E-Visas and Cyber Sovereignty in Somalia
Overflight fees, restricted domestic flights into Gedo, banned Taiwanese visas, new airports, and now a controversial new E-visa system. Controlling only a sliver of the country, visas and airports are one of the few expressions of diaphanous sovereignty under Mogadishu's control. Anyone travelling through Aden Adde is aware of the chaos and graft in the airport, as well as the need for genuine reform and greater efficiency within the Turkish-run terminals. Yet the new E-visa system, abruptly introduced by Somalia's federal government (FGS) on 1 September, does the precise opposite, introducing another rent-generating avenue for an insatiable Villa Somalia while sowing chaos at the same time. Rejected by Somaliland and Puntland, which have separate visa requirements, social media has also been flooded by reports of airlines refusing to board passengers who lack valid E-visas. In practice, the sparkling 'Electronic Visa and Travel Authorisation System,' a supposed "historic milestone," represents another ill-judged, ineffectual power grab by Mogadishu.
In other nations, implementing such an e-visa system would relate to efficiency drives, perhaps, making it easier for foreigners to navigate through bureaucracies and conduct their holiday or business. In Somalia, such a change relates to the paper-thin nature of the federal government's control and dogged insistence upon its 'sovereignty,' only bestowed by the international community. Villa Somalia's sphere of de facto authority is confined to the municipal space of Mogadishu, meaning that the only international borders it controls are Mogadishu's port and airport. The E-visa system enables the FGS to project the illusion of sovereignty across a new frontier: cyberspace.
There is money to be made from visas as well, and with the government desperately trying to boost domestic revenue mobilisation, the USD 64 fee offers a new way to help top up its coffers. Internal Security Minister Abdullahi Sheikh Ismail 'Fartaag' has insisted all fees will be funnelled 'transparently' into government accounts. But the scale of graft within this current administration -- epitomised by the land-clearance campaigns in Mogadishu-- makes it highly questionable that any funds collected will actually go towards Somalia's stalled state-building project.
In press releases, Somali authorities have claimed that extensive preparation and vetting ensured a smooth system, explaining that the platform would "make it easier for foreigners to apply for a visa from anywhere in the world." As part of the East African Community (EAC) visa rules, several African countries - as well as Malaysia - are still visa-free or can apply upon arrival. But for the most part, those travelling on foreign passports must now be pre-approved before arriving in Somalia. Other ministers have framed it as an attempt to improve the security of Aden Adde, but E-visas are hardly likely to diminish the principal threat to the airport - Al-Shabaab's persistent mortar attacks on Halane and on the runway itself.
Instead, the E-visa system raises new security concerns. For example, the website has been critiqued for its apparent lax security, notably using only a domain-validated SSL certificate, the lowest form of encryption authentication. Al-Shabaab already has informants planted throughout Aden Adde with access to flight lists of individuals arriving in the capital. The new, poorly protected visa system may allow the militants even easier access to the identities – and itineraries – of inbound passengers, long before they even board their flights.
Meanwhile, Puntland has rejected the E-visa system outright and maintains its own parallel system, meaning that passengers must shell out USD 60 for a second visa, almost doubling their costs. Information Minister Mahmoud Aydiid Dirir has dismissed the federal system as "robbery" and "illegal," declaring that "until a formal agreement is reached, the central government has no legal authority to control people landing at the country's airports." Somaliland has also rubbished the new system. In a statement released yesterday, Hargeisa's Ministry of Civil Aviation noted that it would continue to offer visas on arrival at the Egal International Airport and that no other electronic visa would be accepted. Meanwhile, pro-Somaliland social media accounts claim that passengers have been permitted to board flights to Hargeisa without showing an E-visa issued by Mogadishu.
Even in South-Central Somalia, there are concerns that the new E-visa system will aggravate the politicisation of flights and airspace. With so much of Somalia's interior held by Al-Shabaab, flying is the only option for many citizens to avoid travelling through jihadist-controlled areas. The FGS has fashioned a political weapon out of this necessity, requiring all flights, both international and domestic, to be routed through Mogadishu. For much of this year, tensions between Villa Somalia and Kismaayo resulted in a federal flight ban on much of Gedo, forcing passengers to make long detours and pay exorbitant sums to travel to their home region. And last September, amid a brief spat between South West President Abdiaziz Laftagareen and Villa Somalia, the Huddur-based 9th Somali National Army Battalion commander was detained as he flew in from Baidoa after meeting with the regional leader.
The new E-visa fiasco exposes running sores in Somalia's body politic, including unresolved disputes between Mogadishu and the Federal Member States (FMSs) over the constitutional review process and incomplete federal architecture. Villa Somalia's determination to pre-empt negotiations by unilaterally imposing its will has left the nation divided between two versions of the Provisional Constitution and a raft of contested powers and responsibilities, from security to natural resources, revenue collection and even high school graduation certificates. The absence of Somaliland, Puntland, and Jubaland from Somalia's putative federation leaves the FGS in nominal control of less than 30% of its national territory – at least half of which is actually administered by Al-Shabaab.
Against this backdrop, Mogadishu's E-visa scheme is likely to be discarded as just another absurd attempt to substitute virtual control of its territory and population for genuine, physical control. But perhaps that is where Somalia is headed: unless the FGS learns to focus on pragmatic politics and effective governance, Villa Somalia's sovereignty may soon be exercised exclusively in cyberspace.
The Somalia Wire Team
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