Issue No. 961

Deciphering Al-Shabaab’s Radio Silence

Never interrupt your enemy when they are making a mistake. Napoleon Bonaparte’s classic rule of combat seems to be the guiding doctrine behind Al-Shabaab’s sudden, uncharacteristic radio silence as Mogadishu’s political elite tear themselves apart. As the ‘government-in-waiting’, one would have assumed the militants would take full advantage of its adversaries’ internal divisions, maximising the propaganda opportunities this offers, and campaign for their own cause. Typically quick to weaponise any intra-Somali division, the militant group's decision to sit out the latest intra-Somali fracturing is intriguing. By withholding its usual blitz of propaganda, the group is playing a longer, quieter game - waiting for the federal house to implode further before stepping in.

Al-Shabaab seems to be deliberately skirting the fraught internal political situation, choosing instead to comment on Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro’s trip to Israel, the opening of a new Somaliland mission in Jerusalem and the US’ decision to bar Somali football referee Omar Artan from entry to the football World Cup due to his "association with suspected members of terror organisations." The latter commentary from Al-Shabaab on Artan is especially interesting. The jihadist group normally regards football as ‘lahw’ (a frivolous pastime unbecoming of a believer) and has in the past targeted kiosks where young people congregate to watch the UK Premier League. The idea of defending Artan and lambasting the US would seem opportunistic; an example of the militants modifying ideology to appropriate a potent nationalist narrative. 

Equally puzzling is the marked decline in Al-Shabaab attacks in recent months. This decline sits within a broader trend of declining deaths by terror attack: equating to roughly 24% each year since 2023. Usually the first to take full advantage of national instability, past trends would predict that Al-Shabaab would increase their activities to further destabilise the government they strive to replace.

However, to read this decline in attacks as a weakening of Al-Shabaab - or any notable improvement in the security environment - would be a misunderstanding; to quantify the threat by simply using death as a metric would systematically misrepresent the reach of Al-Shabaab. Instead, a clear shift is being observed, as Al-Shabaab moves away from mass-casualty terrorism, to focus on territorial warfare, technological development, and troop mobilisation. 

It should be noted that - although somewhat surprising - this approach that the group has adopted is not unprecedented. The group adopted a similar tactic during the electoral crisis of 2021-22 under the Mohammed Abdullah Farmaajo administration.

But this shift does little to explain Al-Shabaab’s silence regarding the ongoing political turmoil in Mogadishu. 

Extensive past propaganda campaigns have made it clear that Al-Shabaab intends to overthrow the ‘apostate’ system that rules Somalia. And it has long been clear that they would prefer to do this peacefully and enter the political scene as ‘saviours’ rather than with aggression. While their rivals take fate into their own hands, it is clear that Al-Shabaab need not interfere in the crisis. With no skin in the political game, they would rather watch their adversaries maul each other, while losing political capital, credibility and legitimacy. An outcome that Al-Shabaab has tried tirelessly to realise over the years is now being carried out by the very actors it has aimed to target. At this stage, an intervention by Al-Shabaab might galvanise the divided elites and distract from the chaos that is currently working in Al-Shabaab’s favour. 

Further, as mediation efforts falter and the mobilisation of arms and clan militias continue unabated, Al-Shabaab may simply be biding its time. Propaganda campaigns and other interventions may be most effective only once armed hostilities have broken out: and the group may have seen this to be an inevitability. In this case, silence is not disinterest, but tactical prudence. 

The confusion that stems from any election-related turmoil acts as a shroud for Al-Shabaab’s activities; they can penetrate ever deeper into Mogadishu and the government, not to mention into Lower and Middle Shabelle. These gains in territory and influence would allow the group to respond to any attacks that may come from a post-Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) government. Bringing attention to themselves via a new propaganda campaign may prove more destructive than constructive at this critical stage of consolidation. 

Although Al-Shabaab does not participate in formal political processes, the group maintains decisive influence over the outcomes. Their capacity for violence as political leverage allows the group to shape, veto, or overturn whatever the formal actors decide. Unlike the politicians, whose influence is contingent on office, Al-Shabaab’s leverage will not expire with a term or a deal. 

The jihadist group will take advantage of this influence at a time that suits their wider strategy, but this timing might be harder to predict. Where some predicted that Al-Shabaab might take advantage of the crumbling political system, others when Mogadishu became a battleground for clan militias: clearly the group is waiting out for a more significant turn of events. 

One scenario that may prompt Al-Shabaab into action would include escalated intra-elite fragmentation combined with a fracturing of the military and security apparatuses, as well as widening inter-clan warfare. In this case, Al-Shabaab would be able to fill any emerging vacuum created in this instance. 

Improved integration and influence within disaffected clans may bring additional benefits to Al-Shabaab: opposition fighters are likely to require additional support, should conflict break out. Clan militias would likely turn to Al-Shabaab for extra trained anti-government fighters to join their ranks. This reliance would give Al-Shabaab additional leverage in the future. 

Another likely explanation is that Al-Shabaab is becoming increasingly content with establishing a parallel government, moving away from their previous endeavours to overthrow the federal government. Having established control of significant swathes of Southern Somalia, large enough to rival the physical size and economy of Jubaland or Puntland, their grip on Somali society is unlikely to wane significantly. Their move away from excessive violence may be a manifestation of shifting ambitions, while they wait for an alternative window of opportunity to exploit. 

Al-Shabaab’s inactivity to date is both a blessing and a warning. Somalia’s partners have been allowed to concentrate on the unfolding political crisis without distractions from potential Al-Shabaab attacks. Additionally, every opportunity Al-Shabaab declines to attack makes the next one more likely to be taken. Security partners should use this opportunity to predict and prepare, understanding that the likelihood of exploitation of the situation would be hard to pass up.