The Reckoning: Breakdown of Somalia’s Third Republic
Today’s editorial in The Somali Wire is written by the Dr. Mursal M. Khaliif, a current member of Somalia's Federal Parliament. The views expressed in this piece are his own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Somali Wire. We publish this contribution to provide our readers with insight into the arguments advanced by key protagonists in Somalia's ongoing public dispute and to encourage informed debate on issues shaping its political future.
The 19th-century Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky wrote in his novel, The Brothers Karamazov:
“Above all, do not lie to yourself. A man who lies to himself and listens to his own lie comes to a point where he does not discern any truth either in himself or anywhere around him.”
In Somalia today, we are suffering because our head of state has lied to himself so much so, that as Dostoevsky had alluded to, he has reached a point where he does not discern any truth either in himself or anywhere around him. However, before we delve into the nature or purpose of the lie and its grave national, regional, and international consequences, a bit of history is warranted on Somalia as a nation-state.
For the past 65 years, Somalia has had three distinct phases of administrations (Republics): the post-independence civilian administration of the Somali Republic from 1960–1969, the military administration of the Democratic Republic of Somalia from 1969–1991, and the post-civil war reconciliation governments of the Federal Republic of Somalia from 2000 to the present day. The first and second Somali Republics fell as a result of a military coup in 1969 and a civil war in 1991, respectively.
The post-civil war Third Republic has been held together for 26 years by three key elements: a power-sharing system based on the five major clans in Somalia, stemming from the Arta (Djibouti) reconciliation conference in 2000; and a provisional constitution underpinned by the establishment of Federal Member States (FMS) based on the Garowe 1 & 2 Conferences of 2011/2012.
Driven by greed and lust for power, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has embarked on a collision course with all three key elements holding the Third Republic together. The President broke precedent on power-sharing, unilaterally rewrote the provisional constitution, and attacked the constitutional autonomy provided to the Federal Member States. In four short years, HSM is on the path to taking Somalia back to the pre-Arta reconciliation era. With only five weeks left in his constitutional mandate, HSM’s latest actions are setting a dangerous precedent in contemporary Somali politics. The military coup that ousted the Southwest State president from Baidoa last week, and the daylight robbery of a sitting MP’s seat for one of HSM’s ministers and key allies in Baidoa this week, are cases in point.
The military attack on Baidoa last week and the failed preceding attacks on multiple districts in Jubaland State over the last 18 months have been falsely rationalised by HSM as an exercise in democratisation — pushing for universal suffrage instead of indirect parliamentary elections. In reality, what HSM and his allies are selling as “one-person, one-vote” is a disguise for term extension followed by a rigged election. The results of any extension beyond May 15, without political consensus, will certainly have a serious detrimental impact on the already faltering relations between the two Darod-led Federal Member States (Puntland & Jubaland) and HSM’s regime. Adding a rigged election to a term extension that lacks broad consensus, the Hawiye-led opposition in Mogadishu and one or two additional Federal Member States will, without a doubt, rightfully boycott the results.
At this point, Somalia’s political direction has never been bleaker. Rife with hubris and a myopic belief that he "belongs" to what he perceives as the "right clan" for a modern-day dictator in Somalia, HSM has lied to himself, believing that he can rule Somalia beyond his constitutional mandate and hold rigged elections to declare himself the winner without serious consequences. This lie is premised on two fallacy-based assumptions. The first is that as long as he buys, corrupts, or oppresses the Hawiye opposition, no one can challenge his reign over Mogadishu. The second is that ignoring the Darod and Isaaq territories (Jubaland, Puntland & Somaliland) while installing a puppet administration in Southwest State will keep other clans on the marginalized periphery. However, the Somali people’s genuine distaste for dictatorship and oppression, regardless of clan affiliation, is the Achilles’ heel of HSM’s self-told lies.
The grave national implication of HSM’s current political direction is the potential breakdown of the third republic of Somalia. There are two scenarios for such a breakdown. In the first scenario, the Council for the Future of Somalia, comprised of Jubaland State, Puntland State, and Mogadishu opposition, may boycott HSM’s self-coronation shenanigans and start a parallel process for electing the 12th Federal Parliament.
What happens next could either expedite lasting reconciliation on electoral consensus or create a prolonged period of political disputes with a high likelihood of violent conflict. The odds of either an expedited reconciliation or a prolonged period of violence are at best 50:50.
The second scenario is even more dangerous for the future of Somalia. The secessionist administration of Somaliland in parts of northern Somalia may be recognized as a sovereign state by more countries than just Taiwan and Israel. Puntland State of Somalia, which has had no working relationship with HSM’s regime for almost three years, may pursue what their erstwhile Minister of Interior once termed the "nuclear option" of seeking state sovereignty. The Jubaland administration may hold statewide consultations on future directions. In either scenario, the adverse impact on regional and international security is worth noting.
