Villa Somalia Grounds Hopes of Dialogue
Last week, the brief glimmer towards a path to resolving Somalia's turgid political impasse was extinguished almost as soon as it emerged. The Council for the Future of Somalia (CFS) was supposedly heading to Mogadishu, including Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni and his Jubaland counterpart Ahmed Madoobe, for talks with Villa Somalia, though their scope remained murky, and optimism that the government would be willing to consider compromise remained dim. But even these initial talks —and the first face-to-face meeting between Deni, Madoobe, and President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Mogadishu for well over two years —were doomed from the off.
First, any pretence that this is a government interested in compromise fast fell away with the sudden attempts to ram another set of centralising amendments to Chapters 5-9 of the Provisional Constitution through parliament last week. On 28 January, amid chaotic scenes, Speaker Aden Madoobe — who has overseen the persistent degradation of the federal parliament —tabled a raft of amendments without warning, attempting to distribute copies to parliamentarians for immediate voting. A member of the president's ruling Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP), Madoobe has been instrumental in cajoling and coercing parliament, repeatedly abandoning all sense of decorum to pass key pieces of legislation without debate, including a controversial Turkish hydrocarbon extraction agreement that would hand Ankara nearly all of Somalia's black gold. But the brazen attempt to push through amendments to Chapters 5-9 was met with fierce resistance, and ugly scenes soon descended in parliament. In one widely shared video, Internal Security Minister Abdullahi Ismail 'Fartaag' is seen grappling with Hassan Yare, an opposition MP. One of the architects of the violent destabilisation of Gedo last year, Fartaag has remained one of the government's most assertive enforcers-- now apparently inside parliament as well.
These ham-fisted amendments, an attempt to institutionalise the government's dismembering of federalism, represent another shot across the bow to the opposition as well, which has repeatedly stated that withdrawing the unilateral amendments to Chapters 1-4 in 2024 was a key starting point for negotiations. The sweeping revisions in March of that year triggered Puntland's withdrawal from the federation, splitting Somalia constitutionally in twain and leading to the enduring, destructive political impasse. And as often stated, any changes to the Provisional Constitution require broad consultation with Federal Member States as well as careful, sequential parliamentary procedure, not provocative ploys to cement a single leader's position in Villa Somalia to the detriment of the country.
This morning, disorderly scenes erupted in parliament again, with Speaker Madoobe attempting to push ahead with the revised chapters. But having already barred several 'disruptive' opposition lawmakers yesterday, other MPs sought to block access to the podium and prevent further political vandalism. Police appear to have been subsequently deployed into the chamber, resulting in more violent scuffles and several injured parliamentarians. A tentative calm may have been restored, but it is galling that parliamentary leaders are content with not only deploying security forces into the chamber but also hustling through such monumental amendments in a manner contrary to the Provisional Constitution and all best practice of constitution-making. Representing another blow to the beleaguered political settlement, these ploys by Villa Somalia are only making the prospect of a parallel electoral process all the more real.
And then the second blow came —Villa Somalia suddenly banned the presidential guards from Puntland and Jubaland from deploying to Mogadishu over the weekend ahead of their principals, despite the opposition and government technical teams having previously agreed to it. The sudden about-turn forced Puntland and Jubaland's planes to abort their journeys, returning to Garowe and Kismaayo and scuttling the talks immediately. Though the farcical arrest warrant for Madoobe was dropped in the prelude to the negotiations, it was not an inconsiderable concession for Deni and the Jubaland leader to agree to meet in Mogadishu, considering the government-fomented violence against their administrations in Sool and Gedo, as well as the concerted efforts to subdue any opposition within the capital.
Ahmed Fiqi, the hawkish defence minister, has vainly tried to defend Mogadishu's turning back of the preparatory flights on X, asserting that the few dozen presidential guards might stockpile weapons in Halane and that these might somehow pose a "serious threat to national security." This is nonsensical; the talks were scheduled for Halane—perhaps the most heavily armed square kilometres in the country—and instead it is a clear post hoc attempt to justify preventing Deni and Madoobe from arriving in Mogadishu. And lectures on national security from Fiqi similarly fall on deaf ears, given his persistent attempts to dismember Somaliland and Puntland, and his more recent installation of a wildly inexperienced military official as the Chief of the Defence Forces at Ankara's behest. There are more than legitimate reasons the two Darood leaders would be cautious about arriving in Mogadishu without some form of security guarantees.
Nor would Deni or Madoobe be the first leaders to travel to the capital with armed units in tow, with opposition figures and senior politicians well-known to traverse the capital in shows of force or in the interest of genuine security. But this, too, has been curtailed by Villa Somalia, particularly in the wake of the mass protests against the government's land-clearance campaigns in 2025. Now, the last-minute re-routing of the flights calls to mind-- again-- Hassan Sheikh's predecessor, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo, who was often fond of weaponising aviation against his domestic political opponents, seeking to routinely deny them access to the national capital. It is another clear signal that Hassan Sheikh is doing all he can to avoid being challenged in Mogadishu by making any starting position so unpalatable that the opposition movement cannot agree to the conditions, allowing Villa Somalia to then attempt to paint them as obstructionist has-beens.
While such tactics hold little weight with domestic or international observers, every week overshadowed by the inauguration of a new federal member state, the fallout from Israel's recognition of Somaliland, and now a host of destructive constitutional amendments, the end of Hassan Sheikh's term edges ever closer. And this week, the date to the presidential elections in May will dip under 100 days-- and the possibility of a de facto term extension grows. What then?
The de-fanged UN mission, as well as the EU and others, has voiced regret that the Puntland and Jubaland missions were denied access to the capital. But despite the occasional glut of rhetorical condemnation and calls for Somali elites to come together, the genuinely influential budgetary and political tools at the international community's disposal do not appear forthcoming, such as suspending World Bank budget support, or at least not in any strategic, concerted manner. Indeed, the riven diplomatic missions —overshadowed by the Gulf —appear set to sleepwalk into a potentially catastrophic political crisis. But they can hardly plead neutrality as the EU and World Bank continue to fund the largesse of this Mogadishu-constrained government.
The CFS are holding talks today, gameplanning of what comes next if the Mogadishu talks collapse entirely. But it does appear untenable that the Somali capital can be used as the site for negotiations unless Villa Somalia demonstrably shows that it will not meddle-- a tall ask indeed. Even so, with several CFS members keeping an eye on the presidency, there are limits to how far Deni and others may be willing to push the prospect of a parallel administration. A Mogadishu-consolidated process would allow the Puntland leader a far cleaner, internationally recognised shot at Villa Somalia, while consolidating power in Garowe is no small matter either, given the active destabilisation of his western border with North-Eastern State as well as Villa Somalia's own ploys in the north. Jubaland, on the other hand, has been a touch more forthright in applying pressure to Mogadishu, with Madoobe having already suggested that Kismaayo would proceed with electing its own senators to the Upper House last month. Kismaayo may also consider recalling its parliamentarians in the coming weeks.
The opposition may not have the immediate means to hold parallel elections, but that does not mean there are no levers at the disposal of Jubaland, Puntland, and other senior opposition politicians. In the wake of the harmful travesty of the revisions to Chapters 5-9 of the constitution, Garowe and Kismaayo may well proceed with the election of their own lawmakers so as to further signal their rejection of the corroded parliament. The formation of a national salvation council is another option, though the alternative authority to Mogadishu would likely need to draw on its links to Ethiopia, Kenya and the UAE to be relevant. But if Mogadishu will not make space for compromise, the country will make space for fragmentation.
The Somali Wire Team
