Addis, Hargeisa, and Garowe, and shifting diplomatic sands
Reports of another major Ethiopia-Somaliland deal turned out to be greatly exaggerated. Last Tuesday, fresh from a lengthy visit to Abu Dhabi, Somaliland President Abdirahman 'Irro' immediately departed for Addis to meet with Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed. As it was both his first visit to Hargeisa's most consequential ally and came so soon after travelling from their shared Emirati patron, speculation abounded in the Somaliland capital about what might be on the cards. That turned out to be somewhat of a damp squib, however, with no bombshell announcement this time like the much-quietened Memorandum of Understanding last year.
Yet, coming nearly a year after his electoral victory over incumbent Somaliland President Muse Bihi, Irro's visit to Ethiopia—and with Addis instructed to accept by the Emirates—was essential in resetting their relations to steadier ground, and there was a quieter convergence on several areas, including defence and trade cooperation. In particular, Irro's visit comes as the UAE seeks to boost the role of the DP World-run Berbera Port in Somaliland within its broader western Indian Ocean and Red Sea trade ambitions, including pressuring Addis to divest from its import-export reliance on Djibouti as part of this strategy. To this end, negotiations between Hargeisa and Addis on issues such as double taxation and streamlining imports are expected to continue in the coming weeks.
Addis appears cautious about fully re-engaging with Hargeisa, with Ethiopia remaining on a war footing in preparation for a potential invasion of Eritrea. Nevertheless, Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was also rebuffed by Abiy earlier this month in Addis, both on stymying Irro's visit as well as plans for the parallel' new Jubaland' administration in Gedo, a key buffer zone for the Ethiopian military against Al-Shabaab. In the end, Irro's visit to Addis was more about a face-to-face meeting with Abiy to restore the strategic dialogue than any grand pronouncements.
And yet while Somaliland's diplomatic corps struggled again to manage domestic expectations, the next stages of the more consequential Hargeisa-Garowe political-security cooperation pact are continuing apace. In early October, senior Puntland and Somaliland officials met in Nairobi to discuss a host of issues, including the destabilising Villa Somalia proxy of the North-Eastern State (NES) in Laas Aanood and counter-terror cooperation against Al-Shabaab. Their subsequent joint communique described a "historic dialogue" and incorporated language that recognised Somaliland's "right to self-determination", representing the most supportive framing from Puntland to its western neighbour's claim to independence to date. And critically, the deal "agreed on the importance of achieving a lasting peace to end the conflict that occurred in Eerigaabo and surrounding areas, and to allow displaced people to return home in safety and confidence."
Though backchannels between the two most stable administrations on Somalia's peninsula and Emirati allies had been continuing for some time, the formalisation of the broad cooperation agreement represents an extraordinary about-turn. Just a couple of years ago, Puntland was directing clandestine support to SSC-Khaatumo militias against Somaliland, but the destructive wielding of Dhulbahante grievances by Mogadishu to undermine both Somaliland and Puntland has necessitated closer cooperation. Further, Al-Shabaab has established a presence from Buuhoodle in the Sool region to the Sanaag coastline, through which it continues to source increasingly sophisticated armaments from Yemen. In this context, the agreement between Puntland and Somaliland was perhaps overdue, but to overcome the natural antagonism between the two polities is immense and required significant political clout from both parties to bring it over the line.
Naturally, the cooperation deal cannot paper over deep-rooted political divergences between Puntland and Somaliland in one fell swoop, not least their continued territorial claims over both Sool and Sanaag. However, it shows how other Somali polities-- no matter their position on reunification-- can work with one another to tackle existential threats such as Al-Shabaab. There have been some expected murmurings of discontent in Puntland, with four major opposition parties — Ifiye, Mustaqbal, Mideeye, and Sincad — making their displeasure clear in a statement that asserts the agreement "endangers the territorial integrity of the Somali Republic." Yet the deal should not be taken as Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni suddenly abandoning his unionist credentials, but instead borne from necessity to secure his western borders from Al-Shabaab and NES. As his campaign for federal president likely kicks into gear in the coming months, though the nature of the polls in May 2026 remains unagreed and highly contentious, it may well be that Deni moderates his position away from recognising Somaliland's "right to self-determination." In the meantime, greater cooperation between Somaliland and Puntland is undoubtedly a positive development, especially as the already grim political-security situation across south-central Somalia deteriorates further.
