Allies Spar in Somalia: What Could Be Driving the Türkiye-Uganda Spat?
Over the weekend, a flurry of viral posts on X (formerly Twitter) highly critical of Türkiye by the Ugandan army chief risked tipping the three-way relations between Somalia, Türkiye, and Uganda into a new tailspin. General Muhoozi - the son of Ugandan President Yoweri K. Museveni and the Chief of the Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UPDF) - accused Türkiye of disrespect, threatened to pull troops out of Somalia, and further demanded USD 1 billion in compensation from Ankara. Although the posts were deleted on Sunday, the storm the comments generated has not died down.
Gen. Muhoozi is no stranger to controversy. He relishes stepping on toes and likes to court publicity with his sometimes-outrageous and robust commentaries on X. Not everything he says is politically correct; loved and loathed in equal measure, his supporters praise his openness and candor, while critics call him "unhinged," preferring to psychologise his brand and style of populist politics.
Regarding the specific substance of his anti-Türkiye posts, there are reasonable grounds to believe he may have been articulating accumulated Ugandan grievances from the last year - especially frustrations related to the two states' security and counterinsurgency partnership in Somalia - but perhaps also concerns over the current trajectory of the Horn of Africa state.
On Friday, the Turkish deep-sea drilling vessel, the Cagri Bey, docked at the Port of Mogadishu in what was billed as a seminal event marking Somalia’s transition toward the exploration and extraction of offshore hydrocarbon resources. Speaking at the colorful event on the dockside, with the Cagri Bey calmly anchored against the turquoise blue waters of the Indian Ocean, the Turkish Petroleum Minister, Alparslan Bayraktar, emphasized the solidity of the strategic partnership between Mogadishu and Ankara and promised the oil and gas project would soon enter the active commercial drilling phase.
Gen. Muhoozi’s invective on X, coinciding with Friday’s formal ceremony, played badly on Somali streets and triggered a media backlash in Türkiye. A day later, on Saturday, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) used a speech on the occasion of Army Day to respond to the Ugandan general. HSM struck a diplomatic tone, acknowledging Uganda’s contributions to Somalia’s security and thanking the UPDF for their unstinting support despite reduced international funding. He even went further, noting how Uganda was forced to use its own resources to replace military equipment damaged in combat.
On the future of the Ugandan troop presence, the Somali president was clear: the SNA, he said, was now capable of taking over the full security functions of the UPDF. "It is now time for us to say to the Ugandans ‘thank you’ and ma’asalaam" (an Arabic/Islamic phrase that can loosely be translated as goodbye).
The latest escalated exchange of rhetoric between these allies in the counterinsurgency war in Somalia speaks to the simmering tensions between Uganda on one side and Somalia and its key ally, Turkiye, on the other - a spat that could morph into a crisis unless speedily resolved.
While HSM expresses confidence in Somalia's readiness for the withdrawal of Ugandan forces, the reality on the ground suggests a hasty exit could trigger a grave security crisis. Somalia's current stability depends heavily on UPDF assistance.
With over 8,000 bilateral troops and 4,500 under AUSSOM, Uganda is the largest troop-contributing country in Somalia. A sudden withdrawal would likely lead to a collapse of security in and around Mogadishu, where Ugandan forces protect critical infrastructure like the port and airport. The diplomatic community at the Halane Complex remains apprehensive about transferring security to Somali forces, given the persistent issue of Al-Shabaab infiltration.
Frustrations have mounted following 'Operation Silent Storm' in late 2025. While the UPDF successfully cleared militants from key bridge towns along the Shabelle River, they suffered heavy casualties. From Kampala's perspective, the operation was made more difficult by a perceived lack of ground support from partners like Türkiye, despite their aerial assistance. General Muhoozi’s recent anti-Türkiye comments likely stem from this experience, where Ugandan troops bore the brunt of the combat while other nations received disproportionate credit.
The situation is further complicated by the non-arrival of a promised Egyptian deployment and the exit of Burundian forces after their mandate was not renewed. Kampala feels its troops are carrying a disproportionate burden - not only in active combat against fortified Al-Shabaab positions but also in holding territory for the Somali National Army.
The Ugandan general's ire is driven by both the grim tactical situation and an official narrative that downplays Ugandan sacrifices in favor of Turkish and Egyptian support. However, by deleting his recent posts on X, Gen. Muhoozi may be signaling a desire to de-escalate and engage in substantive dialogue with Somali and Turkish interlocutors to address these outstanding issues.
Somalia’s partners, who have a stake in keeping the status quo, should nudge all sides to desist from public recriminations and instead invest in dialogue to smooth relations and boost cooperation to keep pressure on Al-Shabaab.
The Somali Wire Team
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