to Somaliland. A day after the announcement, Quuje landed at Egal International Airport in Hargeisa, where she was greeted by high-ranking dignitaries, garlanded in the Somaliland flag, and serenaded with patriotic anthems.
The move has electrified the public in Somaliland and continues to excite animated wider debate across Somalia and the Horn. While media in Hargeisa hailed the defection as a seminal milestone and a triumphant validation of President Abdirahman Irro’s discreet outreach diplomacy, an officially embarrassed federal government in Mogadishu entirely avoided public comment, leaving its digital partisans and unionist supporters to quickly downplay the defection as politically inconsequential. The NES administration in Laas Anood, meanwhile, responded swiftly with fury, declaring that by defecting, Quuje had lost her parliamentary seat and her official immunity, and would now be prosecuted for treason.
Secret talks
The decision by Quuje to switch sides lends credence to reports of secret talks between the Somaliland government and elements of the SSC-Khatumo administration. While the exact details and terms of the deal are unknown, it is highly likely that Hargeisa may have promised she would not face criminal charges. Since Quuje filmed herself fighting against Somaliland forces, she could have legally faced the serious charge of treason. Her defection suggests Hargeisa may be willing to overlook past actions to achieve a larger political goal.
So far, Somaliland officials are keeping reticent about their discussions with Dhulbahante leaders. However, informed insiders predict that more high-profile figures might switch sides soon. Among the names being mentioned are Suleiman Mire Geesood, the former Deputy Commander of the Somaliland National Army, and Suleiman Issa Ahmed “Haglotosiye,” who previously served as a government minister in Somaliland.
These discreet talks are reportedly taking place in Nairobi, Kenya. A key person helping to lead the discussions is Abdirashid Yusuf Jibril, the deputy leader of the Laas Anood administration. Importantly, the talks seem to have the quiet approval of Garaad Jama Garaad Ali (Bah Ararsame/Farah Garaad/Dhulbahante) - the most powerful traditional leader of the Dhulbahante clan, the main driving force behind the armed uprising and a strong advocate of the Somali union. His quiet backing gives these talks real weight.
Still, the final goal of these negotiations is unclear, and it is hard to tell what each side hopes to gain. In the short term, Hargeisa’s main goal is to get back hundreds of Prisoners of War (POWs) held by SSC-Khatumo forces. In the long term, Somaliland’s ultimate aim is to bring the city of Laas Anood back under full government control.
High noon in Laas Anood
The immediate catalyst behind Quuje’s defection is likely rooted in the severe socioeconomic degradation gripping Laas Anood and a pervasive sense of political disillusionment regarding Mogadishu’s commitments. Geographically positioned along a critical regional trade corridor, the town has always relied on transit traffic. Insecurity has now forced transporters to reroute lorries.
Meanwhile, the humanitarian situation is grim, with thousands of families reliant on food aid and a complete absence of the promised external capital injections required for reconstruction. This financial distress has hit the administration directly: local soldiers and civil servants within the NES administration have endured months without salaries or stipends. Furthermore, the extensive foreign diplomatic tours undertaken by regional leader Abdulqadir Firdhiye have proved ineffective, failing to yield tangible international assistance or fiscal relief. Compounding these localised failures, macro-regional shocks - specifically trade and shipping disruptions linked to the Iran War - have acutely magnified the economic isolation of vulnerable urban hubs like Laas Anood.
From a broader perspective, the creation of the NES appears less like a permanent state-building exercise and more like a calculated, short-term tactical manoeuvre by Mogadishu. This strategy was designed to exert asymmetric pressure on Somaliland, disrupt its territorial contiguity, and establish a firm sphere of influence from which to destabilise the northern territories. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud effectively validated this during a recent media interview, openly admitting that NES served primarily as a pressure point against Hargeisa rather than a viable project for long-term governance.
Dhulbahante dilemma
The Dhulbahante appear to have compounded their own misery through recent political choices. Historically, while the clan maintained a deeply rooted unionist identity alongside a desire for self-governance, its leadership practised a highly pragmatic policy. By engaging flexibly with both Somaliland and Puntland, pursuing localised agreements, and strategically hedging their bets, they effectively maximised their political leverage while mitigating risks. By spreading their equities fluidly across Mogadishu, Hargeisa, and Garowe, they intentionally avoided locking themselves into a single outside actor.
The recent hard pivot toward Mogadishu represents a fundamental rewrite of the Dhulbahante’s traditional strategy. Thus far, this shift has yielded little tangible reward beyond the purely symbolic milestone of being recognised as a federal member state within the Somali union. Relations have deteriorated further following Garaad Jama Garaad Ali’s recent, highly publicised criticisms of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) - a public rupture that has likely prompted Villa Somalia to scale back its already limited financial and logistical support.
It is becoming clear to the Dhulbahante that Mogadishu lacks both the economic capacity to stabilise the NES administration and the hard power necessary to reshape the northern political landscape in favour of the Dhulbahante cause. Consequently, the clan now faces an acute strategic dilemma: how to navigate a state of permanent hostility with two immediate, powerful neighbours while remaining entirely dependent on the erratic and volatile goodwill of a faraway federal capital.
Odd federalisation, bad timing
The creation of the NES in late 2025 was widely touted as a continuation, if not a direct improvement, of the Somali federalisation process. In reality, it marks a radical departure from established political tradition. Every standard rule and procedure was systematically skirted, bypassing the laborious process of inclusive, grassroots negotiations typically required to consolidate local buy-in. These flaws have already weakened the state's foundation; the majority of the Warsangeli business elite and clan leaders actually declined to join the administration altogether, preferring instead to keep their traditional relations with Puntland on an even keel.
While the underlying enthusiasm for self-government expressed by the Dhulbahante is entirely understandable, the timing for the establishment of the NES couldn’t have been worse – coming at a time when the already ailing Somali federal system is entering a more acute and potentially fatal phase.
The Dhulbahante are unlikely to get a better deal from Mogadishu than the rough deal the federal government offered to the periphery and constituent federal units. In fact, they risk becoming a shell state, with no viable prospect of long-term survival. This vulnerability is directly linked to shifting political dynamics in Mogadishu; the rise of a robustly assertive and centralising Somali federal government since 2022 has fundamentally altered the entire federal system. Covertly hostile to the decentralised federal model, Villa Somalia has consistently driven a top-down, coercive agenda designed to weaken or potentially dismantle the federal system entirely.
Outlook
The defection of Quuje ought to serve as a wake-up call for Mogadishu, but it is hardly likely to galvanise meaningful action or course-correction. In fact, it could play directly into the worst instincts of factions within the federal government in Mogadishu who already distrust the Dhulbahante, viewing them as undependable partners due to their historical pattern of constant hedging.
For Somaliland, however, this shift opens a distinct window of opportunity to repair ties with the Dhulbahante, negotiate a sustainable cease-fire, and secure a peaceful settlement that restores central authority over what Hargeisa considers its sovereign territory. Crucially, Hargeisa now has a heightened incentive to demonstrate immediate goodwill - by gradually restoring a "soft frontier" to ease the physical movement of people and commercial goods, offering or facilitating delivery of humanitarian aid. Over the long term, Somaliland may ultimately seek to offer the Dhulbahante a framework of enhanced autonomy and self-governance as a primary incentive to keep Sool permanently under its administrative control.
