Issue No. 903

What's happening in Jamaame?

On social media, videos and images of jubilant Jubaland Daraawiish forces celebrating have circulated of late, alongside claims that they were recorded in Jamaame town in Lower Juba. Somali news outlets have similarly declared that Jubaland troops-- backed by Danab special forces-- are now closing in on the town, one of the principal headquarters of Al-Shabaab in southern Somalia. With the broader security auspices across south-central Somalia remaining so grim, it has been gratefully seized upon as some progress against an ascendant Al-Shabaab. Yet much of this is just noise, obscuring the nature of the Kismaayo-directed security operations and airstrikes that have been ongoing since early September in Lower Juba.

Coming amid a severely deteriorated relationship between Jubaland and the federal government, these operations are among the only active concerted attempts to disrupt and pressure Al-Shabaab positions in the country. But rather than preparing for the bloody prospect of liberating and holding Jamaame town, the assorted forces have primarily sought to weaken the jihadist grip along the prized farmland along the River Juba. Long-held by Al-Shabaab, the eastern bank of the river hosts several major jihadist towns. But on the west bank, Jubaland Darawiish, Gashaan paramilitaries and Danab troops have targeted Al-Shabaab positions in the Araare, Muusa Xaaji, and Kobon villages in recent weeks. Some probing operations across the swollen river have been recorded —amplified online by various videos of Jubaland troops on boats —but the scale of the operations is much smaller than reported. The assertions that the Jubaland troops are at the gates of Jamaame are sadly an exaggeration as well, with the activity remaining several kilometres from the fiercely defended town—with the Juba River in the way. Al-Shabaab, too, is preparing various military responses to the Jamaame operations, including reports of planning for high-profile spectacular attacks in Kismaayo.

For the most part, these Jubaland operations appear intended instead to clear and disrupt Al-Shabaab positions rather than to pursue a process of permanent 'stabilisation', with Jubaland forces having largely returned to their Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in Kismaayo, Gaduud and Bar Sanguuni. The question of stabilisation is another thorny issue altogether. Mostly non-Ogaadeen communities populate the Jamaame district, particularly the Somali Bantu —an umbrella term encompassing many of the marginal riverine-dwelling clans, as well as pockets of Dir and Hawiye. Many of these communities have a historical anathema towards the Ogaadeen-dominated Kismaayo and are known to harbour resentment at any prospect of Darood subjugation, an issue long-exploited by Al-Shabaab. Any notion of Ogaadeen-majority forces 'liberating' and holding these areas remains eminently complex, particularly without the requisite political groundwork to mollify deep-seated grievances for these clans and communities. Indeed, somewhat ironically, Jubaland President Ahmed Madoobe's latest outreach to the Mareehaan to counterbalance Mogadishu's destabilising entreats this year may further accentuate concerns about Darood domination of the Juba Valley.

This is not to dismiss the significance of these operations out of hand, but to temper expectations. One positive element of the offensive has been the increase in airstrikes targeting Al-Shabaab positions in Jilib and Jamaame to disperse jihadists, part of the broader uptick in strikes carried out predominantly by AFRICOM this year. Since Trump's return to the White House, the number of strikes in Somalia has surged, with AFRICOM already carrying out over 100 this year, far more than under the Biden administration. In particular, dozens have targeted the Islamic State-Somalia (ISS) faction embedded in the Cal-Miskaad mountains in support of Puntland troops, killing dozens of jihadists. And on the other side of the country, the AFRICOM strikes in Jubaland have suggested an increasing level of coordination between Kismaayo and the US military, even as Washington draws down its broader security assistance in Somalia-- including now to Danab. Though most strikes are believed to have been carried out by AFRICOM, there may be some supplementary aerial support from Kenyan or Turkish strikes as well. However, there has been some controversy swirling around a particular series of strikes on 15 November in Jamaame town, which Al-Shabaab claimed to have killed several civilians, distributing images and videos through its array of propaganda channels and picked up other commentators. But the jihadists routinely claim civilian casualties as a means to discredit and undermine foreign military intervention in Somalia, and such claims require extensive verification.

Barring the Ugandan-led Operation Silent Storm in Lower Shabelle, these Jubaland operations are exemplifying again that any security progress in Somalia has remained in the hands of the Federal Member States (FMSs) this year-- with external support. The federal government, on the other hand, remains wholly focused on its electoral machinations, allowing the war on Al-Shabaab to atrophy. Still, though Kismaayo's operations initially began under the threat of 'new Jubaland'--a parallel administration fomented by Mogadishu in the Mareehaan-majority Gedo region--that cloud has thankfully dwindled in recent weeks. Despite Mogadishu's entreaties, Addis and Nairobi both firmly expressed their displeasure at any further destabilisation of the strategic tri-border region through a parallel administration, which remains a key staging post for Al-Shabaab's penetration into Kenya and Ethiopia. The Mareehaan and Gedo, however, remain cleaved in two between Mogadishu and Kismaayo factions, which Al-Shabaab has again readily sought to exploit. And so the broader security situation across Jubaland remains severely deteriorated, mainly due to the corrosive politics played out by Mogadishu proxies.

With the national political situation currently so poisonous, the best we can seemingly hope for at this juncture is ad hoc offensives supported by external partners —be it Operation Hilaac against Daesh by Puntland or these manoeuvres led by Jubaland. And by no coincidence, the only two FMSs pursuing their own military strategies against the jihadists are these two-- both absent the centralising tent of the federal government and soon to meet in Kismaayo under the opposition umbrella of the Council for the Future of Somalia. In the absence of any coherent national strategy and without the political centre repaired, Jubaland's own initiative remains commendable if inevitably constrained.

The Somali Wire Team