Issue No. 918

Published 28 Jan

Recognition in the Age of Tempest

Published on 28 Jan 20:52 min

Recognition in the Age of Tempest


One month has passed since Israel became the first UN member state to formally recognise Somaliland's sovereignty, a decision that has placed Hargeisa at the centre of a significant geopolitical storm. Despite the initial euphoria in Somaliland, the anticipated cascade of diplomatic recognition from other countries has yet to materialise. Yet, hope still abounds and officials in Somaliland are busy plotting their next move.

President Abdirahman Irro was in Davos, Switzerland, last week to attend the World Economic Forum, as part of a strategic public relations effort orchestrated by the UAE ports operator DP World. The aim was to highlight Somaliland's stability and democratic credentials to the global elite. President Irro met with high-level individuals, including business tycoon Eric Trump, presenting the case for recognition as a business proposition: a stable, democratic state controlling a vital maritime chokepoint, rich in natural resources, and home to the modern port of Berbera. However, recent statements have clarified that although brief pleasantries were exchanged between the two, no private meeting or substantive discussion took place.

The move by Israel triggered diplomatic fallout with Somalia, with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) intentionally conflating its mounting domestic political and security crises with the new external threat – a classic "diversionary conflict" – to boost national support. Attempts by Mogadishu to inflame emotions and ignite a popular uprising against the recognition backfired badly. Reactions in Jubaland and Puntland appear to have been decidedly muted.  In a speech which arguably captures the dominant view in the south beyond the Mogadishu bubble, Jubaland President Ahmed Madoobe accused the Hassan Sheikh administration of contributing significantly to the crisis of “Somaliland’s estrangement” and the sense of alienation that compelled Hargeisa to “seek recognition from and embrace Israel”.

The events of the past month have shown the pitfalls - if not the folly - of geopolitical ‘catastrophising.’ First, the wild claims that Somalia would immediately collapse and the Horn would implode if Somaliland were recognised have been wide of the mark. This apocalyptic vision, pushed zealously by Villa Somalia, was always dubious, a red herring to scare the internationals and deter a realistic assessment of Somaliland and why it merits greater international recognition. 

Somaliland’s recognition is coming at a fraught moment, and understanding the wider global picture is essential. In Davos, leaders bemoaned the collapse of the rule-based world order. Canada’s Mark Carney was even more forthright in a speech to the delegates: “Let me be direct. We are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition.” The Canadian leader is partially correct in his assessment. In the Horn, some analysts have latched onto the Somaliland recognition to amplify the vision of a world unravelling – a form of geopolitical conflation. 

There is little doubt that the world has entered its most precarious geopolitical era since 1945. Intense competition has started among emerging powers seeking to establish new spheres of influence, and a record escalation in lethal armed conflicts. This global upheaval is driven by a fierce scramble for natural resources, access to external markets, and control over chokepoints, strategic maritime trade corridors and waterways. As the United States appears to retreat from traditional theatres and the alliance structures that once maintained the Pax Americana, a volatile vacuum has emerged, fueling a chaotic race by major powers to redefine the international order.

Today's geopolitical turmoil must be examined alongside other significant shifts and megatrends: the merging of various conflict systems across large areas, the breakdown of the post-war multilateral system, the rise of transaction-based foreign policy, and the growth of youth-driven mass uprisings. These issues are exacerbated by intensifying climate change stresses, economic difficulties, worsening state fragility, and general political instability. 

​It is prudent to caution against ‘catastrophising’ the current flux. Geopolitical upheavals are often cyclical rather than linear, driven by recurring patterns of generational shifts, power transfers, and socio-economic dynamics. Undeniably, the world is currently traversing a critical ‘crisis’ phase of these long-term cycles. This period of disruption, while marking the unravelling of the post-Cold War order, is also a period of adaptation and the formation of new balances of power. The perceived chaos may in fact be a transition phase towards a "new muddled order", where states are actively forging new bilateral and regional agreements and building resilience to current shocks, rather than facing an inevitable collapse into global disorder.

The fallout between Saudi Arabia and the UAE is serious and playing directly into the Somaliland recognition crisis. It could inflame tensions and drive proxy conflicts. Gulf alliances are generally tenuous, and there is no strong evidence yet to suggest that the rift between the two former allies is not amenable. In fact, history and precedent suggest that the Saudis and the Emiratis would eventually prefer reconciliation to a protracted feud, which saps their collective strength. The two may work out ways to deconflict their interests in Somalia, Somaliland and Yemen. Mogadishu’s bet on enlisting the Saudis in its war against Somaliland and Israel is unlikely to succeed.​

There are many trigger points for armed conflict and wider instability. Arguably, the gravest risk may be the escalating tensions between Turkiye and Israel, not all of which is driven by Somaliland and the recognition issue. The two powers are increasingly at odds over many issues, and strategists on both sides contend that the danger of a possible future conflict is mounting.

Israel is a Red Sea littoral state historically more interested in states closer to home – Egypt, Sudan and Eritrea. Sudan’s Red Sea coast was the staging post of an Israeli operation in the 1980s  and early 1990s  to smuggle thousands of Falasha Ethiopian Jews to Israel. In Eritrea, Israel maintained an electronic signals intercept station in one of the Dahlak Islands. The foray into Somaliland extends Israel’s range down the vital sea lane and brings it into close proximity with Turkiye  – the pre-eminent external player in Somalia. Israel’s primary strategic interest is to capitalise on its new Somaliland foothold to degrade the Houthis in Yemen and to counter Iran. 

Tel Aviv and Ankara are astute regional players, with historically strong diplomatic relations and the capacity to engage to deconflict their volatile Somalia/Somalia stakes. The two are already doing that in Syria. International actors with leverage and good ties to these two formidable adversaries must step in to de-escalate.

The Somali Wire Team

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