Issue No. 866

Water on an oil fire: Egyptians in Gedo

With the political dust swirling around the deal between splinter members of the opposition National Salvation Forum (NSF) and Villa Somalia, the presidency appears ready to pour 'water' on the Gedo conflagration. Nothing is static in Somalia. After months of fitful Egyptian interest in Mogadishu, this week has seen a sudden swell of engagement in the Somali capital, with the announcement of the arrival of over 1,000 Egyptian soldiers ready to be deployed in the war against Al-Shabaab. Against a backdrop of a visit of the Sudanese intelligence chief to Mogadishu and the simmering violence in Gedo, the possibility of Ethiopian-Egyptian clashes has drastically risen once again. The proposed co-deployment of Egyptian 'peacekeeping' forces alongside Ethiopian soldiers in the Mareehaan-dominated region not only risks 'blue-on-blue' violence but also imperils further jeopardising the yet-unfunded African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). And with the military situation across south-central Somalia so dire, the last thing needed is more needless political violence with Al-Shabaab still on the ascendancy.
 
The scheme to deploy Egyptian troops to Somalia as a potential replacement for Ethiopian forces initially emerged in mid-2024, coinciding with the deterioration of Addis-Mogadishu relations following the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) at the start of that year. At that time, Somalia's federal government insisted that Ethiopian troops could not remain within the country without respecting its much-touted 'sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity,' while rallying various adversaries of Addis, particularly Eritrea and Egypt, to rail against the country's overreach. The proposal to remove Ethiopian forces was always a non-starter, however, with considerable support for Addis's military within Ethiopia's security umbrella that encompasses a string of clans and communities along Somalia's western border, as well as the South West administration. Still, as part of their 'Tripartite Alliance,' Cairo seized the opportunity to support attempts to diplomatically isolate Addis, tying in its own long-standing disputes with Ethiopia over the Nile water basin and the Red Sea, and proposing a military deployment as an instrument to menace Ethiopia's western border. Any illusion that Cairo is interested in the fight against the jihadists should be disproved by its months-long absence amid Al-Shabaab rolling across the country's centre towards Mogadishu earlier this year. For Egypt, Somalia's federal government is a useful proxy-- among several-- in its broader tussle with Addis. 
 
Fast forward to today, the ramping up of Egyptian interests in Somalia, which had conspicuously cooled in the wake of the Turkish-mediated Ankara Declaration in December 2024 and more settled Addis-Mogadishu relations, coincides with the soon-to-be-inaugurated Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Scheduled for September, the mega-dam upon the Blue Nile has triggered intermittent bouts of fury in Cairo, and to a lesser extent, its allies in Port Sudan. But amid years of thwarted negotiations, Egypt has been unable to prevent its completion, even while previously threatening to bomb it and attempting to prise other Nilotic states away from Addis. And with war still threatening between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Cairo maintains an interest in both overshadowing the GERD inauguration and potentially establishing some form of military pressure on Ethiopia on its southeastern border in Gedo-- the anticipated location for their deployment. 
 
The tinderbox that is Gedo now risks having fuel poured over it, with the federal government continuing to cement its grip over several towns and wrest them from the Jubaland administration in Kismaayo. Already, dozens have been killed and many more wounded in the fighting over Beledhawo, in particular, in recent weeks. Little is needed to push the tri-border region over a cliff edge. And that almost came this week, amid conflicting reports that Egyptian military personnel were being deployed to Gedo to escort Somali National Army (SNA) officers to deliver cash for the forces of Abdirashid Janaan, the controversially-appointed National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) commander for the region. While it was more likely Egyptian helicopters used to ferry SNA troops, such immediate politicisation of their deployment against Villa Somalia's domestic enemies, rather than Al-Shabaab, does not portend well. 
 
Facilitating the deployment of Egyptian troops to the border is not only militarily absurd-- the scale of the supply lines makes any deployment extremely cumbersome-- but also sure to mangle any remaining vestige of public goodwill between Addis and Mogadishu. Barring supporting a Jubaland raid on Doolow on its border, Ethiopia has remained mainly on the sidelines of the Gedo destabilisation, building up some military forces in Garbaaharey and elsewhere but preferring not to actively engage with the federal troops. Any flicker that a substantial Egyptian deployment could arrive in Beledhawo is likely to significantly shift that rationale and could precipitate a substantial crackdown, however. Nairobi, another close ally of Ahmed Madoobe, shares concerns as well about the situation in Gedo and its own battle with Al-Shabaab, which continues to wield the region as a staging post for infiltration into North-Eastern Kenya. Meanwhile, in an interview with Universal Somali TV, Sulaiman Dedefo, the Ethiopian ambassador, stated that Egypt is without a positive track record in international peacekeeping, and should look to its neighbours in Libya, Sudan, and Gaza for stabilisation operations.
 
With AUSSOM funding still unagreed and the mission appearing perilously close to economic collapse in the coming months, the Egyptian deployment is perhaps the worst advertisement possible for the force. Ugandan forces-- both AUSSOM and bilateral-- have been spearheading operations in Lower Shabelle in recent weeks, attempting to retake the bridge towns and present a justification for doubting external partners to continue funding the mission. Yet, as part of the same mission, Mogadishu's purported plan to deploy Egyptian forces to the Gedo sector contravenes the very mandate and nature of the mission. As part of its Concept of Operations (CONOPs), which Villa Somalia acquiesced to earlier this year, Gedo was to remain under the operational authority of AUSSOM and the Ethiopian sector commander. That cannot be simply waved away, particularly not against the express wishes of the Ethiopians, and especially in light of these forces being deployed for cementing control over Gedo rather than against Al-Shabaab. And once again, the attempts by Mogadishu to manipulate where forces are located for its own political ambitions reflect a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of AUSSOM at the heart of government, ignoring that this is a UN-approved peacekeeping mission and in place due to the transnational threat posed by Al-Shabaab; a danger that has only continued to rise due to the egregious misuse of the federal military in Gedo and beyond.
 
With the accentuating interest of Egypt, Sudanese military, and the UAE in Somalia this week, it appears that the two competing Arab-African blocs that have violently played out across the Horn and Red Sea may be converging on the country in greater force. Against a backdrop of the Iranian-backed Houthis' engagement with Al-Shabaab and others, Somalia is becoming ever more explicitly embroiled in the broader tussle for control over the littoral states of the Red Sea, the world's most strategic waterway. The Ethiopian-Egyptian tensions fall squarely into this framing, and inserting these contorted, complex dynamics into a situation such as Gedo is foolhardy, risking the security of not just one but three nations. And while Addis may appear publicly cool about the prospect of Egyptian troops being deployed to its border, such seeming nonchalance should not be mistaken for acquiescence to what it considers a threat to its national security. If Egyptian troops are finally deployed, the violence of the past weeks between Jubaland and Mogadishu may prove to be just a prelude to a far bloodier and consequential confrontation.

The Somalia Wire Team