Thus, having separately briefed parliament and opposition party leaders on the outcomes of the UAE and Ethiopia visits, Irro flew to Eerigaabo in the contested Sanaag region yesterday to launch the first phase of the 'peace summit.' Hundreds of delegates, alongside Isaaq and Warsangeli elders, have now gathered in Eerigaabo, intending to pave the way for a peaceful return of those —particularly Warsangeli —displaced by three years of tensions and intermittent clashes. Militias aligned with NES, formerly SSC-Khaatumo, conducted repeated raids towards the cross-clan town, with deadly fighting erupting within and around Eerigaabo on successive occasions as the forces sought to break out of their Dhulbahante-constricted territory in Sool. But from the outset, Irro has made it a focus of his administration to prioritise outreach to the disenchanted eastern communities, particularly the Warsangeli.
And so, among those participating in this week's peace summit is Warsangeli Suldaan Siciid Suldaan Abdisalaan Garaad Mahamuud Ali Shire, the most prominent elder of the Harti sub-clan, while Puntland has offered support for the summit as well. Trade routes between Eerigaabo and Bosaaso, Puntland's aortic port city, are now anticipated to be reopened, strengthening commercial and trade ties between the Warsangeli and Garowe administration. Puntland, too, has held successive high-profile meetings between influential Warsangeli elders and politicians with senior Puntland officials, including Deni, with the president offering a string of positions and reforms in favour of the Harti sub-clan, including at the expense of the Dhulbahante. Though it was initially discussed during the Puntland-Somaliland talks on whether to include the Dhulbahante within the peace summit in Eerigaabo, it was decided that-- for the moment-- the focus should remain with the Warsangeli so as not to complicate or delay matters.
Nevertheless, NES politicians have continued to unsuccessfully covet the Warsangeli, stoking pockets of discontent over outreach to Somaliland and Puntland, including by amplifying disinformation last month over the AFRICOM strike that killed an elder from the Harti sub-clan. While there have not been any significant clashes since Dhahar in July between NES-aligned militias and Puntland forces, there have still been pockets of violence, including some minor skirmishes over the weekend. The Puntland-Somaliland pact will further allow the two established administrations to continue to constrain Villa Somalia's proxy and prevent it from reaching a coastline through the Warsangeli.
The Warsangeli are crucial not only for constraining NES to a single clan constituency but also for the counter-terror dimension of the Puntland-Somaliland deal, which is intended to pave the way for the former's 'Operation Onkod' (Thunder) against Al-Shabaab in the Cal Madow Mountain Range. With active operations to dismantle the Islamic State-Somalia (ISS) faction in neighbouring Cal Miskaad mountains coming to a gradual close, Garowe is looking ahead to Al-Shabaab's heavily fortified positions in Cal Madow, an even harsher and complex prospect than Operation Hilaac (Lightning). Still, much like the anti-ISS offensive and through reaching out to disenchanted clans such as the Ali Suleiman, Puntland has prioritised the Warsangeli in Sanaag, which make up the 'human surround' in which Al-Shabaab swim. But with Somaliland in control of and much of the western flank of the territory held by Al-Shabaab, Hargeisa's cooperation will be key to interdicting withdrawing jihadists. Some nuance here will be key, however, with Somaliland forces certain to detain any senior withdrawing jihadist commanders or armed militants, but far less likely to arrest unarmed Warsangeli men with clan linkages in Sanaag.
An early test of the Puntland and Somaliland deal may come as soon as next week, with President Hassan Sheikh expected to attend the inauguration of his proxy, Abdikhadir Ahmed Aw-Ali Firdhiye, as NES president. Large banners of the federal president are already unfurled in the city, while the presidential guard has been deployed as well. It is the latest-- but particularly egregious-- act by Mogadishu in making reunification an impossible prospect for Somaliland, while simultaneously doing all possible to keep Puntland out of the federation. But the planned ceremonial visit from the president cannot change the reality that the NES project remains not only unconstitutional, but also lacks any significant revenue base, nor even political consensus within the Dhulbahante.
It has been a consequential few days for Somaliland, and for Puntland as well. Even though Irro may not have brokered any major agreement in Addis, the restoration of the highest levels of dialogue—with Emirati backing—between Somaliland and Ethiopia is essential for the unrecognised polity on a host of issues. Further, the Puntland-Somaliland cooperation agreement between the two northern administrations marks a hopeful moment of pragmatism in an otherwise badly fragmented political landscape. And this week, the hard yards of outreach and progress in Eerigaabo with the Warsangeli are now bearing fruit. Whether it can resist the destabilising machinations of NES, Villa Somalia, and Al-Shabaab remains to be seen.
The Somali Wire Team
