President Hassan Sheikh at a Crossroads: Between Clarity and Confusion
Today's editorial in The Somali Wire is written by Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame.
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President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) stands at a defining crossroads, for his leadership, his legacy, and Somalia’s fragile democratic future. Alarming signs point to a deliberate strategy to extend his mandate beyond constitutional limits. Villa Somalia has reportedly circulated the so-called “Zero Paper” among Somali political circles and international partners to test the waters and gauge reaction. The proposal, titled “Somalia’s Exceptional Reform Window: A Mandate to Complete the Constitution and Reset Governance,” calls for a two-year extension under the pretext of completing the constitution and finalizing reforms.
This move, cloaked in technocratic language, has provoked deep public unease. Beneath the rhetoric of “reform” lies a familiar motive, the desire to cling to power under the guise of institutional renewal. Such manipulation risks fracturing the already fragile trust between citizens and the state.
From Promise to Paralysis
When President Hassan returned to office in 2022, he did so with renewed public trust and international goodwill. His campaign promised two defining missions: to defeat Al-Shabaab and to confront corruption. Somali citizens and international partners initially rallied behind HSM’s stated priorities, seeing them as a chance for national renewal and personal redemption. Many hoped his second term would mark a clean break from the corruption and ineffectiveness that defined his previous administration.
His strategy appeared straightforward: rebuild credibility by restoring security and integrity, then capitalize on that momentum to entrench political control. The plan envisioned rewriting the constitution, enacting new electoral laws, and appointing a compliant electoral commission , steps that under the banner of reform, would ultimately consolidate power and reshape Somalia’s political order to his advantage. But the promise of renewal quickly gave way to paralysis.
Instead of appointing a competent, merit based cabinet, HSM surrounded himself with weak and pliant officials, a prime minister and ministers chosen for loyalty rather than ability. Power was centralized in his hands, as he micromanaged every sphere of government, from security operations to federal relations. This obsession with control suffocated institutions, silenced initiative, and crippled reform. The administration’s insecurity replaced leadership; fear of independent minds became its defining trait.
The war against Al-Shabaab lost momentum, the anti-corruption drive evaporated, and confidence in leadership collapsed. As the government weakened, it turned to the same patronage and nepotism it once condemned. Corruption became systemic.
Public land and state assets were sold at undervalued prices, draining national resources and destabilizing the economy. In Somalia, land is not merely property — it is collateral, savings, and the backbone of investment. By devaluing it, the government has choked access to credit, frozen business activity, and deepened economic despair. Meanwhile, rising taxes and arbitrary fees have turned ministries into center’s of extraction rather than service.
This is not reform, it is regression. It is the slow transformation of the state from a public institution into a marketplace for rent and privilege.
A Nation on Pause
With only months remaining in his term, President Hassan now presides over a government adrift and a public losing faith. Surrounded by advisers who shield him from reality, he mistakes control for competence and defiance for strength.
The much-publicised three-tier electoral model, once promoted as reform, has lost credibility and is now viewed as a political tool to justify extension. Reckless economic management has compounded the crisis. Investors are cautious, partners uncertain, and citizens disillusioned. Somalia today is a nation on pause, suspended between ambition and inertia.
Legitimacy, once lost, cannot be restored through extension or manipulation. It must be rebuilt through inclusion, transparency, and trust. Yet the President refuses to recalibrate, avoiding the political cost of acknowledging failure. Leadership requires humility, not denial.
If this course continues, the opposition will have no choice but to mobilize citizens and defend the constitutional order through peaceful and lawful means. Somalia cannot endure another cycle of deception and instability. The public’s patience is not infinite, and the state’s fragility cannot bear another assault from within.
Despite exhaustion from decades of crisis, Somalis still believe in one enduring principle: that power must change hands peacefully through the ballot, not through bargains or backroom deals. Their hope lies in renewal — in new leadership capable of rescuing the nation from drift. As political uncertainty deepens, Al-Shabaab and other extremists stand ready to exploit division and disillusionment.
Legacy or the Loss of History
President Hassan Sheikh now faces a decisive moment. He must recognize that the path he pursues is unsustainable. At this crossroads, wisdom demands humility, to listen, to consult, and to act in the national interest rather than personal ambition.
He can still reclaim leadership by initiating a credible, inclusive dialogue on electoral reform , one that guides Somalia toward a legitimate, peaceful, and constitutional transition. He must abandon any thought of term extension and instead lead a genuine national consultation to design a transparent electoral framework, one stronger and fairer than the 2020 model, and a vital step toward one-person, one-vote democracy.
The choice before him is stark: legitimacy or the loss of history. History does not forgive those who mistake power for purpose, but it honors those who place country above self.
HSM still has the chance to rise above confusion, restore integrity to public office, and leave behind a Somalia that moves forward through the ballot, not the backroom.
Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame is a member of the Somali Federal Parliament, an opposition leader, the chairman of the Wadajir Party, and a presidential candidate in the forthcoming elections of 2026. The original piece was first published on Substack on 03 November.
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While much international attention is on Mogadishu – understandably so - another electoral crisis is brewing in the regional state of Galmudug. Historically unstable, prone to Al-Shabaab violence and destabilisation and wracked by chronic inter-clan frictions and periodic armed hostilities, the looming vote appears likely to aggravate the situation and foment more divisions.
Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.
A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.
Last weekend, the Murusade, a major sub-clan of the powerful Hawiye clan family, staged one of the largest and most colourful coronations of a clan chief in recent memory in Mogadishu. The caleemasarka (enthronement) of Ugaas Abdirizaq Ugaas Abdullahi Ugaas Haashi, the new Ugaas or sultan of the Murusade, was attended by thousands of delegates from all parts of Somalia. Conducted next to the imposing and magnificent Ottomanesque Ali Jim'ale Mosque, on the Muslim day of rest, Friday, the occasion blended the Islamic, the regal and the customary; a restatement of an ancient tradition very much alive and vibrant.
With all eyes trained on the Strait of Hormuz blockades and their geopolitical convulsions, discussions and concerns, too, have risen about the perils of other globalised chokepoints, not least the Bab al-Mandab. The threats to the stability of the Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea may not arise principally from the escalatory logic that the US, Iran, and Israel have been locked in, but the threats posed from collapse and contested sovereignty offer little relief. Off Somalia's northern coastline in particular, it is transnational criminal networks — expressed in smuggling, piracy, and, less visibly but no less consequentially, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing — that define the character of offshore insecurity. It is this last phenomenon that provides the foundation on which much of Somalia's maritime disorder is built, and which remains the most consistently neglected.