Issue No. 876

Rumours and Fallout After Badhan AFIRCOM Strike

American airstrikes across Somalia continue apace. By September, it had been reported that over 70 strikes had been carried out by the US in the country, already surpassing the record number of 69 in 2019 in the final year of the first Trump administration. And in the past few days alone, notable strikes have been carried out in the Lower Shabelle, Middle Juba, and Bay regions in south-central Somalia, as well as up near Badhan in the contested Sanaag region-- which marked the 78th strike of the year.

Not all AFRICOM strikes have been without controversy, however. On 13 September, three missiles struck a single vehicle travelling in the Eel Buuh district near Badhan, killing a prominent Warsangeli elder, Omar Abdullahi Abdi. Much remains unclear over his death, with competing claims from various factions attempting to weaponise and politicise the strike to their own ends since. However, rather than Abdi, it appears likely that the intended target was initially Said Arab 'Diisay', Al-Shabaab's deputy leader in northern Somalia from the Darood/Dishiishe/Mugdi/Reer Ugaas clan, with the car belonging to the jihadist commander, and Diisay's telephone number tracked to the vehicle as well. Though reportedly active nearby, Diisay was not killed in the strike, with Abdi the sole passenger, at least according to his family and suggested by a subsequent AFRICOM statement on 17 September, which alleged the strike targeted an Al-Shabaab arms dealer and not a senior commander. But citing operational security, few other details were provided. Puntland has further aligned itself with the American version of events, quietly tying the Warsangeli elder to Yemeni arms trafficking networks as well.

But in the hours after the strike, anti-Puntland commentators soon seized on Abdi's death across social media and in news outlets linked to the federal government. Many hailed Abdi as a peacemaker, while one widespread rumour initially cast the strike as a conspiracy between Puntland and the UAE to eliminate the elder due to his purported criticisms of alleged Emirati mining stakes in the northernmost Federal Member State (FMS). And with four days between his death and the AFRICOM statement confirming US responsibility, the rumour mill became a firestorm. Whether the Warsangeli elder was linked to the arms trade remains contentious, but it is dubious that he was a significant weapons dealer for Al-Shabaab, even despite the complex porousness of the tri-country smuggling networks between Iran, Yemen and the Somali peninsula. Nevertheless, several questions remain, not least why Abdi appeared to be travelling in a car owned by a senior Al-Shabaab leader.

Then, on 18 September, Al-Shabaab's press office released a statement entitled "Denial of the statement from AFRICOM Crusaders," asserting that the elder had no ties to the jihadist group and that his death is part of a pattern of killing of civilians and "intellectuals" by the US government since the 1990s. Regardless of America's contentious history of military interventionism in Somalia, such a statement should be taken with a pinch of salt, with the militants consistently quick to claim that AFRICOM airstrikes murder innocent civilians to sully the US's reputation. Further, Al-Shabaab also has a particularly vested interest in weaponising the death of the Warsangeli elder against the US and Garowe. With Operation Onkod (Thunder) imminent-- the ground operations by Puntland in the Almadow Mountains against the jihadist group, Al-Shabaab are looking to deepen their reach into the Harti sub-clan that populates eastern Sanaag, rapaciously exploiting any long-standing grievances against the Majerteen-majority Garowe to resist the offensive.

For several months, Al-Shabaab has undergone significant preparations, redeploying increasing numbers of fighters and commanders from Buuhoodle and the Sool region towards their bases in the rugged mountain range– particularly from the Dubeys sub-clan of the Warsangeli. The jihadist group are anticipated to front significant resistance, with their strategic access to the eastern Sanaag coastline considered critical for their links to Yemeni arms traders, as well as increasingly the Iranian-backed Houthi militant group. For well over a decade, the Almadow Mountain range has been a sanctuary for Al-Shabaab's northern presence, while their relationship with the marginalised Warsangeli has been paramount. Now, with Onkod looming, the US strike against Diisay's vehicle arguably represents the opening salvo of the offensive.

