Issue No. 916

Somalia's Electoral Deadlock Deepens

At the 11th hour on 19 January, Villa Somalia tried its old hand once again. With the opposition’s deadline looming the next day—and risking the emergence of a parallel process—the Office of the Prime Minister, not even the president, issued a cagey statement calling for a national consultative forum in Mogadishu on 1 February. No agreed participants, no apparent agenda, and held in a city where Jubaland President Ahmed Islam 'Madoobe' has an outstanding arrest warrant, it appears to be another non-starter; just another bout of lip service with federal elections just a few months away.

It is difficult to take the invitation to the national dialogue at face value, not least because it was released only hours before the deadline set by the opposition following the Kismaayo conference. The communique following the 18-20 December summit had lambasted the collapse of Somalia's security, the amendments to the Provisional Constitution, the government's land clearances in Mogadishu, and a raft of other issues. Further, the communique stated that the assorted leaders would seek to prevent a constitutional vacuum, calling for the federal president to meet with stakeholders before 20 January. Above all, the opposition is seeking a mediated consensus on an election that can offer a timely transition, alongside urging the government to drop the unilateral amendments to the Provisional Constitution. But the government has shown no indication that it is willing to negotiate on any of these issues; quite the opposite, it has repeatedly wielded the charade of talks to push ahead with its unilateral agenda.

The UN and the UK both credited the proposal for an inclusive Mogadishu meeting yesterday, encouraging the opposition to attend. But it is still ambiguous if the federal government will again convene an essentially expanded National Consultative Council (NCC) meeting or a genuine stakeholder process. So far, indications suggest the former-- as was the case across 2025. One need only recall the NCC meeting in May 2025: following a surging Al-Shabaab advance, the government prevaricated before ultimately using the forum to rubber-stamp its electoral agenda—and then announcing the ruling Justice and Solidarity Party in its wake. Amid a resurgent Al-Shabaab and the flurry of political crises, the gradual neutering of the NCC — a body once intended to help negotiate the completion of the federal model — has been much overlooked. 

Even the prospect of it being held in Mogadishu makes it improbable that Madoobe or his Puntland counterpart, Said Abdullahi Deni, will attend, particularly given that PM Hamza Barre made it clear just a few days ago that Villa Somalia does not recognise the authority of the Jubaland president. At the same time, Mogadishu has once again amplified its destabilisation ploys against Puntland, including by arming and emboldening the North-Eastern State on its western flank. The presence of Asad Diyaano-- federal police commander, Puntland Security Forces head, and Majerteen/Osman Mohamoud opposition figurehead-- in Laas Aanood last week was well noted in Garowe, as was that of members of the Araan Jaan clique. None of this chimes with the sense of a government genuinely willing to negotiate its sweeping constitutional and electoral agenda.

There has yet to be a formal response from the opposition, though technical committee member Mohamed Adan Koofi said the group is discussing a political roadmap aimed at safeguarding national unity and constitutional order. But a meeting is anticipated soon in Nairobi to chart a path forward, with Madoobe, Deni, former President Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed, and others expected to attend. The Council is preparing for another conference in Garowe as well, believed to be intended to outline proposals for a peaceful, constitutional transfer of power if Hassan Sheikh exceeds his term limit. Still, the opposition itself remains a somewhat fractious coalition of convenience, even now being short on a shared electoral blueprint. Nevertheless, Jubaland President Ahmed Madoobe, earlier this month at the reopening of the regional parliament, suggested he would proceed with the appointment of senators to the Upper House, and Puntland may well follow suit.

Even so, it is all but inevitable that Hassan Sheikh will remain in power beyond May; there simply is not enough time to build the necessary electoral infrastructure to facilitate indirect state and federal elections. For the opposition, however, a short technical term extension to facilitate these polls may be acceptable, but a carte blanche 12-month continuation of Hassan Sheikh's presidency remains inconceivable. Yet there are also growing concerns that the federal president will use the cover of Israeli recognition as a guise for declaring a national emergency of some sort, and potentially seek to delay elections. While President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has tried —and failed —to giddy up nationalist sentiment, it is the worst-kept secret in Mogadishu that he is seeking a term extension by any means possible. And a broader conflict in northern Somalia between the host of vying geopolitical and Somali forces there might well provide another cover for a de facto term extension as well. 

While there remains a broad expectation in some corners that the Somali political elite will find a path through the current deadlock, finding a solution to the constitutionally divided country is no small ask. Last time out in 2021 under Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo, it took the near-overrunning of Villa Somalia by incensed Hawiye militias to force the crisis-- amplified by pressure from an engaged and invested international community. What might force a similar situation this time is less clear, particularly given that Hassan Sheikh has worked to create a series of parallel security structures within Mogadishu. Further, it is doubtful whether the 'traditional' international community remains sufficiently exercised to wield budgetary suspension or the tools at its disposal to force a settlement—or, indeed, in the age of the Gulf, whether that is enough. Since the mutual recognition of Israel and Somaliland, Doha, Riyadh, and Ankara are believed to have funnelled millions of dollars into Villa Somalia.

Buoyed by intervention from these powers, it appears ever less likely that the federal government will make the necessary compromises for a broadly accepted election. And what comes next? With no viable national dialogue or route to an indirect election, the electoral deadlock is certain to persist and push the fragile political order closer to breaking point. But almost conversely, the state may be able to survive when the settlement doesn't. Billions of dollars poured into Somalia have created the shell of a state, but the organs of a bureaucracy do not reflect the underpinnings of a shared political agreement. This is the grim irony of the 'Mogadishu Rising' narrative-- a capital ostensibly ascendant yet a government fomenting conflict across the country. Perhaps the danger, then, is not that Somalia suddenly falls apart, but that it settles into a brittle equilibrium, with federal member states and the government acting as autonomous political-security units, insulated by external patrons and local force.

The Somali Wire Team