From Ankara to Cairo to Doha: Villa Somalia courts the 'region'
Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's diplomatic tour continues apace. Since 26 December and Israel's bombshell recognition of Somaliland, Hassan Sheikh has travelled to Türkiye, Ethiopia, and, in recent days, Egypt and Qatar, rallying support for his government, and Somalia's "unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity." And he has found success in three of these four, with Ankara, Cairo, and Doha sitting on one side of a broader Red Sea schism against the Emirati-Israeli axis. Somaliland ally, Emirati broker and regionally isolated Ethiopia, as ever, continues to hedge its bets. But it is worth prising apart the profoundly ideological-- and non-ideological-- elements of this broader constellation that Mogadishu has hitched its fortunes to.
With the Emirates having been unceremoniously booted from Mogadishu last month at the behest of Somalia's allies, two new bilateral defence pacts with Saudi Arabia and Qatar have been rapidly hammered out. The first is with Doha, further cementing the profound linkages between Villa Somalia and the Qatari government, which has donated substantial quantities of military equipment to the federal government over the past two years. As part of this latest accord, it is believed that Doha is prepared to absorb the multi-million-dollar monthly stipends for the Somali National Army (SNA) and military police units paid by the UAE.
Perhaps more interesting, though, is Riyadh's foray into Somali politics, which had largely withdrawn since the last Gulf schism with Doha post-2017, with which the Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo government aligned itself. But the Israeli recognition of Somaliland-- facilitated by their shared ally of the UAE-- in December has drawn a somewhat-tentative Riyadh into the morass of Horn of Africa politics, in large part due to the simultaneous Emirati-backed offensive by Yemeni separatists. In turn, the Saudis have been increasingly forthright in their condemnation of the UAE interventions in Yemen and Sudan, while pressuring Mogadishu to expel the Emirates as well. Villa Somalia-- eager to access Saudi petrodollars and its geopolitical heft-- has appeared only too happy to comply.
On Monday, Somali Defence Minister Ahmed Moallim Fiqi subsequently signed the new defence memorandum of understanding with his Saudi counterpart, Prince Khalid bin Salman bin Abdulaziz, in Riyadh. Details are patchy, with a Somali government statement merely stating that it "aims to strengthen the frameworks of defence and military cooperation between the two countries, and includes multiple areas of common interest, serving the strategic interests of both parties." But coinciding with a new multi-billion dollar Pakistan-Saudi security pact and arms deal, some within Villa Somalia clearly hope that it will be taken under the wing of the dubbed 'Islamic NATO,' with Türkiye, too, seemingly weighing up joining.
That may be a tad hopeful. From a previously interventionist approach, Riyadh's foreign policy has definitively changed in recent years, described by Saudi analysts as a shift to a "zero-conflict" framing after the heavy costs imposed by its geopolitical wrestle with Iran, Qatar and Türkiye in the 2010s. As part of this, it sought a mediatory role in conflicts such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, while it has similarly sought to dampen the regional reverberations of the tumultuous Israeli-Iranian conflict. And yet, Riyadh, having also broadly focused on domestic considerations such as the NEOM project, was arguably outmanoeuvred by the Emirates in the Greater Horn of Africa and is now playing catch-up.
Ironically, it is precisely the "zero-conflict" approach that has brought Riyadh into more direct confrontation with Abu Dhabi in Sudan, Yemen, and Somalia, with Saudi Arabia preferring to support embattled central administrations. And with the UAE and Israelis pursuing a maximalist anti-Islamist agenda across the broader region, Riyadh has continued to drift further from this axis. Whether or not Riyadh donates some symbolic military equipment from Pakistan to Somalia remains to be seen, perhaps to be parked alongside the Turkish F-16 fighter jets now in Mogadishu.
But though some have framed Riyadh as becoming a more explicitly Islamist force, that is somewhat of a misnomer-- or at least should be nuanced. Though Saudi Arabia has no doubt been a historic exporter of Wahhabist beliefs via mosques and madrasas, including in Somalia, it simultaneously harbours a mistrust of the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islamism that could threaten the monarchy's grip on the petrodollar state. For instance, while the Saudis and Egyptians are both explicit-- and increasingly bullish-- supporters of the Sudanese army, so too have their capitals made abundantly clear their displeasure with the Islamist flavour within the military. Last year, Cairo explicitly summoned Sudanese Armed Forces General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to make these reservations known, while recent comments from Saudi officials similarly highlighted their concerns about the influential role of former members of the National Congress Party.