On top of this, the Digil & Mirifle clans in Southwest State may not accept whatever puppet regime is installed by HSM and the Hawiye opposition in Mogadishu may have no option but take up arms against extension beyond constitutional mandate or HSM’s plans to rig elections in his favor. Without national unity to defeat or degrade the two transnational terrorist groups in Somalia — Al-Shabab and ISIS — the imminent risk to regional and international security is very high.
With the bandwidth of the international community currently focused on other more pressing international conflicts, the world should pay close attention to the potential breakdown of Somalia’s third republic and its subsequent ramifications. Forewarned is forearmed!
By Dr. Mursal M. Khaliif
Dr. Mursal M. Khaliif is a current member of Somalia’s Federal Parliament, serving on the Defense Committee. He is also the former Minister of Planning & International Cooperation, and former Minister of Health for Jubaland State of Somalia.
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.
Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.
Last weekend, the Murusade, a major sub-clan of the powerful Hawiye clan family, staged one of the largest and most colourful coronations of a clan chief in recent memory in Mogadishu. The caleemasarka (enthronement) of Ugaas Abdirizaq Ugaas Abdullahi Ugaas Haashi, the new Ugaas or sultan of the Murusade, was attended by thousands of delegates from all parts of Somalia. Conducted next to the imposing and magnificent Ottomanesque Ali Jim'ale Mosque, on the Muslim day of rest, Friday, the occasion blended the Islamic, the regal and the customary; a restatement of an ancient tradition very much alive and vibrant.
With all eyes trained on the Strait of Hormuz blockades and their geopolitical convulsions, discussions and concerns, too, have risen about the perils of other globalised chokepoints, not least the Bab al-Mandab. The threats to the stability of the Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea may not arise principally from the escalatory logic that the US, Iran, and Israel have been locked in, but the threats posed from collapse and contested sovereignty offer little relief. Off Somalia's northern coastline in particular, it is transnational criminal networks — expressed in smuggling, piracy, and, less visibly but no less consequentially, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing — that define the character of offshore insecurity. It is this last phenomenon that provides the foundation on which much of Somalia's maritime disorder is built, and which remains the most consistently neglected.
In the past months, a number of unsettling images and videos have emerged from the Russian frontlines in the Ukraine war. Within the horrors of the grinding "kill zone," where kamikaze drones strafe the sky for any signs of movement, yet another concerning dimension has emerged—the use of African recruits by Moscow in the conflict, often under false pretences. Particularly drawn from Kenya, many reportedly believed they were signing contracts to work as drivers or security guards, only to be shipped to the front lines upon arrival. Such activities are illustrative of several issues, including Russia's relationship with countries in the Horn of Africa, one shaped more by opportunistic realpolitik than genuine partnership.
Villa Somalia's triumph in Baidoa may yet turn to ashes. Since the ousting of wary friend-turned-foe, Abdiaziz Laftagareen, in late March, the federal government has ploughed ahead with preparations for state- and district-level elections in South West. Nominally scheduled for next week, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has chosen to reward his stalwart parliamentary ally, Aden Madoobe from the Rahanweyne/Hadaamo, with the regional presidency after some vacillation, naming him the sole Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP) candidate
Another showdown over Tigray's political architecture is unfolding, with the future of the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) once again at stake. For much of this year, fears of renewed war have loomed over Ethiopia's northernmost region, with the federal government mobilising substantial forces to the edges of Tigray.
In Act III, Scene I of William Shakespeare's tragedy Coriolanus, the tribune Sicinius addresses the gathered representatives and, rejecting the disdain the titular character displays towards plebeians, defends them, stating, "What is the city but the people?" Capturing the struggle between the elite and the masses of ancient Rome, the line has remained politically resonant for centuries--emphasising that a city, democracy, and state rely on the people, not just their leader. Or perhaps, not just its buildings. It is a lesson missed by Villa Somalia, though, with the twilight weeks of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's term in office — at least, constitutionally — dominated by the government's twin campaigns in the capital: land clearances and the militarisation of Mogadishu.
On Tuesday, 14 April, the four-year term of Somalia's federal parliament ended, or rather, it didn't. Villa Somalia's (un)constitutional coup of a year-long term extension for the parliament and president in March remains in effect, leaving the institution in a kind of lingering zombie statehood. It is perhaps a fitting denouement for the 11th parliament, whose degeneration has been so thorough that its formal expiration means little in practice.