Kismaayo talks collapse as rift widens again
The weekend's Kismaayo talks were never likely to succeed. The political chasm between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Jubaland President Ahmed Madoobe was vast, forced apart by the government's military manoeuvres in Ras Kambooni last December and Gedo this year. Since Madoobe's withdrawal from the National Consultative Council in late 2024 and subsequently the federation, Villa Somalia has been hellbent on destabilising the Jubaland leader-- whom it still does not recognise. Nevertheless, some, not least Nairobi, had hoped that with Somalia's political temperature so fraught, Hassan Sheikh might suddenly come to his senses, offering concessions that could yet pave the way for a broader dialogue and settlement necessary for peaceful elections in May 2026. Instead, the federal president appears content with merely the optics of having visited Kismaayo, with the machinations for 'New Jubaland' being revived upon his return to Mogadishu.
Pressure from a number of angles had been mounting on Madoobe for some time to meet with Hassan Sheikh in Kismaayo. A Kenyan facilitated call between the Jubaland leader and the federal president in August was explicit that Madoobe would not cede ground on any direct elections deal with Villa Somalia and insisted on the presence of a trusted third-party mediator, the lifting of the farcical arrest warrant on him and recognition of his status as Jubaland president. The political deadlock between Mogadishu and Kismaayo has dragged on for nearly a year, with the recent meeting coming almost exactly 12 months after Madoobe withdrew from the National Consultative Council and orchestrated his own re-election, securing a comfortable third term. In turn, Villa Somalia, having failed to violently oust Madoobe with the Ras Kambooni debacle, where hundreds of Somali National Army (SNA) soldiers were routed across the Kenyan border, turned its attention to the Mareehaan-majority Gedo and has sought to expel the Jubaland administration's presence there as well, much like Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo in 2019. Dozens have been killed in subsequent clashes between SNA troops and Jubaland forces in the strategic border town of Beled Hawo, also flaring tensions within neighbouring Mandera.
Such deteriorated relations between Jubaland and Villa Somalia made the buildup of the talks in Kismaayo frosty at best. Still, there were delegations from Ethiopian and Kenyan intelligence to help facilitate, with the latter spearheaded by Noordin Haji, Nairobi's chief of intelligence. Haji has sought to play the role of mediator in recent months, maintaining close relationships with both Kismaayo and Mogadishu. And for both Nairobi and Addis, Gedo remains a key buffer zone against the penetration of Al-Shabaab into their countries, with Madoobe a long-trusted interlocutor. Despite this, the talks on Sunday got off to an inauspicious start, with Mogadishu rocked by the complex Al-Shabaab attack on the National Intelligence and Security Agency compound at Godka Jila'ow into the early hours of the morning.
Despite the clear parameters of what was required to move the needle, Hassan Sheikh offered no such concessions in Kismaayo. Instead, talks broke down almost immediately, as the federal president refused to compromise on the two central elements of their discord —Madoobe's re-election in November 2024 and the format of the next federal polls scheduled for May 2026. Extraordinarily, Hassan Sheikh further insisted that Madoobe must return to the National Consultative Council, which has essentially been rendered a vehicle for the president's own Justice and Solidarity Party. Not only intended to sabotage the talks with the view of continuing to push for a term extension, but it was also an apparent snub to the Kenyans, who had deployed not insignificant political capital to bring the two parties together.
Further, such opening positions could never be accepted by Madoobe, particularly coming in the wake of the formalisation of a new, broader opposition coalition ahead of the Kismaayo talks — 'The Council for Somalia's Future.' Made up of Puntland, Jubaland, and the National Salvation Forum (NSF), it has been clear for some time that these parties have sought to coordinate resistance to Villa Somalia's dangerous antics. Still, the formal announcement of the new coalition is a significant development, and will make it considerably more complex for Villa Somalia to prise off and co-opt elements of the mounting opposition. In Kismaayo, Madoobe insisted that he would not agree to any side deal with Hassan Sheikh on the electoral format without consulting with his Council members. How this new coalition evolves and its next steps remain to be seen, but the Hawiye elements are again seeking to rally the simmering discontent in Mogadishu against the violent land clearances, with major protests scheduled for tomorrow. Moreover, amid the revival of 'New Jubaland,' it is improbable that the new opposition coalition will sit on its haunches, with the Council anticipated to host talks in either Garowe or Kismaayo in the coming weeks.
