Issue No. 960

Published 10 Jun

The Galmudug Vote – The Next Powder Keg

Published on 10 Jun 7:13 min

The Galmudug Vote – The Next Powder Keg

While much international attention is on Mogadishu – understandably so - another electoral crisis is brewing in the regional state of Galmudug. Historically unstable, prone to Al-Shabaab violence and destabilisation and wracked by chronic inter-clan frictions and periodic armed hostilities, the looming vote appears likely to aggravate the situation and foment more divisions.

In about 10 days’ time, the Somali National Independent Boundaries and Electoral Commission (NIEBC) plans to conduct partial direct elections using the controversial OPOV (one-person-one-vote) model, which the opposition is boycotting. The planned limited plebiscite comes against the backdrop of intense intra-elite competition and a split within the Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) administration and the ruling Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP). Ahead of the exercise, political and security tensions are ratcheting up in the towns of Adaado and Dhusamareb, where voters will cast their ballots to elect MPs and eventually a regional president.

Relations between Villa Somalia and the regional President Ahmed Abdi Kariye “Qoor Qoor” (Hawiye/Habar Gedir/Salebaan) - unstable and unpredictable even in the best of times – have been steadily deteriorating in recent months, much of it driven by perceptions that HSM is backing Qoor Qoor’s rivals for the post of president.

Dispute over police command

Tensions between Qoor Qoor and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) came to a head in May when Villa Somalia issued a directive to replace the region’s police chief with Colonel Mohamed Dahir Abdulle (Hawiye/Habar Gedir/Salebaan), a fellow kinsman of the Galmudug president, but a loyalist more aligned with the JSP and the federal authorities. Qoor Qoor was quick to frame the appointment as an illegal hostile bureaucratic takeover and countermanded it by reinstating the old police chief Colonel Khalif Abdulle “Ilkacase,” a commander from the powerful Habar Gedir/Ayr sub-clan. By backing Abdulle, Mogadishu aimed to execute an intra-clan fracturing strategy - splitting the loyalties of Qoor Qoor’s immediate Saleban base while securing direct control of the localised electoral security apparatus.

Dispute over Villa Somalia ‘candidate’

For much of the last four years, many assumed that Hassan Sheikh favoured his close ally, the Director-General of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) Mahad Salad (Hawiye/Habar Gedir/Ayr). The spy chief was purposely reappointed by HSM because he was viewed as an asset in the campaign to degrade Al-Shabaab in Galmudug and to mobilise the Habar Gedir sub-clans (Sa’ad, Salebaan and Ayr) to join the clan militia fighters, the Ma’wiisley. Mahad Salad was in fact allowed to train over 2,000 clan fighters with federal support and alleged assistance from elements of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF); early this year, Africa Intelligence, a respected specialist publication, disclosed that a handful of retired SAF generals were involved in training the militia. Mr Salad’s political rivals, meanwhile, framed the scheme as part of a plan by the spy chief to consolidate his influence and further his ambitions to become regional president.

Strong evidence is emerging that Mahad Salad is no longer HSM’s most favoured candidate for the Galmudug top post; in fact, it is now a near certainty Villa Somalia is throwing its weight behind the candidacy of Liban Shuluq (Hawiye/Habar Gedir/Sa’ad), a wealthy business associate of HSM with links to the qat trade. Shuluq is a controversial figure who in 2023 was implicated in a murky case of importing a large cache of weapons (AK-47 rifles, RPGs, grenades) from Ethiopia allegedly for the ma’wiisley campaign and paid for by the federal government. The secret arms shipment, which ended up being looted by clan militias in Abudwaaq, Hiiraan, tarnished his reputation and triggered calls for his arrest for illicit arms smuggling.

HSM’s decision to shift support to Liban Shuluq soured relations with Mahad Salad and has been criticised by influential Habar Gedir leaders such as Abdi Hasan Awaale "Qaybdiid" (Hawiye/Habar Gedir/Sa’ad). In recent weeks, HSM has been trying to mollify the Habar Gedir and in a series of meetings and photo ops in Mogadishu, keen to demonstrate that relations with the NISA DG remain solid. Mahad Salad, certainly, proved his utility to Villa Somalia in the aftermath of the violence in Mogadishu. His diplomatic skills and ability to engage HSM’s opponents, de-escalate tensions and lean on the Habar Gedir to stay out of the escalating dispute between Hassan Sheikh and the Sheikh Sharif-Hassan Ali Khaire camp is beneficial from a Villa Somalia perspective. But whether these new roles may shore up Mahad Salad’s position – produce a quid pro quo - in the race for the Galmudug presidency remains unclear. It is possible the NISA chief may insist on firm guarantees from Villa Somalia on federal neutrality if he fails to obtain a firm commitment of full support.

Risks of instability

The FGS’s unilateral electoral grand scheme in south-central Somalia continues to generate volatility and sow further divisions. Any imposition of handpicked leaders by Mogadishu in Galmudug through the OPOV system will almost certainly roil the regional state's politics and compound its security dynamics. The fallout between Qoor Qoor and the federal authorities, as well as the wrangles within the JSP alliance and the rivalry between Shuluq and Mahad Salad risks triggering adversarial and militarised regional and clan mobilisation.  

In recent weeks, there have been reports of heavily armed paramilitary units and state-level forces disregarding formal command-and-control structures in favor of tribal allegiances and abandoning their frontlines. Troops from as far north as Gaalka’yo and the volatile coastal counter-insurgency hubs of Xarardheere have completely relocated to Dhuusamareeb. These forces are now deeply entrenched inside the state capital, explicitly mobilised to shield their respective sub-clan candidates. By alienating the state leadership, the intelligence apparatus, and historic clan powerbrokers simultaneously, the federal government has fractured the very coalition required to stabilise central Somalia.

Dhuusamareeb is not merely a political capital preparing for an election; it is a hyper-militarised theater where state-level Daraawish forces, national intelligence assets, and private clan militias stand poised to act in defence of their respective stakes in the polls.

With the Ayr, Sa’ad, and Saleban rivalry escalating and Villa Somalia seemingly uninvested in the conduct of a free and fair poll, Galmudug’s democratic experiment will likely fail and, worse, could trigger renewed instability that Al-Shabaab may exploit.

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