Issue No. 868

Turmoil in Jubaland spills into Kenyan politics

For Nairobi, Jubaland has long been a frontline against Al-Shabaab, a key staging post from which the jihadists have launched attacks on Kenyan soil. Amidst a seesawing relationship between Nairobi and Mogadishu, the southernmost Federal Member State (FMS) has always been a buffer zone for Kenya, with many thousands of soldiers having been posted into Jubaland in an attempt to inoculate North-Eastern from the jihadists' infiltration. But over several years, the battleground has nevertheless morphed, with Kenya's borderlands having transformed into the site of a low-level militant insurgency, and with Manda Bay an epicentre of the fight against Jaysh Ayman, Al-Shabaab's semi-autonomous wing in Kenya. Much has changed over the past decade, including the steady advance of Salafist thought in these peripheral areas, but there has been one constant-- Ahmed Madoobe, the Jubaland president. 

Yet the enduring relationship between Madoobe and the Kenyan army has come under recurring and increasing attack from some Somali politicians in Kenya, some influenced by Al-I'tisaam and others by broader clan grievances. And with Gedo still simmering, such vested interests appear to be on manoeuvres once again amidst Nairobi's attempts to cool the temperature between Mogadishu and Kismaayo. For Kenya, Jubaland remains pre-eminent in its national security portfolio, having invested political, military, and economic capital into making Kismaayo viable after helping to install Madoobe over a decade ago with Ethiopian support. And though Jaysh Ayman continues to conduct attacks and sow IEDs against government positions in Mandera, the Kenyan army's presence has nevertheless delivered some defence from Al-Shabaab. Working cheek-by-jowl with Jubaland, the Kenyan military is especially prominent in Kismaayo, with a presence in the city's port —where the army extracts some taxes —as well as the airport. 

Yet Nairobi--much like Addis--has remained mainly on the sidelines amidst the latest endeavour by Mogadishu to wrest Gedo from Madoobe, hoping to play a mediating role between the two. Late last year, amidst the calamitous routing of Somali National Army (SNA) troops at Ras Kamboni across the Kenyan border, Nairobi attempted some shuttle diplomacy between Madoobe and Villa Somalia, but to no avail. And though it briefly vacillated over its relationship with Madoobe and his future as Jubaland president, Nairobi eventually fell behind their man in Kismaayo and received a haranguing for bringing him to the Kenyan capital from Villa Somalia earlier this year. The joint visit of Noordin Haji, Kenya's intelligence chief, and the country's army chief to Kismaayo last month was perhaps intended to present a united Kenyan intelligence-military front on Jubaland.

Mandera, meanwhile, has been wrestling with the fallout of the government's Gedo machinations, and particularly the intense clashes in the border town of Beled Hawo that have left dozens dead and displaced thousands into Kenya. Reports of Jubaland forces being stationed within Mandera and also withdrawing over the Kenyan border after Beled Hawo fighting have triggered intermittent protests from Mandera officials in recent weeks. Nairobi has watched on with concern, with the stage having been set for further infiltration and attacks by Al-Shabaab in both Gedo, and across the border into Kenya and Ethiopia. Although Nairobi and Addis share concerns about Al-Shabaab infiltration in North-Eastern Kenya and the Bale Mountains, respectively, there has been little public coordination on a joint response to the crisis.

Then, Mandera Governor Mohamed Khalif launched a broadside against Jubaland last week, alleging that state-level forces had established a training camp in a primary school and calling for their expulsion. It has triggered a snowball effect, prompting others to lobby for the training of Jubaland forces in Kenya to cease and for Nairobi to withdraw the Kenyan military from the FMS. Spying an opportunity through which to criticise the Ruto administration, several non-Somali Kenyan opposition politicians have similarly condemned the reports of Jubaland forces within Mandera, including former Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua. But transforming the fraught Jubaland issue and Al-Shabaab's persecution of its insurgency in North-Eastern Kenya into a political football does not do it justice. And the more meaningful danger to Kenya stems not from Madoobe's troops, but rather the active destabilisation of the tri-border Gedo region by the federal government and subsequent empowering of Al-Shabaab.

