The Reckoning: Breakdown of Somalia’s Third Republic
Today’s editorial in The Somali Wire is written by the Dr. Mursal M. Khaliif, a current member of Somalia's Federal Parliament. The views expressed in this piece are his own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Somali Wire. We publish this contribution to provide our readers with insight into the arguments advanced by key protagonists in Somalia's ongoing public dispute and to encourage informed debate on issues shaping its political future.
The 19th-century Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky wrote in his novel, The Brothers Karamazov:
“Above all, do not lie to yourself. A man who lies to himself and listens to his own lie comes to a point where he does not discern any truth either in himself or anywhere around him.”
In Somalia today, we are suffering because our head of state has lied to himself so much so, that as Dostoevsky had alluded to, he has reached a point where he does not discern any truth either in himself or anywhere around him. However, before we delve into the nature or purpose of the lie and its grave national, regional, and international consequences, a bit of history is warranted on Somalia as a nation-state.
For the past 65 years, Somalia has had three distinct phases of administrations (Republics): the post-independence civilian administration of the Somali Republic from 1960–1969, the military administration of the Democratic Republic of Somalia from 1969–1991, and the post-civil war reconciliation governments of the Federal Republic of Somalia from 2000 to the present day. The first and second Somali Republics fell as a result of a military coup in 1969 and a civil war in 1991, respectively.
The post-civil war Third Republic has been held together for 26 years by three key elements: a power-sharing system based on the five major clans in Somalia, stemming from the Arta (Djibouti) reconciliation conference in 2000; and a provisional constitution underpinned by the establishment of Federal Member States (FMS) based on the Garowe 1 & 2 Conferences of 2011/2012.
Driven by greed and lust for power, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has embarked on a collision course with all three key elements holding the Third Republic together. The President broke precedent on power-sharing, unilaterally rewrote the provisional constitution, and attacked the constitutional autonomy provided to the Federal Member States. In four short years, HSM is on the path to taking Somalia back to the pre-Arta reconciliation era. With only five weeks left in his constitutional mandate, HSM’s latest actions are setting a dangerous precedent in contemporary Somali politics. The military coup that ousted the Southwest State president from Baidoa last week, and the daylight robbery of a sitting MP’s seat for one of HSM’s ministers and key allies in Baidoa this week, are cases in point.
The military attack on Baidoa last week and the failed preceding attacks on multiple districts in Jubaland State over the last 18 months have been falsely rationalised by HSM as an exercise in democratisation — pushing for universal suffrage instead of indirect parliamentary elections. In reality, what HSM and his allies are selling as “one-person, one-vote” is a disguise for term extension followed by a rigged election. The results of any extension beyond May 15, without political consensus, will certainly have a serious detrimental impact on the already faltering relations between the two Darod-led Federal Member States (Puntland & Jubaland) and HSM’s regime. Adding a rigged election to a term extension that lacks broad consensus, the Hawiye-led opposition in Mogadishu and one or two additional Federal Member States will, without a doubt, rightfully boycott the results.
At this point, Somalia’s political direction has never been bleaker. Rife with hubris and a myopic belief that he "belongs" to what he perceives as the "right clan" for a modern-day dictator in Somalia, HSM has lied to himself, believing that he can rule Somalia beyond his constitutional mandate and hold rigged elections to declare himself the winner without serious consequences. This lie is premised on two fallacy-based assumptions. The first is that as long as he buys, corrupts, or oppresses the Hawiye opposition, no one can challenge his reign over Mogadishu. The second is that ignoring the Darod and Isaaq territories (Jubaland, Puntland & Somaliland) while installing a puppet administration in Southwest State will keep other clans on the marginalized periphery. However, the Somali people’s genuine distaste for dictatorship and oppression, regardless of clan affiliation, is the Achilles’ heel of HSM’s self-told lies.
The grave national implication of HSM’s current political direction is the potential breakdown of the third republic of Somalia. There are two scenarios for such a breakdown. In the first scenario, the Council for the Future of Somalia, comprised of Jubaland State, Puntland State, and Mogadishu opposition, may boycott HSM’s self-coronation shenanigans and start a parallel process for electing the 12th Federal Parliament.
What happens next could either expedite lasting reconciliation on electoral consensus or create a prolonged period of political disputes with a high likelihood of violent conflict. The odds of either an expedited reconciliation or a prolonged period of violence are at best 50:50.
The second scenario is even more dangerous for the future of Somalia. The secessionist administration of Somaliland in parts of northern Somalia may be recognized as a sovereign state by more countries than just Taiwan and Israel. Puntland State of Somalia, which has had no working relationship with HSM’s regime for almost three years, may pursue what their erstwhile Minister of Interior once termed the "nuclear option" of seeking state sovereignty. The Jubaland administration may hold statewide consultations on future directions. In either scenario, the adverse impact on regional and international security is worth noting.
On top of this, the Digil & Mirifle clans in Southwest State may not accept whatever puppet regime is installed by HSM and the Hawiye opposition in Mogadishu may have no option but take up arms against extension beyond constitutional mandate or HSM’s plans to rig elections in his favor. Without national unity to defeat or degrade the two transnational terrorist groups in Somalia — Al-Shabab and ISIS — the imminent risk to regional and international security is very high.
With the bandwidth of the international community currently focused on other more pressing international conflicts, the world should pay close attention to the potential breakdown of Somalia’s third republic and its subsequent ramifications. Forewarned is forearmed!
By Dr. Mursal M. Khaliif
Dr. Mursal M. Khaliif is a current member of Somalia’s Federal Parliament, serving on the Defense Committee. He is also the former Minister of Planning & International Cooperation, and former Minister of Health for Jubaland State of Somalia.
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Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro’s trip to Israel in June (from 14-17) was far more than symbolism. Not only was it a calculated strategic diplomatic play, and a chance for Somaliland to appear on the world stage, but also an opportunity for Somaliland to present itself as a fully-functional state, able to conduct foreign relations and cut bilateral deals. Irro, a seasoned former diplomat, navigated the intricate demands of state protocol with remarkable ease - cutting an immaculate, regal figure in his navy-blue suit. Accorded full head-of-state honours, he laid a wreath at the Theodore Herzl mausoleum, engaged in high-level talks with President Isaac Herzog and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, opened the new Somaliland embassy in Jerusalem and convened meetings with Knesset members, senior officials, and business leaders. For Israel, hosting President Abdirahman Irro in Jerusalem functioned to signal its strong commitment to deepening strategic ties while also countering perceptions of waning diplomatic momentum.
Never interrupt your enemy when they are making a mistake. Napoleon Bonaparte’s classic rule of combat seems to be the guiding doctrine behind Al-Shabaab’s sudden, uncharacteristic radio silence as Mogadishu’s political elite tear themselves apart. As the ‘government-in-waiting’, one would have assumed the militants would take full advantage of its adversaries’ internal divisions, maximising the propaganda opportunities this offers, and campaign for their own cause. Typically quick to weaponise any intra-Somali division, the militant group's decision to sit out the latest intra-Somali fracturing is intriguing. By withholding its usual blitz of propaganda, the group is playing a longer, quieter game - waiting for the federal house to implode further before stepping in.
While much international attention is on Mogadishu – understandably so - another electoral crisis is brewing in the regional state of Galmudug. Historically unstable, prone to Al-Shabaab violence and destabilisation and wracked by chronic inter-clan frictions and periodic armed hostilities, the looming vote appears likely to aggravate the situation and foment more divisions.
Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.
'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.