Two bloody days in Baidoa
A tentative calm has returned to the South West city of Baidoa. On Wednesday afternoon, heavy fighting broke out in the town's western neighbourhoods, and after two days of bloody clashes, dozens appear to be injured or killed. What began as a land dispute near Baidoa's livestock market quickly degenerated, pulling in forces aligned with a federal minister as intense gunfire and mortars rocked the city. This was no small matter —and despite assertions that it was a case of disarming rogue forces, it was anything but, and instead appears to be the latest product of ratcheting electoral tensions. With South West President Abdiaziz Laftagareen today announcing the expulsion of the government's most senior electoral official from Baidoa, is this the final straw for the fractious Baidoa-Mogadishu relationship?
Though fighting began near the livestock market, it soon spread to incorporate the forces of Colonel Abdirahman Niishow, a prominent member of the 60th Somali National Army (SNA) Brigade and opposition-linked figure. Hailing from the Rahanweyne/Hadame, Niishow, too, is believed to be on the other side of the land dispute, with South West President Abdiaziz Laftagareen seemingly spying an opportunity to neuter a thorn in his side in a pivotal election year. An attempt on Wednesday afternoon to detain the colonel escalated the fighting further, while the clashes in the Hawlwadag neighbourhood then spread to the nearby residence of the federal Minister of Livestock, Hassan Hussein Mohamed 'Eelay', as well. Armed deadlock persisted into Thursday, with rival forces exchanging gunfire throughout the day until the South West troops eventually seemingly subdued their opposition. Though subdued today, there are concerns that well-armed opposition forces may yet reconstitute themselves and launch renewed raids.
Images and videos of staccato heavy machine-gun fire and civilians scurrying for cover have been widely shared, painting a scene of intense chaos in the administrative capital of South West. And as almost as soon as the fighting began, accusations and counter-accusations abounded between the parties involved, with allies of the South West administration accusing the federal government of complicity or outright orchestration of the fighting. Senator Aadam Abdinasir stated that "one of its ministers is involved in the violence," meaning Eelay, while another MP and ally of Laftagareen, Abdirisaq Midnimo, claimed that the clashes were "deliberately planned and instigated" by the federal government-- which has remained conspicuously silent. Others, too, have claimed that Eelay and Niishow were building up forces within Baidoa as part of a broader plot to destabilise the city and even potentially overthrow Laftagareen.
Despite their nominal alliance, Villa Somalia has repeatedly resorted to various destabilisation tactics against Baidoa over the past two years, including flirting with hosting long-overdue parallel elections in Baraawe. Last August, the government drew two former speakers of parliament from South West —Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden and Mohammed Mursal —into Villa Somalia's camp, further accentuating tensions, though Laftagareen has more recently reconciled with Mursal. And there is also an enduring suspicion that Villa Somalia may seek to drive regional elections in Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and South West as another ploy to delay the May 2026 presidential polls. Further fueling the furious speculation has been the presence of another close government ally and Laftagareen adversary, Speaker of Parliament Aden Madoobe, in Addis this week.
Addis remains the principal security guarantor of Laftagareen, with Ethiopian troops maintaining a significant presence within and near Baidoa as part of their military umbrella along their Somali border. The Ethiopian army presence at the airport, too, has been critical for Laftagareen to stave off any threats to his position as regional president, with the South West leader routinely blocking opposition figures from landing in Baidoa. Speaker Madoobe, on the other hand, can leverage substantial influence in the Bakool region, and his relationship with Laftagareen has often veered negatively. However, whether Madoobe was lobbying Ethiopian officials to sanction the government's removal of Laftagareen — whom Villa Somalia deeply mistrusts —remains a matter of speculation.
But the South West Minister of Information, Mohamed Ibrahim Bilal, speaking in the aftermath of the fighting yesterday, hedged his bets, simply accusing the armed men of being bandits who attacked regional security forces. He denied that it was motivated by political differences, nor that politicians were involved. But Laftagareen has now taken a much harder line, speaking at a mosque today, calling the fighting a deliberate ploy to undermine Baidoa's security. The South West president alleged that individuals affiliated with the federal government were responsible for the violence, and that no non-governmental armed group or unrest would be tolerated. It marks one of the strongest interventions by the often withdrawn regional leader in the past year and a clear reflection of his displeasure at perceived meddling by Villa Somalia.
Eelay is a well-known rival of Laftagareen, and this is not the first time the federal minister has been accused of stoking conflict in Baidoa. Reports of divisions within the federal cabinet have also subsequently emerged, with Eelay laying the blame on South West authorities and claiming that they were undermining the federal electoral process. In another twist to the story, the Baidoa clashes broke out this week, with the Villa Somalia-appointed commissioner of the National Electoral Board present in Baidoa, part of the putative groundwork for 'national' —and highly controversial —direct elections. Though Laftagareen is known to harbour major doubts about the feasibility of such an election,
It may be a series of unfortunate errors that resulted in dozens being injured and killed in Baidoa this week-- doubly concerning with the city's largest population of IDPs and with Al-Shabaab ensconced in its peripheries. But there is little doubt that the distrust between Laftagareen and Hassan Sheikh runs deep, though a wary self-interested truce between the two has been maintained for some time. As often remarked, Laftagareen's continued acquiescence to the government's electoral agenda remains critical to any veneer of legitimacy. The Rahanweyne leader is the only elected non-Hawiye politician —barring the installation of the North-Eastern State (NES) Dhulbahante president last year —still within Villa Somalia's camp. His position has critically allowed the federal government greater leeway to not only paint the presidents of Jubaland and Puntland as obstructionists, but to cast Villa Somalia's planned 'direct' vote as a genuinely national endeavour. Still, Laftagareen has hardly the credentials of a genuine democrat, and it remains dubious at best that the South West leader would countenance a contest-- direct or otherwise-- not under his control in Baidoa.
With only a few months to go before elections, pressure is mounting on all sides to negotiate a path through this deadlocked morass, with Laftagareen's position becoming ever more critical. Thus, the decision by members of the federal government —whether sanctioned by Villa Somalia or not —to drive a fresh wedge with Laftagareen beggars belief. And if the government's electoral commissioner is indeed expelled —though Laftagareen also has a reputation for vacillation —it could not come at a worse moment for Villa Somalia. If South West were to join Puntland and Jubaland in opposition to Villa Somalia, federal authority would be confined to a rump, Hawiye territory, vigorously contested by Al-Shabaab and Hassan Sheikh's political opposition. If Baidoa now slips from Villa Somalia's fragile orbit, the illusion of a managed political transition may finally unravel faster than anyone in Mogadishu expects.
The Somali Wire Team
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