Issue No. 864

North Eastern State: Caveat Emptor

With its parliament finally selected and presidential elections upcoming on Thursday, all might appear rosy in the new state of North Eastern (NES). Villa Somalia's engineering of the Dhulbahante clan enclave is chuntering along, with the 'Federal Member State' (FMS) being incorporated into the country's badly askew federal system. New militias are being trained under the framework of the Somali National Army (SNA), while state-level offices are being established with NES branding. But with Mogadishu's motivations for NES confined only to carving out a location for rigged polling stations, while vandalising Somaliland and Puntland, what might the future hold for NES beyond the incumbents in Villa Somalia? Nationalists have widely hailed the bright, shiny makhaayad (or 'kiosk') as a triumph of state-building, but the inevitable bill will undoubtedly prove steep.

The creation of a new FMS does not signal Villa Somalia's sudden conversion to federalism; quite the opposite – as Mogadishu proceeds to dismantle Somalia's federal system. But for the moment, a new Darood FMS in part of the contested Sool region serves a purpose. Much like Gedo, NES is a Darood clan enclave intended to serve Villa Somalia's electoral machinations, carving out a couple of polling stations from which it can claim cross-clan and cross-region legitimacy. And in a fell swoop, NES keeps Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni occupied in securing his western borders and distracted from building a potential presidential campaign, while dismembering Somaliland and Puntland by claiming both Sool and Sanaag. With the two Darood-majority FMSs of Puntland and Jubaland rejecting the federal government's legitimacy, NES is a poor stab at an alternative. However legitimate the Dhulbahante grievances may be against Isaaq-dominated Hargeisa and the Majerteen-majority Garowe, the new FMS —shoddily built without consensus or constitutional procedure —is wholly dependent on external support. It is all show and no substance.

It is not just Villa Somalia ploughing in money and arms, but also China and Türkiye as well, which have dispatched support in various forms for the Laas Aanood administration. For Beijing, the relationship between Hargeisa and Taiwan makes NES an ally in its broader attempts to force through a 'One China, One Somalia' vision. This week, PM Hamza Abdi Barre has travelled to China to further cement the growing ties between Mogadishu and Beijing, much to the chagrin of Somalia's much to the discomfort of Somalia's dwindling supporters in the US government. And some have reported that the now-released Turkish MV Sea World weapons that were briefly seized by Puntland forces last month were intended for SSC-Khaatumo. 

Both Beijing and Ankara may care little if NES collapses, but neither is Villa Somalia motivated by a sustainable vision of Dhulbahante aspirations to statehood. Instead, if President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) can pull off his electoral trick next year, he may simply cast NES aside, or relegate its status to just one of a growing number of statelets beholden to his increasingly autocratic, Islamist-flavoured agenda. Of even greater concern for NES should be what might happen if HSM were deposed next year through a 'return to the tent' or some other yet-to-be-agreed-upon electoral model. The constitutional and legal limbo of NES will come into sharper focus with the incoming federal administration expected to pick up the bill.

Moreover, a new federal government may well be more motivated to repair relations with Puntland and Jubaland than to sustain HSM's folly in Laas Aanood with more federal funds, troops and an expensive logistical air bridge. The establishment of NES is also in direct breach of Somalia's Provisional Constitution (Article 142), which awards Puntland full rights to "retain and exercise powers" consistent with its own state constitution and requires the federal government to consult existing FMSs "in the decision-making process regarding the federal system, and security arrangements." An incoming administration may therefore be inclined to revert to a more conservative interpretation of the constitution, in which Puntland exercises a veto over NES's formation.

NES fiscal projections are similarly dire. Having failed to attract the loyalty of the Warsangeli clan in Sanaag, NES has neither a port nor any significant internal revenue to speak of, while its trade could be easily choked off by Garowe and Hargeisa. And with diminishing funds flowing into Mogadishu — the lifeblood of the government — the general trajectory of the USD 5-7 billion in annual foreign support, a mixture of budgetary assistance, military aid, humanitarian funding, and more, is already heading for a steep downturn. Every month, as the federal government struggles to assert 'more and more' control over 'less and less' of Somalia's territory, NES may well become collateral damage in the trend of a shrinking state. The tyranny of geography means that without budgetary and military life-support from Mogadishu, NES could well collapse if HSM leaves government. 

Perhaps most important of all for NES's credibility and longevity is the absence of the Warsangeli, whose elders have largely fallen behind Puntland in recent weeks. Still, much of the Harti sub-clan appears to be biding its time, waiting to see the outcome of the imminent NES presidential elections and if Firdhiye is selected as leader-- which would continue limiting NES to Sool and a sliver of Sanaag. So far, little has been done to assuage the Warsangeli's concerns of a genuine contest. On 17 August, the list for the 83 MPs for NES was published– comprised of 30 from Sool, 37 from Sanaag, and 16 from Buhoodle. However, allegations of interference by the Ministry of Interior and SSC-Khaatumo leader Abdikhadir Aw-Ali 'Firdhiye' muddied the selection process. Seven prospective presidential candidates, including a frontrunner, Gamal Mohammed Hassan, publicly rejected the Interior Minister Ali Hosh-appointed committee overseeing the process, asserting that it was an attempt to gerrymander the election and threatened a parallel and more inclusive procedure. Last week's election of close Firdhiye/Villa Somalia ally Adan Abdullahi Awhasan from the Fiqishini sub-clan of the Hawiye as speaker of parliament may give a sense of what is to come with the regional presidential poll scheduled for later this week.

Puntland is well aware that this could prove to be a short-term project of Villa Somalia that could have long-term destabilising repercussions. Earlier this month, Warsangeli elders met with Puntland President Said Deni, as well as Puntland parliamentary speaker Abdirisak Ahmed Saud, to continue cementing ties between Garowe and the Harti sub-clan, discussing greater representation in the FMS government among other topics. For Puntland, the Warsangeli are not only critical for stymying the reach of Villa Somalia's machinations in Laas Aanood, but also for laying the groundwork for Operation Onkod (Thunder) against Al-Shabaab in the Calmadow Mountains in Sanaag. 

Though the problems inherent in NES and with their relations with Mogadishu are readily apparent, what a 'collapse' looks like is far less clear. The shell of a fragile but heavily armed administration has certainly alarmed its neighbours. Yet reverse engineering the atomisation of northern Somalia and Somaliland, with tensions so fraught and the control of Sool and Sanaag regarded as existential, is highly complex. And, as always, Al-Shabaab is waiting in the wings. The jihadists, their presence finally acknowledged by SSC-Khaatumo officials earlier this year, have stoked and exploited the now-chasm-like gulf between Hargeisa and Laas Aanood, establishing a presence from Buuhoodle up to the Sanaag coastline. More broadly, much of 'NES' is now heavily militarised, with weapons and armaments flooding into the region over the past two years. It will not take much to tip it over into full-blown conflict. 

So, while NES may appear to have the hallmarks of a functioning FMS-- an administration, a new parliament and soon a president-- it is symptomatic of the broader malaise and charade of Somalia's state-building system. Sadly for the Dhulbahante, NES is just one symptom of Villa Somalia's much broader political vandalism. As the federal government's interest in NES inevitably wanes, international partners will doubtless be asked to stump up the cash for the impoverished statelet's administration, legislature, security and social services – an unappealing invitation to throw good money after bad. Potential buyers should think twice. Caveat emptor.

The Somalia Wire Team