Issue No. 899

Somalia's Port Politics Heats Up

Ports matter on the Somali peninsula. More than any other single revenue source, they serve as the lifeblood of the administrations in Hargeisa, Garowe, Mogadishu, and Kismaayo. In the unravelling of the state in the early 1990s, administrations coalesced—and fighting raged—over control of the four ports of Berbera, Bosaaso, Mogadishu, and Kismaayo, establishing the radically uncentralised nature that persists in Somalia's political economy today. But three decades on, who accesses and operates these aortic ports reflects and refracts another of today's defining issues for the Horn of Africa: the rapacious geostrategic tussle among Middle Eastern countries along both sides of the Red Sea.

This week, an official notice issued by the federal Ministry of Ports and Marine Transport on 30 September 2025 (Ref. No. XW/WDGB/89/09/2025) surfaced, stating that an Electronic Cargo Trafficking Number (ECTN) system is now mandatory for all cargo entering or leaving the country. A seemingly innocuous enough request, an ECTN is a digital document used to monitor cargo, recording origin, shipper, consignee, routing and contents, with the process now relatively common across much of West and Central Africa. And according to the government, failure to comply could result in "administrative fines, detention or seizure of cargo... all enforced with applicable Somali laws and maritime regulations." But in a context such as Somalia's—where the federal government's control does not extend beyond the confines of the capital—Mogadishu's port or customs authority has neither the capacity nor the political access to validate any of this information before a vessel docks, let alone seize or detain it. 

Instead, it is a brazen attempt by Villa Somalia to starve Puntland, Somaliland, and Jubaland of the port revenues that enable their independence from Mogadishu's antagonism, as well as impose centralised fees on importers. In 2018, the federal government attempted a similar trick to centralise customs, but this was rejected by Puntland and Somaliland at the time. The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, which forgave billions in debt when Somalia reached a key decision point in December 2023, required negotiations between Mogadishu and its federal member states over harmonising tariffs and the formation of a National Ports Authority, but these floundered, and an agreement was never reached. Moreover, what the federal ministry's notice conveniently omitted to mention is that while ECTNs were initially enforced in Mogadishu in February 2023, they had to be halted just a few months later in May of that year, when pressure from the private sector and other stakeholders within government proved too great over the high costs incurred. The customs authorities in Berbera and Bosaaso — where the Emirati DP World conglomerate plays a prominent role in the operations of both ports — are certainly not going to bow to Villa Somalia's new tax regime when even Mogadishu’s own stakeholders have refused to.

Further, the latest tussle between Mogadishu on one side and Garowe and Hargeisa on the other comes in the wake of the continuing e-visa debacle. Here, too, the federal government has sought to exert 'cyber-sovereignty' over Puntland and Somaliland, insisting that all travellers obtain a federal e-visa through a company linked to President Hassan Sheikh's family. But the subsequent massive data leak of over 30,000 foreigners and ethnic Somalis has proven highly embarrassing, with numerous experts having prior warned of the flimsy security software intended to protect such data. And while leaking an individual's personal information is one matter, gaining access to sensitive import details has been strenuously resisted by Jubaland in negotiations over customs alignment over the past year. Kenya, which maintains an active presence at the Kismaayo port, may have a few queries about Mogadishu's demand for data and its possible imposition of tariffs as well. And further concerns stem from the penetration of Al-Shabaab throughout the organs of the Somali state, with every ship's manifest that docks at Mogadishu already accessible and taxable by the jihadists. 

Puntland's Ministry of Ports and Customs Authority has stated that it will not enforce the ECTN in Bosaaso, nor will the Federal Member State be bound by federal regulations passed without consultation. For Puntland, Bosaaso accounts for an estimated 0.8-1.1 million tonnes of trade per year, valued at USD 650-900 million, in turn generating a substantial portion of Puntland's revenue. Somaliland has similarly rejected the pronouncement, stating that only the "Somaliland Ports Authority can implement the ECTN system" and that it is developing its own independent system. Berbera, on the other hand, accounts for 70-85% of Somaliland's import revenue through hosting the DP World-operated port, which has undergone several expansions as part of the 30-year management concession. Protestations from Garowe and Hargeisa are one issue; whether this translates into freight service firms implementing ECTN's is another consideration.

Puntland officials have cited Turkish influence behind this latest salvo from the capital, and with good reason. The Ministry of Ports happens to be overseen by Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur 'Jama', the former defence minister and confidante of Ankara. Having been finally removed from the defence portfolio earlier this year with Al-Shabaab on the ascendancy, Jama's move to ports minister was no coincidence, with a Turkish conglomerate, Albayrak Group, having secured a concession in 2014 to oversee the operations of Mogadishu Port. And during meetings between Villa Somalia and its Turkish allies in Mogadishu and Ankara, Jama is present more often than not, serving as a kind of quasi ambassador from his posting. 

With fresh investments by the Albayrak Group into the Mogadishu Port this year for a glittering new container terminal, some have suggested this may be a ploy to suck import/export from its own domestic rivals. In the meantime, carriers and insurers are likely to react with uncertainty, while a federal delegation is expected to travel to London to lobby maritime insurers and shipping companies to comply with the new ECTN rules. A possible scenario of double taxation or double compliance may well deter companies from using the deep-sea ports of Berbera and Bosaaso, and that of Kismaayo as well. 

In this view, Mogadishu's attempts to obtain ECTN information and muscle in on Bosaaso and Berbera are all but certain to be considered a shot across the bow by the Emirates. Berbera and Bosaaso are key cogs in both the Emirates' broader aspirations to control the access points into the African continent, as well as influence the sub-national administrations on either side of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Meanwhile, current relations between Abu Dhabi and Mogadishu are frosty at best, with Villa Somalia quietly aligning itself with Qatar, Turkiye, and Egypt amid the broader Gulf geopolitical schism playing out across both sides of the Red Sea. 

To this end, Abu Dhabi has recently elevated Berbera's role within its transnational network of ports and trade infrastructure managed by DP World, purportedly requesting that its Ethiopian allies consider diversifying their imports through Somaliland rather than solely through Djibouti last month. But in neighbouring Bosaaso in particular, the UAE has courted controversy as well, with numerous reports that Abu Dhabi has funnelled considerable weaponry and Colombian mercenaries through Bosaaso en route to its Sudanese allies in Darfur, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Any attempts by Mogadishu or Ankara to impose scrutiny on the currently bullish Emirates may well trigger a substantive response. Already on opposing sides of the Sudanese war—the nexus of the broader Gulf schism that has pulled in all African neighbours—the Turkish-Emirati split may yet become more pronounced in Somalia. 

The government may well seek to justify these new regulations on the grounds of rationalising and streamlining customs procedures and enhancing transparency in the movement of goods across the East African Community (EAC). But imposing the ECTN has little to do with regional economic integration, nor tackling smuggling or trafficking off Somalia's coasts, a highly complex transnational prospect that involves small dhows ferrying arms, sanctioned Iranian fuel, people, and contraband. Instead, it is a centralising, money-making scheme, and one certain to drive another wedge between Mogadishu and all other port-dependent administrations on the strategic peninsula. But unlike e-visas, an undoubted irritant and symbolic blow to the de facto independence of Somaliland, any substantive constraints to these ports would have significant repercussions for the delicate balance of power within the ruling coalitions in Hargeisa, Garowe, and Kismaayo-- and thus the fragile equilibrium of the country that has enabled the federal model as well.

The Somali Wire Team