For Egypt, meanwhile, the warm welcome afforded to the Somali president last week should be understood in the broader context of its forays into the Horn of Africa, still predominantly centred on the Sudanese civil war and the enduring contestation with Ethiopia over the use of Nile waters. Though Addis and Mogadishu relations have markedly improved since the nadir of 2024, when Ethiopia flirted with Somaliland recognition, Cairo continues to seek a pressure point on Ethiopia's south-eastern border as it strives for 'sea access'. It is apparent that Egypt holds no particular ideological enmity towards Somaliland —or affinity with Mogadishu —but rather considers these relationships as part of the broader geostrategic picture. But the Somali president is having to play a balancing act as well, which partially explains his recent visit to Ethiopia before travelling to Egypt.
The same is not true for two other close Somali allies, Ankara and Doha. Qatar is explicitly more ideological in its dealings, with its vision for the broader region going far beyond the geostrategic competition of Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, with which it has fostered closer ties since the al-Ula accord in 2021. For decades, Doha has played a particularly prominent role in the elevation of Salafist and Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated movements, often drawing the ire of the other Gulf monarchies. It has simultaneously positioned itself as a peace broker for Islamist insurgencies, hosting talks between Hamas and Israel since 2023, as well as between the Taliban and the US government. And in Somalia, it has maintained clandestine lines of communication with Al-Shabaab, repeatedly seeking to engage with Mogadishu about the prospects of 'peace talks,' including laying much of the groundwork during the Farmaajo administration. A brief interlude with the return of Hassan Sheikh to Villa Somalia in 2022 has given way to restored Doha-Mogadishu ties.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Ankara, meanwhile, has rolled back many of the sectarian elements of the Turkish state of the 20th century, with political Islamism epitomised in its domestic identity. And so has Erdogan sought to export a flavour of his Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated movement in the region, backing a range of like-minded forces, including in Libya and parts of North Africa. For the ruling Justice and Solidarity Party in Somalia, formed around a clique of Damul Jadiid-linked politicians, this fits squarely within Erdogan's neo-Ottoman vision. And unlike Egypt, which collaborates with Israel in the Mediterranean theatre, Ankara is appearing to double down on Turkish military investment in Somalia as a counterbalance to Tel Aviv's own attempts to move into the Somali peninsula.
Finally, it is apparent that Mogadishu can wear many hats, playing up its Islamist credentials in Doha, its state-building vision to European partners, or anti-Emirati positioning in Riyadh. But it is also revealing who Villa Somalia dispatches to foreign capitals along the Red Sea to shore up its position. No doubt Hassan Sheikh may grab the headlines as the president, but a coterie of nationalist-- and Islamist-- politicians have been on foreign manoeuvres since the end of December. Prominent among them is, as ever, the hawkish Fiqi, but so are the State Foreign Minister Ali Omar Bal'ad, one of the most aggressive defenders of Somali unionism, and Education Minister Farah Abdulkadir, a prominent Damul Jadiid-member often referred to as the 'de facto prime minister,' such is his influence within government. Villa Somalia's strength in this diplomatic moment lies precisely in its ideological elasticity. Reformist Islamists within Damul Jadiid are comfortable in Doha and Ankara, while security-first nationalists find ready partners in Cairo and Riyadh. Some of these linkages are no doubt intended to endure beyond the end of Hassan Sheikh's term-- fast-approaching in May.
And for now, Mogadishu appears to have secured diplomatic cover from four heavyweight regional capitals-- Ankara, Cairo, Riyadh and Doha. But the constellation it is binding itself to is neither wholly unified nor stable, with two distinct wings within this axis. Somalia may have found friends in the Red Sea arena, but it is also tying its sovereignty to a geopolitical moment that could shift as quickly as it formed.
The Somali Wire Team
