Mogadishu's violent land clearances gift Al-Shabaab PR win
The heat is turning up once again in Mogadishu. On Sunday, thousands of protestors again took to the streets of Somalia's capital, furiously rejecting the voracious land-grabbing campaign of the federal government. And again, the protests were met with violence, with at least one killed and several others injured when security forces opened fire on protestors in the Dayniile district, triggering a fresh wave of recriminations against Villa Somalia-- whose occupants are currently in New York for the 80th UN General Assembly meeting. But the demonstrations are just the latest display of discontent regarding these mass clearances, which have been seized upon not only by senior members of the national Hawiye opposition but by Al-Shabaab as well.
Dozens of well-known public landmarks and buildings have been razed by executive decree, with the campaign escalating significantly since the start of the year. Schools, hospitals, military sites, and even a public cemetery have been interred, with little warning given before the informal-- and now increasingly legitimate-- settlements are evicted. Land ownership remains perhaps the most contentious issue in Somalia today, with territory intimately connected to clan identity. This is especially the case in Mogadishu, where the extensive destruction of the capital and cyclical violent exoduses during the civil war have imposed contentious and complex settlement patterns, nearly always at the expense of the most vulnerable clans and communities. Today, the Somali Bantu-- the most disenfranchised and subjugated group in the country-- comprises a significant proportion of the peri-urban underclass that has been repeatedly displaced. In this light, the most recent clearance campaign of the government is simply the latest in a long, tortured history of vulnerable groups being forcibly ousted by more powerful forces, be it General Aidiid's militias or Al-Shabaab.
Intermittent-- but rising-- clashes have occurred as a result of the government campaign, including between police officers and federal soldiers last November in the capital's Moalim Nur neighbourhood, killing several people. More recently, Villa Somalia's refusal to pay the customary tithe for requisitioning land from an MP of the president's sub-sub-clan led to further violence near Tarabuunka in August, with the opposition lawmaker mobilising his own forces in turn. Clan militias from well-armed Hawiye sub-clans are being increasingly mustered to resist such displacements. Over the weekend, two of the most prominent Hawiye opposition members, former President Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed and ex-PM Hassan Ali Khaire, deployed their respective supporters and militias to help galvanise the anti-government protests. The condemnation of the land clearances has become one of the key messages delivered by Madasha, the cross-clan opposition coalition of senior politicians that includes both Sheikh Sharif and Khaire.
It is abundantly clear that these non-government militias are regarded as a potent threat by Villa Somalia, with Hassan Sheikh desperate to prevent a repeat of Badbaado Qaran (National Salvation), the Hawiye uprising in 2021 that nearly overran the Presidential Palace and forced Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo to abandon his term-extension plans-- and with good reason: the incumbent president is beginning his own manoeuvres with an eye to pushing through a two-year term extension beyond May 2026. That is why Villa Somalia, with its Justice and Solidarity Party ally, Speaker of the Lower House Aden Madoobe, has worked to delay the federal parliament's reopening for weeks, preventing MPs from scrutinising the land-grabbing and the stumbling war against Al-Shabaab, or preparing motions of impeachment against the president's allies. Weeks after parliament was supposed to convene, Villa Somalia is still seeking to co-opt and bribe opposition ringleader parliamentarians, but the disgust at the government's excessive corruption and feckless politics makes such deal-cutting far more difficult. So, in turn, the government is seeking to choke off opposition from all avenues, including even ordering the arrest of journalists who have covered the protests in the capital.
The next step is ousting the non-government militias from Mogadishu itself. Under the guise of regularising the Somali National Army (SNA) and cracking down on perennial issues such as 'ghost soldiers,' the Ministry of Defence has recently introduced biometric registration in the capital. In reality, it is using such reforms to attempt to expel any 'disloyal' Hawiye forces. At successive points this year, Villa Somalia has sought to curtail the movements of opposition leaders and their armed escorts-- even with Al-Shabaab advancing towards the capital, and these militias urgently needed to mount a coherent defence.
At that time, much of the commentary emphasised the number of SNA and African Union peacekeepers manning the capital's checkpoints. Yet this overlooks the highly militarised nature of Mogadishu's core, with armed guards posted at every villa, hotel, and business — numbers that stretch into the thousands – and who are loyal to their clan rather than the federal government. This is why the jihadists' 'shadow administration' for Mogadishu-- formed earlier this year-- has prioritised outreach with clan elders, reassuring them of their particular land and business rights while emphasising their own opposition to the government. Attempting to forcibly disarm the opposition-aligned militias may protect Villa Somalia from a 'Badbaado Qaran 2.0' in the short term, but it may ironically hasten its own fall to Al-Shabaab.
On the flipside, the president is simultaneously lobbying for thousands of loyal militiamen to be incorporated into the SNA payroll, providing them with access to government weapons and ammunition. With dwindling funds available and amid news that the US is winding down support for partner forces in Somalia, it is just the latest instance of federal security resources being wholly misappropriated. It is not just the president, but close allies too, with National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) Director, Mahad Salad, aggressively recruiting paramilitaries ahead of his widely speculated run for the presidency of Galmudug.
While the federal government continues to line its pockets through land appropriation, it has delivered another PR win for Al-Shabaab. In a graduation speech to jihadist fighters published over the weekend, Al-Shabaab spokesperson Ali Dheere boldly foregrounded plans to seize Mogadishu in the context of Villa Somalia's clearance campaign. The militant leader claimed that his group would not allow the government to seize or reallocate properties, and that only the original owners of land were permitted to develop it, while those engaging in the clearances would be targeted with "serious measures." And it was no coincidence that the message was conveyed by Dheere rather than some other Al-Shabaab leader: the spokesman is a member of the Murosade clan, which has spearheaded the latest protests in Dayniile.
Unconfirmed reports suggest that Dheere was one of several militants targeted by airstrikes over the past few days in Middle Juba, with some local sources reporting him as injured or missing. If so, the loss of such a visible and high-profile figure would represent a weighty blow to Al-Shabaab. But killing the messenger won't necessarily silence the jihadist's chilling message: Villa Somalia may steal your land, but Al-Shabaab will make sure you get it back.
The Somalia Wire Team
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