Some of the rhetoric from the Kenyan-Somali politicians today bears a striking resemblance to Al-I'tisaam's favoured talking points, notably the removal of Madoobe and the withdrawal of Kenyan forces from Somalia. Much of it is rehashed, echoing Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo's tenure and his attempts to depose Madoobe and seize Gedo, when Somali communities and politicians within Kenya were similarly divided. At that time, Al-I'tisaam money 'talked,' and plenty of Somali-Kenyan MPs publicly questioned the role of Nairobi in Jubaland. But it was Kenyan forces that crucially halted the potential total collapse of Kismaayo, when they stopped Ethiopian commandos from seizing Madoobe from the port city in August 2019 on the instructions of Farmaajo. Without such an intervention, it is hard to know what the state of Jubaland might look like today. And while it is difficult to ascertain whether the latest bout of Kenyan-Somali politicians condemning Jubaland are affiliated with Al-I'tisaam, they are certainly singing from the same hymn sheet.

Still, it is important not to overemphasise the role of the Salafist movement, with other factors also at play in the current furore, not least clan. Unlike the Ogaadeen-dominated Kismaayo, Mandera's communities are mostly drawn from the Garre, as well as the Murulle, Mareehaan, and Degodia. And much like several Mareehaan sub-clans in Gedo, these peripheral communities harbour a degree of resentment towards Kismaayo as well as Nairobi-- where Ogaadeen elite, such as Madoobe's own Mohamed Zubeir sub-clan, wield the consequential political power. Due to cross-border clan ties with Kismaayo, communities in Garissa, for example, have been historically more sympathetic to the Madoobe government. But with the Ogaadeen ascendant in Nairobi and regarded as holding the Jubaland file for Kenya, some peripheral clans inherently pivot towards Mogadishu. And successive federal governments in Somalia, in turn, have developed their own relations with Mandera's elite to help stoke anti-Madoobe sentiments. Cross-clan territorialism and a broader contest for power are playing out on the public stage, with recent events in Gedo once again accentuating these broader issues.

Looking ahead, Nairobi faces an undoubtedly thorny question in negotiating between Madoobe and Mogadishu, with a comprehensive solution to Somalia's broader political crisis not currently within its grasp. It may be able to cool the dangerous violence in Gedo somewhat, but from Madoobe's position, negotiations solely with the federal president remain a non-starter, with him still being deemed a criminal and the farcical Red Notice from Interpol outstanding. Perhaps more importantly, the legality of his position as Jubaland president has been repeatedly questioned by Villa Somalia-- an impossible stance from which to begin any talks. Second, Madoobe is well aware of the slippery nature of Villa Somalia and its attempts to cleave off parts of the opposition, and will refuse to negotiate on the future of Somalia without a collective position that includes Puntland and the national opposition. And lastly, the Jubaland president has insisted upon the Kenyans as a third-party negotiator, a proposition now rebuffed by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud despite having entreated with Nairobi earlier this year to broker talks. The president's flip to now arguing that a third-party Kenyan negotiator is not needed makes little sense, nor does it chime with relying on Nairobi's good offices to facilitate a call with Madoobe. Rather than genuine outreach or offering of concessions, it is more probable that Villa Somalia was looking for a positive headline ahead of the UN General Assembly summit later this month.

There are understandable frustrations with Madoobe within the marginal clans of Jubaland, as well as the spill-over of the Gedo violence into Mandera. But like it or not, there is no serious alternative to Madoobe at this current juncture, and certainly one that does not invite further instability into Jubaland. The FMS president dominates Kismaayo, and unseating him--forcefully or otherwise--would invite a host of fraught negotiations about the consequent political makeup of his successor. Yet if Madoobe is to re-establish control over Gedo, he will once again require external interventions from either Kenya, Ethiopia, or both. The failure to make the necessary inroads with the Mareehaan sub-clans within Gedo has cost the Jubaland president dearly, again.

But in Kenya, the reductionist arguments swirling around the crisis in Jubaland and 'protecting sovereignty' miss the broader issue of the country's national security, as well as the still-rising threat of Al-Shabaab in North-Eastern as a result of Villa Somalia's destructive antics in Gedo. While resisting Al-I'tisaam's pernicious reach and acknowledging grievances in Mandera, cooler heads in Nairobi must prevail on the Jubaland file to protect Kenya's strategic relationship with Madoobe.

The Somalia Wire Team