Issue No. 940

Baidoa or Bust for Hassan Sheikh

The battle for South West—and Somalia's political future—continues apace. With the brittle alliance between South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen and President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud having broken down spectacularly, the federal government is pouring in arms and forces to oust the Digil-Mirifle leader. Staring down the barrel of the formal opposition holding three Federal Member States and, with it, greater territory, population, and clan, Villa Somalia is looking to exploit intra-Digil-Mirifle grievances—and convince Addis—to keep its monopolistic electoral agenda alive. But this morning, Laftagareen announced a 9-member electoral committee to hastily steer his re-election, bringing the formal bifurcation of the Somali state ever closer.

The collapse of the Laftagareen-Mogadishu alliance has been predicted numerous times in the past 18 months, but the velocity of the pivot from public allies to foes has been remarkable. Considerable numbers of federal Haram'ad paramilitaries and clan militias drawn from disgruntled Digil-Mirifle clans have been mobilised by Mogadishu, and a handful of key South West towns have now fallen to anti-Laftagareen forces, with the federal government holding Baraawe, Huddur, Buurhakaba, and Qansaxdheere. In particular, Haram'ad forces and federal ministers were airlifted aboard Italian-donated helicopters into the coastal town of Baraawe to parade their victory, forcing dozens of South West Daraawiish troops to withdraw to Jubaland by sea. Images, too, have been widely shared of alleged Egyptian weapons and rifles donated to the Somali government-- nominally to be wielded against Al-Shabaab-- in the hands of deploying anti-South West militias.

But Laftagareen just has to hold Baidoa —the de facto regional capital —to orchestrate another term in office and leave Villa Somalia flapping in the wind. And hold it he does-- with the Digil-Mirifle leader defiantly criss-crossing the Ethiopian-secured town and its environs since his dramatic return from Mecca last week. The regional president, historically shunning the limelight, has seized his moment, denouncing the federal government for acting like "gangs and bandits," asserting that Mogadishu had effectively declared war on the region and stating that the state must be defended from such violence. Insisting that he will have to be forcibly removed from Baidoa, the South West leader has publicly met and overseen his allied forces and Daraawiish paramilitaries on a near-daily basis. Powerful memories, too, are being invoked of the 1990s and particularly the Rahanweyne Resistance Army (RRA)-- the armed movement established in explicit opposition to the rampaging forces of Hawiye leader General Mohamed Farah Aideed. Attempts by a Hawiye-dominated administration in Mogadishu to forcibly impose its political agenda in southern Somalia sit uneasily with many Rahanweyne, who have prided themselves on their federalist credentials.

Even so, Laftagareen's political base remains constrained beyond the Hadame sub-clan of the regional president, with much of the other major Mirifle sub-clans, such as the Eelay, Hariin, and Leysan, opposed to his years in office. The parachuting of former Parliament Speaker Mohamed Mursal into Baidoa, as well as the MP Saran-Soor, are an attempt by Laftagareen's administration to display a more cohesive front, with both politicians offering support for the establishment of the South West State Electoral and Boundaries Commission. More quietly, Laftagareen is reaching out to his old allies of ex-President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo and spy chief Fahad Yasin as well, hoping to draw on their support and constituencies, including the Mareehaan in Gedo, to aid his position. But there is plenty of discontent for Mogadishu to exploit, with Speaker of Parliament Aden Madoobe and Livestock Minister Hassan Mohamed 'Eelay' spearheading the government's machinations.

In particular, the government is seeking support of the Leysan, historically one of the best-armed sub-clans of the Mirifle, which Laftagareen's administration has broadly shunned since he was installed in late 2018. So far, though, Villa Somalia's insistence that the Leysan must lend their considerable forces to oust Laftagareen has been met with offers of mediation instead, not least because Hassan Sheikh himself orchestrated the Digil-Mirifle president's repeated term extensions. But Leysan elders and prominent figures such as Minister of Religion Mukhtar Roobow are expected to gather in Mogadishu in the coming days to discuss a unified position on the South West crisis. And with Laftagareen offering little suggestion of genuine competition or political alternation in the imminent elections, it may be that the Leysan-- facing an unpleasant choice-- feel compelled to join Villa Somalia's high-risk campaign. 

But while cynically exploiting such grievances has been a tried-and-tested tactic of Villa Somalia in Laas Aanood and Gedo, there has been a simultaneous growing exodus of Rahanweyne politicians aligned with Baidoa from both the federal government and the president's Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP). Representing little more than a cobbled-together band of politicians underpinned by vague Islamist-centralising tenets, JSP is coming apart at the seams, unable to withstand the buffeting of national politics. Another target of Mogadishu ploys, Jubaland President Ahmed Madoobe has emerged as a particularly prominent ally of Laftagareen in recent days, offering public support to his Digil-Mirifle counterpart. As part of this, over 120 withdrawing South West Daraawiish paramilitaries from Baraawe arrived ashore to a warm welcome from the Speaker of the Jubaland Parliament. And within the Council for the Future of Somalia (CFS), many will be hoping Laftagareen survives the coming days to bolster their position against the federal government ahead of plans to begin a parallel electoral process in April. 

Still, if Laftagareen is to fend off Mogadishu's offensive, the South West president will have to retain Addis's backing, which has underwritten Baidoa's security for much of the past three decades. The Ethiopian overall priority remains the stability of its security buffer against Al-Shabaab, which stretches through Hiiraan, Bay, Bakool and Gedo. Though some brief clashes erupted near Baidoa last week, it was the Ethiopian military that made it explicit that it will not accept further fighting in the town itself, prompting the Badbaado Qaran--South West opposition forces to withdraw. But Hassan Sheikh, too, is attempting to secure the support of Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed in removing Laftagareen, having lobbied him during a recent tripartite meeting with the Djiboutian president as well. Abiy has other issues on his mind —principally the possibility of fresh conflict in Tigray —and is dodging Hassan Sheikh's requests to meet in person, with a plan for the Somali president to visit Addis falling through yesterday. Moreover, Laftagareen's staunch loyalty to Ethiopia during 2024 —amidst acrimonious Mogadishu-Addis relations —may well impact the mercurial Abiy's position on the crisis, as well as the support of other Ethiopian allies for the leader in Somalia, such as Jubaland President Ahmed Madoobe. 

For Villa Somalia, it is a lose-lose situation if it is unable to prise Laftagareen from Baidoa. If the Digil-Mirifle president presses ahead with orchestrating his re-election, the federal government can attempt to invalidate it, but Rahanweyne elders will nevertheless gather in Baidoa, and Laftagareen will be able to join the opposition CFS coalition unimpeded. The alternatives for the federal government are similarly unpleasant, with either an indirect election held in Baraawe —contravening the misleading promise that Somalia is somehow transitioning to direct democracy —or an engineered direct poll across a handful of towns. 

So, with the advantage shifting towards the opposition, it is increasingly apparent that the president will wield all means at his disposal to regain the upper hand and keep — through violence — South West within his camp. Yet with Baidoa unlikely to fall without Ethiopian acquiescence and Laftagareen consolidating his position outside the JSP, the contours of a parallel process are stiffening, and will render Villa Somalia's fanciful direct electoral scheme inconceivable. A faked election in Baraawe would fool no-one, and indeed only confirm the fracturing of the state. And yet —optimistically —this may yet open a window of opportunity for genuine talks if sufficient pressure can be brought to bear on Hassan Sheikh in the coming weeks, before the threat of competing tracks hardens into a more permanent divide as his term expires. But in a world at war, the question, as ever, is which external party has the leverage and interest to bring such pressure.

The Somali Wire Team