The most critical lesson from Puntland's gradually concluding Operation Hilaac in the Bari region has arguably been the sustained outreach to long-marginalised clans– such as the Ali Salebaan– that provided the 'quiet surround' in which Islamic State-Somalia was able to develop. To this end, Puntland has sought to replicate such outreach to the Warsangeli in recent months. FMS President Said Abdullahi Deni has repeatedly met with senior elders and politicians from the clan-- both to lay the groundwork for Operation Onkod and to resist the entreats from the North-Eastern State administration in Laas Aanood. Promises of enhanced political representation in his cabinet and Puntland's parliament have been offered, as has the integration of Warsangeli militias into the FMS's formal forces. But the consequences of the killing of the well-known Warsangeli elder remain to be seen for Onkod, while Mogadishu-affiliated individuals continue to muddy the waters. Still, while no further information appears to be forthcoming from either Puntland or the US regarding the strike, senior Warsangeli elders have not yet publicly distanced themselves from Garowe. And in recent days, US Ambassador to Somalia Richard Riley, accompanied by American military officials, travelled to the northern FMS to meet with their Puntland counterparts to discuss continued joint operations and support.

More concerning, though, is the chatter that has suggested the airstrike may have targeted Abdi due to his purported attempts to facilitate North-Eastern State's access to the sea, potentially through Laas Qoray in the Sanaag region. The port town is a historic smuggling hotspot, long exploited by Al-Shabaab and increasingly by the Yemen-based Houthis as they further develop their various interests along the Somali peninsula. But for Hargeisa and Garowe, both opposed to the North-Eastern State for encroaching on their claimed territorial boundaries, the administration accessing the Gulf of Aden remains an absolute red line. Yet this version of events throws up a number of questions as well, not least how the two administrations-- which have some minor, though developing, interactions-- collaborated to convince AFRICOM of the value of such a strike. Further, Abdi had been vocally opposed to the creation of the North-Eastern State, publicly criticising it earlier this year and purportedly having met with Puntland officials just a few days before his death. 

Still, none of this has prevented officials from the North-Eastern State from attempting to politicise the death of Abdi as well. Barring the minor Maakhir faction of the Warsagenli that sided with SSC-Khaatumo in the formation of the new 'FMS' last month, most of the Harti sub-clan have refused to engage with the Villa Somalia proxy. And the election of Abdikhadir Ahmed Aw-Ali Firdhiye– a close ally of the federal government and purportedly bankrolled by the Interior Ministry– further cemented the project as limited to a majority Dhulbahante scheme. But outreach into the Warsangeli has not ceased, and much like Al-Shabaab, those opposed to Puntland within Laas Aanood have spied an opportunity to prise elements of the Warsangeli towards their unconstitutional project. And while the links between SSC-Khaatumo officials and Al-Shabaab remain contentious, well-known individuals such as Abdi Madoobe, a senior Dhulbahante militia commander, have close ties with the jihadist group.

While the fall-out of the AFRICOM strike near Badhan continues to play out, several arguably more significant US airstrikes were reported yesterday in south-central Somalia. Though yet unverified, they could prove highly consequential if accurate, with reports that one missile struck a meeting of senior upcoming Al-Shabaab leaders, including their shadow Banaadir governor, Sheikh Muse Abdi Arale. Another was purported to have hit a car in Middle Juba, targeting senior Al-Shabaab foreign operatives, including Pakistani, Moroccan, and Sudanese nationals involved in training jihadists with Houthi weapon systems. And the third strike was reported to have destroyed a training camp in Lower Shabelle, killing dozens of jihadists, with Al-Shabaab spokesperson Sheikh Ali Dheere believed to be present as well. Amid growing reports that the US is set to slash all support for partner forces in Somalia channelled through the State Department, the most prominent being Danab– the highly effective Bancroft-trained special forces- airstrikes are now set to be the favoured weapon of choice for the US government. 

Much remains unclear about the death of Abdi, and whether he was even alone in the Al-Shabaab deputy commander's car. Clarity is urgently needed, with an investigation into the circumstances surrounding his death required to allow cooler heads to prevail and to prevent further egregious politicisation. Few could justifiably question the targeting of a senior jihadist leader such as Diisay, but the killing of a prominent Warsangeli elder-- before operations have even begun against Al-Shabaab in the Almadow Mountains could have a far more negative impact on the offensive than eliminating a mid-ranking arms dealer; if he even was one. 

The Somalia Wire Team