Hassan Sheikh's Calculated Electoral Gamble in Mogadishu
At the end of November, the residents of Mogadishu will be able to supposedly participate in their first direct elections since the late 1960s. Though having repeatedly postponed the polls, the handpicked Independent National Electoral and Boundaries Commission (INEBC) has set the date of the district council elections for 30 November, asserting that close to a million people have registered in the capital for the grand event. And yet, as ever, with the Hawiye-dominated politics of Mogadishu still so frayed and the polls considered a flimsy attempt to foreground a term extension for President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, the exercise in direct democracy is hardly laudable. Further, with Somalia's politics in its typical cyclical lull ahead of the 2026 federal elections, these unconstitutional district council polls may well prove the next pressure point.
The initial rationale behind these district elections was dubious from the outset, envisaged as part of a 'three-tier' electoral system to lay the groundwork for more substantial state-level direct polls in September 2025 and subsequent federal and parliamentary votes in 2026. But as detailed in the National Electoral Bill passed last year, such a justification was instead considered a veil to massively constrict the electoral playing field. According to the initial electoral law, the three political associations that received the highest proportion of votes in these council elections would be designated the country's national parties for 10 years. It was a blatant attempt by Villa Somalia to rig the system against its opponents, seeking to shut them out not just at this coming electoral cycle, but for two presidential term limits.
That has now been somewhat moderated, thankfully, with the alarming link between the imminent district council elections and national political parties having been severed in late August as part of the handful of concessions made by Villa Somalia in negotiations with the splinter faction of the National Salvation Forum (NSF). Instead, a process in which a political organisation that secures above 10% of the seats at the federal parliament will now become a 'national political party.' What a 'national' party means at this current juncture is largely meaningless, with polls only able to be held in a fraction of the country, with much of Somalia's hinterland held by Al-Shabaab, while Puntland and Jubaland continue to reject the electoral scheme. As such, expanding the direct district council elections remains only possible to a handful of mostly Hawiye satellite towns in South-Central and Baidoa-- where tensions have ratcheted up dramatically in recent weeks. But even conducting the elections in Mogadishu is constitutionally dubious, given the unresolved status of Banaadir within the Provisional Constitution, and is likely to accentuate the two duelling versions of the text that are currently active in the country.
And yet, according to the INEBC, 923,220 voters have been distributed their voting cards in Mogadishu-- almost a third of the estimated population of the capital. This is a nonsensical figure, with numerous reports of children and teenagers being rounded up by security forces and forcibly registered, with their ages doctored in turn. The electoral body remains highly controversial as well, with its chair, Abdikarim Ahmed Hassan, a close ally and former campaign manager for the president.
But many of those registered voters are genuine, of course, and will cast their ballots across 16 graded districts. Nine of those, including Hodan, Dayniile, and Wadajir, have been graded as 'A', while seven others, including Shangani and Boondheere, are deemed 'B'. The justification for this is that the Grade A districts are more populous, with larger tax bases and greater service demands, resulting in each of these councils having a higher number of members. But, again, there are inconsistencies and flaws in this approach, including the fact that three districts recognised last year-- Gubadley, Darussalam, and Garasbaaley-- will not be counted. There are a host of other concerns about how this model will proceed, including the manner in which electoral results can be contested and more besides.
Furthermore, the raft of concerns held by senior opposition politicians, such as former President Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed, remains undimmed, ranging from the lack of security preparations to the continued authoritarian drift of the federal government. Indeed, these district elections are proceeding with little indication of Villa Somalia allowing for genuine political alternation or competition, with many senior leaders boycotting the event. In turn, the federal government has repeatedly sought to choke any dissent, including by deploying federal forces against public opposition meetings, demonstrations, and journalists. What elements of the international community have seemingly failed to grasp is that a genuine, direct one-person, one-vote election is not simply the act of casting a ballot, but the whole milieu that surrounds such an exercise, which allows the outcome to be considered legitimate. With reports suggesting that many of the councillors vying in November have already been hand-selected by the government, it is difficult to regard the first 'direct' polls in the capital for decades as little more than a charade.
The security situation in Mogadishu is hardly favourable either. Though the offensive tempo of Operation Silent Storm has slowed with the recapture of Awdheegle, Al-Shabaab remains ensconced across much of the peripheries of the capital. Its ability to conduct complex attacks in Mogadishu has not been substantially diminished either, as evidenced by the humiliating raid on the National Intelligence and Security Agency Godka Jilicow base. And with the future of the African Union peacekeeping mission still uncertain, looking into 2026, the establishment of a string of appealing targets not just in these district polls but in supposedly subsequent elections should not be dismissed.
The Council for the Future of Somalia, comprising Jubaland, Puntland, and a host of senior opposition leaders, is now planning to host a joint summit in Kismaayo, likely to detail their further opposition to the government. Whether the Hawiye elements of the coalition decide to mobilise their forces and supporters in Mogadishu at the end of November will have to be seen. Yet, despite all this, it may well be that the district elections proceed, with the national opposition preferring not to engage so as not to be depicted as obstructionist.
If so, that presents another dilemma, as it opens the door for Villa Somalia to cast the elections as evidence to the international community and the public that direct elections are now possible nationwide —and so conceivably seek to delay the May 2026 federal polls and hand the president a term extension. The justification is already being laid out that more time —up to two years —is required to lay the groundwork for direct presidential elections. According to Article 74 of the electoral law, the INEBC already has the authority to delay the polls if they are unable to happen on schedule. The reasons given include both insecurity and natural disasters, but more concerningly, the body can simply choose to delay the elections if these direct polls cannot happen on an absurdly fast schedule. It is anticipated that the federal government will subsequently argue that the president will thus require more time to return Somalia to a democratic age, but any prospect of a term extension remains doggedly opposed by the coalescing national opposition.
There are other questions as well, such as the purpose of district elections in a city where virtually no services are provided by the government-- with even the housing of its displaced citizens being razed to auction off land. But more broadly, these elections have little to do with the repeatedly thwarted democratic aspirations of Mogadishu's citizens, and far more with the president's own political future. None of this is to dismiss the genuine enthusiasm among citizens towards casting their ballots later this month, hoping to wrest their future away from a sliver of the capital's elite —precisely the opposite. A democracy is greater than the sum of a poll, but by any standard, these district elections seem determined to serve those in power, not Mogadishu's people.
The Somali Wire
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The 19th-century Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky wrote in his novel, The Brothers Karamazov: “Above all, do not lie to yourself. A man who lies to himself and listens to his own lie comes to a point where he does not discern any truth either in himself or anywhere around him.” In Somalia today, we are suffering because our head of state has lied to himself so much so, that Dostoevsky had alluded to, he has reached a point where he does not discern any truth either in himself or anywhere around him. However, before we delve into the nature or purpose of the lie and its grave national, regional, and international consequences, a bit of history is warranted on Somalia as a nation-state.
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