Al-Shabaab and Palestine
In the early evening last Thursday, Al-Shabaab fighters launched several indirect mortar rounds at the US-supported Danab special forces military base in Kismaayo. Little damage appears to have been done, though perhaps serving as a timely reminder of the continued strength of Al-Shabaab in Jubaland amid the calamitous wresting of Gedo from Ahmed Madoobe's administration by Villa Somalia. And though following recent Danab clearance operations near Kismaayo, the mortar strikes were instead framed, however, under the title of "Decisive Operations against the American Crusaders at Kismayo Airport in Support of our Muslim Brothers in Palestine." Even amidst the gradual shifts in the militants' propaganda in Al-Kataib Media Foundation towards emphasising narratives of Somali nationalism, the Palestinian cause has remained a consistent 'North Star' across years of Al-Shabaab output. While the ongoing obliteration of the Gaza Strip by Israeli forces may have invited such references, the explicit attack in these terms is nevertheless worth exploration.
Palestine has been one of the few constants in the development of Al-Shabaab's now highly sophisticated propaganda output over the years, with messages routinely disseminated condemning American and Israeli 'crusaders' in the holy lands. With many in the Muslim world feeling an affinity with the brutalities faced by the Palestinian people, Al-Shabaab-- and other militant groups-- have repeatedly leaned into such sympathies, playing on the emotional resonance to recruit as well as to establish itself in the broader jihadist milieu and cause. More than any other subject, Palestine is central for Al-Shabaab to cast themselves as defenders of Muslims globally, seeking to 'legitimise' and 'localise' their own violent struggle by invoking the continuing genocide by Israel. As ever, the militant group can range from the most local issues of adjudicating land contestation between clans to the global questions, such as the Palestinian cause.
Al-Shabaab's invocation of Palestine in its Al-Kataib statement last week, stating that the Kismaayo mortar attack "is a direct act of solidarity with our besieged brothers and sisters in Palestine," has substantial precedent within the group. In the late 2000s, for instance, Al-Shabaab aligned another Israeli invasion of Gaza with the US-backed Ethiopian invasion of Somalia as "two wounds of the Muslim Ummah." Not only that, but Palestine was a key point of rhetorical convergence with 'Al-Qaeda proper' and Al-Shabaab over a decade ago, when the latter pledged public allegiance to its then-head Ayman al-Zawahiri. Subsequent joint communiqués between the two affiliated groups would invoke Palestine as a "frontline of jihad." Even while the relationship between Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab has diminished in recent years, with the latter now the most heavily armed, wealthiest, and most influential affiliate of the former, Al-Kataib will still dig out clips of Osama Bin Laden and others decrying Israel's treatment of the Palestinian people. And in its perverse celebrations of Islamic holy days, Al-Shabaab's scripted protests routinely feature children with banners depicting "We are coming,' O Jerusalem," and "Jerusalem Will Not Be Judaized."
With the spike of global attention and outrage on Palestine, Al-Shabaab has similarly upped its references in its propaganda. Images of Israeli airstrikes in Gaza or civilian casualties are routinely recycled by Al-Kataib or by Al-Shabaab's affiliated news sites, such as Somalimemo, to incite outrage, as well as mask them as 'genuine' outlets. And within Al-Shabaab's rank-and-file, it is apparent that the Palestinian cause continues to hold substantial rhetorical weight. Earlier this year, when the Al-Shabaab senior commander in eastern Sanaag —Yasiin Osman Khalid 'Kilwe'—was sidelined by his superiors, he established a splinter faction of some 200 fighters under the title of Liwaa al-Qudus, which translates as 'Jerusalem Brigade' or 'Under the Banner of Jerusalem.'
And such evocation has continued even amidst the more recent subtle shifts within Al-Shabaab towards more actively accessing Somali histories and culture in Al-Kataib documentaries and Radio Andaluspodcasts. Among these have been a three-part documentary on the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, as well as more regular profiles on jihadist commanders and how they came to join Al-Shabaab. Later this week, a documentary by Al-Shabaab on the infamous killings of 10 sheikhs and the jailing of several more by the Siad Barre regime in 1975 for opposing the controversial 'Family Law' is expected to air. For many Muslims in Somalia, as well as the country's jihadist movement, the event was a calamity, and it kicked off the snowball that helped inspire the country's first homegrown Islamist militant group, Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, in the early 1980s.
Yet such affinity and rhetorical framing of the Palestinian cause have not translated into any kind of material or direct support from Al-Shabaab for Hamas or vice versa. Constrained to the Gaza Strip and under intense military pressure from indiscriminate Israeli attacks, Hamas are hardly in a position to be lending a hand to their vague jihadist cousins in Somalia. Still, Al-Shabaab has nevertheless been inspired by the Hamas 7 October attacks, establishing its own armaments advancement wing in the aftermath of the violence on Israeli communities. Individuals in Jilib, Al-Shabaab's de facto capital, were instructed to watch and learn from the sea of videos that emerged in the wake of the deadly incursions.
This military unit, and others, have particularly emphasised the development of suicide drones, with the support of the Iranian-backed Houthis, or Ansar Allah, the militant group that controls much of Yemen-- despite their own distinct theological divergence. Some have since framed Al-Shabaab as an auxiliary part of the much-bloodied Iranian 'Axis of Resistance' that centred on Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis. What is apparent, however, is that the Houthis have rapidly diversified and expanded upon their strategic interests and connections on the 'other' side of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, not only with Al-Shabaab but also with their competitors in Puntland, the Islamic State-Somalia faction and unaffiliated clan militia groups. Hundreds of young Somali men have since been trained in everything from the interdiction of maritime vessels to IED usage. But Al-Shabaab is pre-eminent among the Somali forces with links to the Houthis, and is leveraging the relationship to prepare more sophisticated weaponry for use on the battlefield or the fortified Halane camp in Mogadishu.
The Palestinian cause links to a broader anti-imperial and anti-colonial sentiment within the Islamic world, and the devastation of the Gaza Strip has understandably rallied many. Israel's scorched-earth campaign in Gaza is deeply unpopular amongst Somalis, and it is not uncommon to see Palestinian flags adorning city streets across Somalia. The ruling Dam ul-Jadiid clique in Mogadishu – like Hamas, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood – has also made its position on Palestine clear, with cabinet ministers routinely slipping anti-Semitic tropes into public statements. But solidarity over Palestine, no matter how deeply it may run, is manifestly insufficient to bridge the divide between Al-Shabaab and Somalia's feckless federal government. Sadly, as in Gaza, it seems likely that only one side will survive this conflict.
The Somalia Wire Team
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