Issue No. 888

After the Lightning

The lightning is over-- for the time being. Last week, after 11 gruelling months, Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni announced the victory of Operation Hilaac (lightning) against the Islamic State-Somalia (ISS) faction in the Cal Miskaad mountains. Declaring triumph at the opening of the 57th Puntland parliament session, he asserted that the group had been nearly entirely dismantled, barring a few pockets of cells "still hiding" in Cal Miskaad, and thanked international partners for their assistance —singling out the US, UK and UAE in particular.

The origins of ISS in Puntland's Bari region emerged a decade ago, somewhat ironically, from a split within the Al-Shabaab contingent positioned there at the time. In 2015, Abdulqadir Mumin, a former radical preacher who had lived in Sweden and the UK, defected from his position as Al-Shabaab commander—along with several dozen of his clansmen—to swear allegiance to then-Daesh emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. And in the years since, amid intermittent pressure from Al-Shabaab and Puntland authorities, Mumin nevertheless carved out an important niche for his contingent in the Golis Mountains—an austere, unforgiving landscape. 

Unlike the Daesh factions in the Middle East, the significance of the Daesh faction never lay in any grand territorial control—though it was increasingly extorting businesses in Bosaaso—but rather in its Al-Karrar Office. The Office serves as a principal financial node within its global architecture, with Mumin's forces believed to have routed millions of dollars in Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies to help facilitate global Daesh operations, even after the death of key commander Bilal al-Sudani in early 2023 in an American special forces raid. As part of its Al-Karrar Office functions, the ISS wing was appointed responsible for overseeing affiliates in both Mozambique and eastern DRC, evidenced by recovered correspondence between Mumin and other jihadist commanders in East Africa. From then, Mumin's stature appeared to rise further still, with US officials privately asserting last year that he had been designated the glomar emir of ISS. Whether or not a non-Arab had been appointed overall leader, there can be little doubt of Mumin's seniority within Daesh prior to Operation Hilaac, reflecting as well the shift in the epicentre of jihadism from the Middle East to the African continent.

Against this backdrop, as well as ISS's pull to regional jihadists and increasing encroachment on Bosaaso, Deni's government decided to launch Operation Hilaac in a bid to degrade the forces. Groundwork was laid through outreach to disenchanted clans, such as the Ali Salebaan, in which Daesh had prospered, with promises of militia integration and developmental assistance made. And so, having massed roughly 3,000 assorted forces ranging from the Emirati-backed Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) to clan militias, the offensive began in late 2024 by gradually clearing the base around the steep valley passes in which Daesh had embedded themselves. In Phase Two, the bases and networks dug into the mountainsides in the Dhasan, Shebaab, and Dhadar villages, among others, were subsequently targeted, with significant caches of weapons and ammunition secured. Since then, hundreds of jihadists have scattered into the mountains, with Puntland forces gradually tracking down and eliminating pockets of resistance amidst the arid ridgelines with American and Emirati assistance.

Since those early weeks of the offensive, the technological sophistication of ISS has come into sharp focus as well, with several kamikaze drones shot down by Puntland forces. And in late December 2024, ISS deployed a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device to disrupt planning operations at the military base in Dharjale, killing over a dozen Puntland soldiers. Daesh have continued to produce and litter the mountain roads with IEDs as well, inflicting considerable casualties on the advancing forces in gruelling attritional tactics. 

Some of these armaments appear to have been sourced from the Yemen-based Houthis, who have provided access to developed armaments and training to ISS, including suicide drones, as they have for Al-Shabaab. Amidst this offensive, ISS commanders are believed to have relocated some of their families to Yemen, as well as continuing to source weapons and supplies through traditional smuggling networks across the narrow Gulf of Aden. Such entrenched networks--part of the triangular trade in sanctioned Iranian fuel, Yemeni weapons, and Somali goods--are likely to continue posing a threat to Hilaac's successes, as the remaining pockets of ISS aspire to rearm and reassert themselves. Al-Shabaab, too, profits off these trafficking routes, and has sought to bulk up stockpiles ahead of Puntland's planned Operation Onkod in the Cal Madow Mountains in the coming months. 

International assistance has also been a significant factor in Puntland's successes, particularly the US and UAE strikes. With the second Trump administration having lifted authorisation restrictions on airstrikes, AFRICOM has conducted dozens against entrenched ISS positions in the past months, eliminating scores of militants as well as senior commanders in turn. Kenya and Ethiopia have also provided material support, while other foreign partners, such as the UK, have furnished intelligence and developmental assistance. But conspicuously absent across these tough months has been Mogadishu.

Rather than supporting the only significant anti-jihadist operations in the nation, Villa Somalia has instead sought to undermine Puntland's grinding progress, particularly by stoking tensions through its proxies in Laas Aanood, forcing Garowe to divert forces from anti-Daesh operations to protect its western flank. In this light, it is no wonder that many in the US and others no longer consider the federal government a genuine counter-terror partner, and would rather invest their resources into supporting sub-national administrations like Puntland. Nor should the significance of Operation Hilaac be dismissed for Deni's presidential campaign, a likely motivator for Villa Somalia's attempts to sabotage the offensive. It has both delivered the Puntland leader strong anti-jihadist credentials and endeared him to Abu Dhabi, a potentially influential financier for any costly run. 

Still, Puntland could not indefinitely sustain large-scale operations in such harsh conditions, and with ISS significantly degraded after months of cat-and-mouse fighting, it makes sense to bring the bulk of the offensive to a close. Senior extremist commanders have either been killed, such as the Head of Immigration and Foreign Fighters, Ahmed Musa Said, or others captured, like Abdirahman Shirwac Aw-Saciid, responsible for Bosaaso extortion and assassinations. Though ISS, like Al-Shabaab, had diversified positions and expertise, the loss of such senior figures will remain a serious blow to any attempts to reconstitute itself. 

However, Mumin remains at large, with conflicting reports on his whereabouts, including indications that he may have fled to Sudan or Yemen. Abdirahman Fahiye, his deputy and the governor of ISS operations since 2023, is another veteran jihadist who has evaded capture or death. But what has been notable throughout this campaign has been the scale and depth of the international array of fighters, with jihadists from Morocco, Tanzania, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and particularly Ethiopia. Such a diverse composition of nationalities is a distinct contrast to the nature of Al-Shabaab in the neighbouring Cal Madow Mountain range, which is nearly wholly composed of ethnic Somalis.

Looking ahead, to sustain Hilaac's successes, though most soldiers will need to be withdrawn for rest, recuperation, and refit, maintaining kinetic forces drawn from the local communities will be key to Puntland's stabilisation strategy. Dozens of American airstrikes may have proven critical, but the hard yards of clearance and stabilisation have been borne by the Puntland troops, with hundreds believed to have been killed or wounded in the months-long campaign. Delivering on the promises of development in remote areas such as Turmasaale and Dhadar is also necessary to maintain renewed relations with the marginalised groups from whom ISS drew its local support. Daesh, too, will be watching and waiting, though its commanders and rank-and-file are divided on next steps and how best to rebuild, with Puntland's tyranny of geography meaning that aspiring jihadists and vulnerable migrants are likely to continue to be drawn to the region. And after lightning comes thunder—Operation Onkod, the forthcoming anti-Al-Shabaab offensive in the neighbouring Cal Madow range.

The Somali Wire Team