On the other hand, Villa Somalia has sought to portray the Kismaayo meeting as solely a bilateral effort with Madoobe, obscuring the role of the Kenyan mediators in an attempt to underscore that Hassan Sheikh can travel the country at will. And having secured the photoshoot, it is probable that Mogadishu will again cast the Jubaland leader as somehow an obstructionist to pave the way for 'New Jubaland' - borrowing directly from the government's Sool playbook to cleave out contested territory by exploiting longstanding Mareehaan grievances. Yet the project remains unlikely to be sustainable in the long term without the unified support of the Mareehaan. Among other influential Mareehaan sub-clans, the majority of the Reer Hassan have remained loyal to Madoobe, partly because his vice-president is drawn from their sub-clan.
Nor has Villa Somalia helped its cause by deploying such deeply unpopular characters, such as Abdirashid Janaan-- wanted for human rights violations-- and the Minister of Internal Security, Abdullahi Sheikh Fartaag, to spearhead the carving out of Gedo. Instead of heralding a new democratic administration in Garbahaarey, further intra-Mareehaan conflict, with intermittent killings and clashes having pockmarked the town in recent weeks, should be anticipated. And--again-- it is Al-Shabaab that stands to gain from such vapid antics, further opening the door for the jihadists to consolidate their hold across large swathes of the strategic tri-border area.
In 2013, Hassan Sheikh was forced to travel to Kismaayo to entreat with Madoobe, having failed to oust the then-newly elected Jubaland president after stoking violence in the vital port city. In the wake of Jubaland emerging as a Federal Member State in a process supported by Addis and Nairobi, the federal president threw weight behind the warlord Baare 'Hiiraale', triggering violence on the streets of Kismaayo. But his thwarted antics then proved a critical inflexion point in Hassan Sheikh's first term, with the president then able to hear that further attempts to forcibly impose Mogadishu's will would only result in further bloodshed. Sadly, today, with much eerily reminiscent of both 2013 and 2019, Hassan Sheikh appears unwilling to learn the same lessons —no matter the cost to the dangerously frayed political settlement of Somalia.
The Somali Wire Team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
While much international attention is on Mogadishu – understandably so - another electoral crisis is brewing in the regional state of Galmudug. Historically unstable, prone to Al-Shabaab violence and destabilisation and wracked by chronic inter-clan frictions and periodic armed hostilities, the looming vote appears likely to aggravate the situation and foment more divisions.
Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.
A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.
Last weekend, the Murusade, a major sub-clan of the powerful Hawiye clan family, staged one of the largest and most colourful coronations of a clan chief in recent memory in Mogadishu. The caleemasarka (enthronement) of Ugaas Abdirizaq Ugaas Abdullahi Ugaas Haashi, the new Ugaas or sultan of the Murusade, was attended by thousands of delegates from all parts of Somalia. Conducted next to the imposing and magnificent Ottomanesque Ali Jim'ale Mosque, on the Muslim day of rest, Friday, the occasion blended the Islamic, the regal and the customary; a restatement of an ancient tradition very much alive and vibrant.
With all eyes trained on the Strait of Hormuz blockades and their geopolitical convulsions, discussions and concerns, too, have risen about the perils of other globalised chokepoints, not least the Bab al-Mandab. The threats to the stability of the Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea may not arise principally from the escalatory logic that the US, Iran, and Israel have been locked in, but the threats posed from collapse and contested sovereignty offer little relief. Off Somalia's northern coastline in particular, it is transnational criminal networks — expressed in smuggling, piracy, and, less visibly but no less consequentially, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing — that define the character of offshore insecurity. It is this last phenomenon that provides the foundation on which much of Somalia's maritime disorder is built, and which remains the most consistently neglected.