Issue No. 962

Somaliland’s Recognition Angst

Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro’s trip to Israel in June (from 14-17) was far more than symbolism. Not only was it a calculated strategic diplomatic play, and a chance for Somaliland to appear on the world stage, but also an opportunity for Somaliland to present itself as a fully-functional state, able to conduct foreign relations and cut bilateral deals. Irro, a seasoned former diplomat, navigated the intricate demands of state protocol with remarkable ease - cutting an immaculate, regal figure in his navy-blue suit. Accorded full head-of-state honours, he laid a wreath at the Theodore Herzl mausoleum, engaged in high-level talks with President Isaac Herzog and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, opened the new Somaliland embassy in Jerusalem and convened meetings with Knesset members, senior officials, and business leaders. For Israel, hosting President Abdirahman Irro in Jerusalem functioned to signal its strong commitment to deepening strategic ties while also countering perceptions of waning diplomatic momentum.

The visit comes some six months after Israel’s formal diplomatic recognition of Somaliland (December 2025). The anticipated wave of international recognition has not materialised, remaining a source of some unease. While the optics in Jerusalem make for good headlines and are certain to enthuse Somalilanders, concerns over flagging public morale may mount if no other state follows Israel’s example in the coming months.

So far, domestic public consensus overwhelmingly supports the recognition agenda and favours relations with Israel. However, localised dissent persists, especially among Islamist factions, notably in the ranks of the Salafist Al-I'tisaam movement. Concurrently, public sentiment reflects growing dissatisfaction over perceived diplomatic stagnation from historical partners like the United Arab Emirates and Ethiopia. 

Policy shift

The initial post-recognition euphoria appears to be transitioning into a more pragmatic outlook; a positive power in managing expectations. In his 18 May Independence anniversary speech, President Irro tackled the problem head-on - hinting that recognition is an extended process rather than a singular breakthrough, whilst appealing for patience and realism. The president praised Somaliland’s stability, democratic self-governance and resilience and reiterated his administration’s determination to step up the campaign for international recognition. He signalled a policy shift from ‘waiting for recognition’ and toward ‘making recognition undeniable’ by deepening bilateral diplomatic engagement with states. To institutionalise the new policy, Irro inaugurated the Somaliland Independence and Recognition Institute (SIRI) in Hargeisa to be headed by Sir Gavin Williamson, a UK Conservative Party politician and long-time campaigner for Somaliland’s recognition.

Unease with the UAE

At the core of Somaliland’s angst over recognition lies the United Arab Emirates - Somaliland’s premier strategic ally, primary foreign investor, and operator of the critical Port of Berbera.  While Abu Dhabi rhetorically supports Somaliland's statehood, it remains highly reluctant to grant unilateral formal recognition, preferring to let other states take the lead. This hesitation is driven by acute diplomatic pressure from regional rivals, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey. The Iran War and its unstable post-conflict outlook further reinforce the UAE’s policy of ambiguity and diplomatic hedging. To mitigate backlash, Abu Dhabi has, in the last year, shifted the burden of promoting Somaliland to DP World, operating on the premise that platforming Somaliland as a geoeconomic hub attracts less geopolitical hostility while serving Hargeisa’s long-term interests. However, this corporate-centric ‘platforming’ approach risks losing traction in Hargeisa in the long-term if it remains the UAE’s strategic default position. Following Israel's formal recognition, the UAE is certain to face ever-mounting pressure to pivot from its traditional "cooperation without recognition" paradigm to full diplomatic statehood; failure to do so will severely deepen domestic disillusionment with Abu Dhabi. 

Disappointment with Ethiopia

Despite Hargeisa viewing Ethiopia as a primary candidate for formal recognition, intensive diplomatic lobbying over the past 18 months to finalise and recast the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed under the previous Muse Abdi Bihi administration has stalled. Negotiations faced significant friction: granting Ethiopia sovereign sea access and military basing rights proved domestically contentious for Hargeisa, while Somaliland remained frustrated by Addis Ababa's reluctance to utilise the Port of Berbera. Furthermore, to preempt Egyptian military deployment to Somalia, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed engaged in Turkish-led mediation with Mogadishu. This engagement restricted Ethiopia's room for unilateral manoeuvre regarding Somaliland and generated strong pushback from the AU, EU, UN, and Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Under this concentrated pressure, Abiy has effectively retreated from the MoU, shifting his strategic focus toward maritime access via Eritrea's Assab port—even through potential military force—while relentless pressure from Djibouti’s President Guelleh has seen Somaliland drop further down the priority list in Ethiopia's foreign policy matrix.

Eritrea-Ethiopia volatility

The regional security outlook also remains highly uncertain. The risk of a conventional border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia is elevated, exacerbated by a deteriorating humanitarian and security situation in Tigray despite intense diplomatic pressure from the United States. In a hot conflict scenario, Ethiopia will almost certainly shelve any consideration of formalising ties with Somaliland. Conversely, a low-probability détente between Addis Ababa and Asmara could alleviate regional pressures, potentially reopening a window for Ethiopia to re-engage with Hargeisa.

Al-I'tisaam – Short-term nuisance, long-term threat

Domestic anti-recognition sentiments, so far, predominantly emanate from local Salafist factions even though aggressive rhetoric remains sporadic, with no current evidence of widespread, institutionalised and organised radicalisation. However, this equilibrium might change. Jama'at Al-I'tisaam (Al-I’tisaam bil-Kitaab was-Sunnah) stands as the most influential, organised Salafist movement in Somaliland. Characterised by an amorphous, secretive, and non-hierarchical structure, Al-I'tisaam possesses significant financial leverage, with deep investments spanning lucrative sectors including import-export, fuel logistics, financial services, construction, real estate, and telecommunications. While the movement officially advocates for non-violent methods to establish an Islamic state, its internal political alignments are deeply fractured. A prominent faction favors political reunification with Somalia and strongly opposes Somaliland’s diplomatic ties with Israel. Conversely, another internal faction offers mild, conditional support to the Irro administration, though they remain reluctant to publicly confront the state over the Israel file.

Israel’s December 2025 recognition fundamentally altered Somaliland's geopolitical status, transitioning it from an unrecognised ‘breakaway’ territory to a ‘partially-recognised’ state. Leveraging this new status, the Irro administration has launched an ambitious diplomatic offensive prioritising non-traditional partners to ‘make recognition undeniable.’

The coming months and years will tell if Irro’s recalibrated recognition strategy will be efficacious – and the bigger point: whether Israel’s recognition has produced a chilling effect likely to stall momentum.