President Hassan Sheikh’s Call for Dialogue, Polarisation in Practice
Today’s editorial in The Somali Wire is written by Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame, a prominent Somali political figure and former senior government official. The views expressed in this piece are his own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Somali Wire.
We publish this contribution in order to allow our readers insight into the arguments advanced by key protagonists in an ongoing public dispute, and to encourage informed debate on issues shaping Somalia’s political future.
We would like to extend an invitation to others who may wish to contribute to The Somali Wire in the future. We appreciate insightful perspectives on topics concerning Somalia crafted as editorials. Please contact us for more information if interested.
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has announced a call for dialogue between his government and the Future Council of Somalia – the main umbrella opposition bringing together the leadership of Puntland and Jubaland, as well as the Somali Salvation Council. The Future Council has accepted the invitation, and a meeting is scheduled for 1 February. Technical teams from both sides are already working to prepare and facilitate the talks, including addressing potential obstacles to the conference, such as the arrest warrant issued by the federal government against the President of Jubaland.
Yet, despite this formal gesture toward dialogue, the President’s actions continue to contradict its spirit. The same administration calling for talks is pressing ahead with the very measures that ignited the current political crisis – most notably, the unilateral amendment of the Constitution, including changes to four constitutional chapters.
The President frequently argues that the opposition – most of whom were candidates in the 2022 elections, myself included – had pledged to review the Constitution. This claim is only partially true and deeply misleading. What was pledged was constitutional review, not constitutional replacement.
From the standpoint of constitutional law, particularly in fragile countries emerging from prolonged civil conflict, it is well established that constitutions often leave certain provisions – especially those governing the distribution, allocation, and exercise of power, resources, and revenues – deliberately imprecise. This ambiguity is not a defect; it is a stabilising mechanism. It allows competing political forces to negotiate and reach consensus first, after which any agreed constitutional settlement is presented to the public for approval through a referendum.
Crucially, the Somali Provisional Constitution itself provides a clear and binding procedure for constitutional amendments under Article 132. That procedure has been blatantly violated.
The President, together with the Speakers of both Houses breached the constitutional amendment process by altering the Founding Principles enshrined in Chapter 1 of the Constitution. These are not technical or marginal provisions; they form the constitutional bedrock of the Somali state.
The amendment process was conducted without transparency and without meaningful public participation. In particular, the authorities failed to:
Allow the public to submit comments and proposals to the joint constitutional committee; and
Engage Federal Member State legislatures or incorporate their harmonised submissions, despite the fact that the amendments directly affect Federal Member State powers and interests.
The exclusion of key stakeholders is undeniable. Puntland and Jubaland formally boycotted the process, as did leading opposition figures from the Somali Salvation Council. Meanwhile, the remaining three Federal Member States were operating with expired mandates, further undermining the legitimacy of the entire exercise.
Moreover, the Federal Parliament did not lawfully adopt the proposed amendments. The process failed to meet the constitutional requirements of:
A two-thirds (2/3) majority of existing members in the House of the People; and
final approval by at least two-thirds (2/3) of existing members in the Upper House.
With only three months remaining in his term, the President faces rejection from Puntland and Jubaland, as well as from the Mogadishu-based opposition Salvation Forum. Importantly, all these actors have repeatedly stated their willingness to engage in good-faith dialogue with the President and his team. Yet instead of confidence-building and creating a conducive environment for negotiations, the President has chosen escalation and polarisation.
The underlying objective of this approach is clear: securing a term extension. This also explains the President’s opposition to elections in South West State, Galmudug, and Hirshabelle after their mandates expired. Extension of the presidential term has become the central driver of the current constitutional confrontation.
Taken together, these actions demonstrate that the call for dialogue is not made in good faith. It is not aimed at reconciliation or consensus, but at manufacturing political consent and cover for unilateral decisions and a potential term-extension.
Nevertheless, the opposition remains committed to engaging in dialogue in a spirit of reconciliation and national responsibility. It will not, however, be passive or complicit in tactics designed to impose a term extension. Extension is a red line which must and cannot be crossed.
This moment therefore demands wider engagement beyond the political elites. The Somali people must assert their role as the ultimate source of constitutional authority. The business community, academia, religious scholars, civil society organisations, and professional associations must speak out clearly and publicly.
The international community, too, must recognise that the era of quiet, private messaging has passed. What is required now is public, principled pressure on the President to halt his unilateral, divisive, and polarising actions and to return the country to a lawful, inclusive, and consensual constitutional process.
There is no greater danger facing Somalia than the prospect of governing without legitimacy after May 15. This is the most urgent and critical challenge confronting the nation today.
To conclude, a final, binding and consensual national framework for the upcoming vote before the mandate of the incumbent government expires is not optional: it is essential to preserving the constitutional order, political stability, and the future of the Somali state.
Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame is a member of the Somali Federal Parliament, an opposition leader, the chairman of the Wadajir Party, and a presidential candidate in the forthcoming elections of 2026.
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
While much international attention is on Mogadishu – understandably so - another electoral crisis is brewing in the regional state of Galmudug. Historically unstable, prone to Al-Shabaab violence and destabilisation and wracked by chronic inter-clan frictions and periodic armed hostilities, the looming vote appears likely to aggravate the situation and foment more divisions.
Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.
A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.
Last weekend, the Murusade, a major sub-clan of the powerful Hawiye clan family, staged one of the largest and most colourful coronations of a clan chief in recent memory in Mogadishu. The caleemasarka (enthronement) of Ugaas Abdirizaq Ugaas Abdullahi Ugaas Haashi, the new Ugaas or sultan of the Murusade, was attended by thousands of delegates from all parts of Somalia. Conducted next to the imposing and magnificent Ottomanesque Ali Jim'ale Mosque, on the Muslim day of rest, Friday, the occasion blended the Islamic, the regal and the customary; a restatement of an ancient tradition very much alive and vibrant.
With all eyes trained on the Strait of Hormuz blockades and their geopolitical convulsions, discussions and concerns, too, have risen about the perils of other globalised chokepoints, not least the Bab al-Mandab. The threats to the stability of the Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea may not arise principally from the escalatory logic that the US, Iran, and Israel have been locked in, but the threats posed from collapse and contested sovereignty offer little relief. Off Somalia's northern coastline in particular, it is transnational criminal networks — expressed in smuggling, piracy, and, less visibly but no less consequentially, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing — that define the character of offshore insecurity. It is this last phenomenon that provides the foundation on which much of Somalia's maritime disorder is built, and which remains the most consistently neglected.