Issue No. 874

Published 17 Sep 2025

One Puntland president, two constitutions, and three expired mandates

Published on 17 Sep 2025 16:27 min

One Puntland president, two constitutions, and three expired mandates

Another genuine contender has now entered the race for Somalia's presidency. Last week, Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni announced his candidacy in the elections scheduled for May 2026, ending months of speculation about a possible second tilt at Villa Somalia. The Puntland leader has certainly established a fine governance record in recent months, overseeing substantial military operations against Islamic State-Somalia and fending off threats to his Federal Member State (FMS) from Villa Somalia's proxy, North-Eastern State (NES). But such is the degree of political deadlock in Somalia, it is not even clear what electoral model Deni expects to contest next year.

The context in Somalia today differs substantially from when Deni announced his candidacy in 2022, with Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo having eventually backed down after the uprising on the streets of Mogadishu, even if trying —and failing —to game the 'return to the tent'. A transitional prime minister was in place, and the negotiated political agreement had secured enough buy-in for the indirect elections to proceed. Today, Somalia remains teetering on the edge of a full-blown crisis, with Villa Somalia refusing to retreat on its farcical, rigged electoral plan that has pushed the country's politics to breaking point. Al-Shabaab, meanwhile, remains on the ascendancy, and with future funding for the African Union peacekeeping mission remaining doubtful, whether Mogadishu will still be in the hands of the federal government in May 2026 to inaugurate a new president is uncertain.

Deni is no stranger to both one-person, one-vote (OPOV) elections or traditional clan-based polls, having overseen direct local votes in mid-2023. But he was also re-elected as Puntland president in January 2024 through the clan-based system, following occasionally bloody political wrangling over their nature in the preceding months. What is perhaps more important, though, is that it is highly doubtful that Deni will acquiesce to oversight of next year's presidential elections to the current, politically slanted National 'Independent' Electoral Commission. Further, a degree of coordination is now emerging between Deni, Jubaland President Ahmed Madoobe and the National Salvation Forum (NSF) coalition of opposition leaders, in formulating an alternative electoral model for next year. 

But before any election, ensuring enough political buy-in from all stakeholders for the poll to be 'good enough' and broadly accepted remains a tall ask. At the national level, there are now effectively two constitutions in effect in Somalia today-- three, if one includes Somaliland's-- in an almost 50-50 territorial split of the country, with Jubaland and Puntland aligning with the 2012 Provisional Constitution and South West, Galmudug and Hirshabelle, plus Mogadishu adopting questionable amendments to the first four chapters. Yet the terms of Abdiaziz Laftagareen (South West), Ahmed Abdi 'QoorQoor' (Galmudug) and Ali Abdullahi 'Guudlawe' (Hirshabelle) have all expired. Only the two leaders of Puntland and Jubaland, Deni and Madoobe, possess renewed constitutional and political mandates from their constituencies. Ironically, while elements of the international community grumbled when Madoobe was re-elected last November, there has been near-total silence about the expired terms of Laftagareen, QoorQoor, and Guudlawe.

The chaos of the past 18 months has deflected pressure from building on the three card-carrying members of the president's centralised Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP). Since May 2023, Villa Somalia has steadily corroded the National Consultative Council (NCC), rendering the body intended for negotiating federalism into a mechanism for term extensions and patronage. It is no coincidence that all three presidents still remaining within Villa Somalia's camps are those without substantial independent revenues. In turn, Hassan Sheikh has alternately fended off or amplified pressure to hold internal challenges for Laftagareen, Guudlawe, and QoorQoor at various moments. 

In Galmudug, for instance, the president has maintained several other candidates in play, including the returned spy chief Mahad Salad and arms dealer Liban 'Shuluq' to maintain a degree of coercion over QoorQoor, ensuring his continued public support despite private doubts. And such machinations have been particularly evident in South West-- with Laftagareen prominent as the only non-Hawiye FMS president within the NCC. At several points, Villa Somalia has threatened to host parallel elections in Baraawe to keep the Rahanweyne politician in check, all while entertaining a host of possible contenders for the presidency, including the former regional leader, Sharif Hassan, who reconciled with Villa Somalia just last month.

Meanwhile, Hassan Sheikh's stubborn refusal to allow his allies to hold elections directly contradicts his turgid bombast about ushering in a new phase of democracy in Somalia. The rationale has been that Villa Somalia intends to deliver direct elections in Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and South West, while Jubaland's presidential election last year was rendered null and void due to its indirect nature. But on the flipside, there have been several indirect polls in government-aligned areas in recent months, not least the election of Abdikhadir Aw-Ali Firdhiye as president of the new NES in late August, a process overseen by the Interior Ministry and heavily marred by allegations of corruption. Further, several MPs have continued to be elected through the traditional route, and with the establishment of the 'new Jubaland' administration in Gedo progressing, it remains improbable that the new state's president will be elected by a direct vote. 

With the country and international community distracted by the constitutional and electoral crisis kicked up by Villa Somalia at the national level, any pressure to hold FMS presidential elections has evaporated. But it is quite extraordinary to examine the stasis of Somalia's leaders since 2022, with only Jubaland and Puntland's leaders having renewed their mandates within this period. But even while elections in South West, Galmudug, and Hirshabelle are long overdue, time is now fast running out before next year's elections-- and it is widely anticipated that Mogadishu will cite the need for FMS leadership polls as a stalling tactic to extend Hassan Sheikh's own term of office. In the meantime, however, Deni's announcement of his candidacy should draw further scrutiny to the illegitimacy of the presidents in Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and South West, as well as the bifurcated constitutional predicament Somalia has veered into.

The Somalia Wire Team

 

 

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