Issue No. 862

Leysan Reconciliation in South West

After months of simmering tensions within the Leysan sub-clan of the Digil-Mirifle, a complex reconciliation process is bearing fruit. Partly stemming from enduring frustrations with South West President Abdiaziz Laftagareen, the conflict between Leysan militias and his government gradually morphed in the past year into an intra-clan conflict. Several dozen militia members have been killed in the intermittent fighting in and around Berdaale in particular, as well as 5 civilians. Now, however, after intricate negotiations, it appears that the Leysan militias positioned a few kilometres from the town for over a year may soon be reintegrated into the formal security architecture, hopefully soothing rifts within the sub-clan.

Laftagareen is far from popular in South West, widely regarded as a self-serving politician who has repeatedly extended his term without regard for inclusive deal-making. In late 2018, the president was imposed on South West by former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo in violent scenes that included the jailing of the reformed Al-Shabaab commander and current Minister of Religion, Mukhtar Roobow. Since then, with support from the incumbents in Mogadishu, Laftagareen has held onto his position, batting away pressure to hold elections-- despite his term expiring in December 2022, including by attaching himself to plans to synchronise regional presidential elections with federal polls. He is acutely aware, however, that the support and patronage dispensed from Villa Somalia may not last forever, and Laftagareen has been careful to hedge his bets on several occasions.

In turn, since coming to power, Laftagareen has constrained opposition in Baidoa and across South West, at times clashing with elements of the Leysan-- one of the most prominent Digil-Mirifle sub-clans. Laftagareen's suppression has ranged from denying opposition politicians access to Baidoa to amending the South West constitution in February 2024 to hand the presidency sweeping control over the regional parliament. The Leysan, meanwhile, have a reputation as stringent defenders of Digil-Mirifle land, battling against the raiding of General Aidid's forces in the 1990s as well as Al-Shabaab over the past decades. The sub-clan still wields the best-armed militias of the Digil-Mirifle to this day, partly due to a close relationship with the Ethiopian military presence in South West. Laftagareen, on the other hand, hails from the Harin sub-clan of the Digil-Mirifle, who have also clashed repeatedly with the Leysan over land and grazing rights.

The regional president has had opportunities to reconcile with the Leysan during his time in office, but has preferred to consolidate his position. This has included cycling through district commissioners and officials in Leysan-majority areas without consultation, triggering intermittent violence with sub-clan militias. However, the most recent spates of violence stem from the redeployment of opposition militias away from Baidoa as part of negotiations between Laftagareen and the opposition, overseen by Villa Somalia in 2023. 

As part of these political talks over Laftagareen's term extension, it was agreed that the coalition of Leysan militias mobilised in Baidoa would be redeployed to Berdale and integrated into the formal security architecture there. This was, of course, in exchange for promises that the South West president would commit to a regional presidential election after another short-term extension-- though over two years on from the negotiations, there is no sign of any kind of poll appearing in the offing. And while they redeployed to Berdale, the Leysan militias were never integrated into government forces. Having been deprived of revenue, they subsequently established checkpoints to tax trade into Gedo. 

From here, the conflict took on a new dimension, with the district administration also displeased at the establishment of revenue-raising checkpoints in their territory. Clan negotiations to reconcile the rival Leysan forces in and around Berdale failed, with an elder killed last May during the heightened tensions. Eventually, however, the Leysan opposition militia removed itself from the town and settled a few kilometres from its outskirts in Al-Shabaab-held territory. The jihadists have a long history of seeking to infiltrate and exploit clan grievances and disputes, and it appears that Al-Shabaab may have come to some sort of arrangement to allow this Leysan militia to peacefully remain. At the same time, the South West administration mistakenly attributed its own attempts to remove the Leysan militias from near Berdale as clearance operations against Al-Shabaab, with Laftagareen seemingly concerned that they could mass again in the context of a future election.

However, over the following months, the conflict evolved into an intra-conflict within the sub-clans of the Leysan, roughly split between those aligned with Laftagareen and the opposing forces. Although Leysan politicians and elders have been keen to reconcile their community in the turbulent political context, the situation has proven fraught with so many layered interests. And the continuing reconciliatory process has already had some successes, with senior Leysan from across the diaspora brought to Mogadishu and Baidoa to oversee the negotiations. As part of the regional opposition, other Digil-Mirifle politicians have also been involved with the reconciliation process, including former South West President Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden. 

Primarily facilitated by Roobow, Leysan elders and politicians from all sides met between 3 and 7 July in Mogadishu, with the South West Minister of Interior also present. To his credit, Laftagareen has firmly supported the reconciliation process, seemingly eager to see the Leysan militias reintegrated into the fold. And subsequently, phase two of the reconcilitation process began in Baidoa earlier this month, with the committee bringing together stakeholders to negotiate. Critically, it was agreed that the diya (blood money) for the 5 killed civilians in the clashes would be divvied up, with Laftagareen paying the diya for an elderly man in Berdale and Leysan businesspeople covering the other four. However, the militia's presence for well over a year in Al-Shabaab-held territory complicates matters somewhat. The degree to which the jihadists may have infiltrated the militia is unclear, and immediately redeploying them back to Baidoa and Berdale-- as some have suggested-- could backfire. It is preferable to dispatch them first to Mogadishu for training and examination before incorporating them into any formal security forces, as some members of the reconciliation committee have proposed.

The rationale behind Laftagareen and Villa Somalia's support for the Leysan reconciliation process is complex, but the central role of the Digil-Mirifle in the government's electoral plans is hard to overstate. Without the South West, the government's electoral strategy is further constrained to a handful of Hawiye-dominated towns in central Somalia and two minuscule Darood clan enclaves in Sool and Gedo. And in turn, the Leysan's role within South West is similarly central to, if not supporting, at least not publicly resisting and destabilising Baidoa and Berdale for the time being. The Ethiopian military stationed in Berdale is also expected to play a role in the coming weeks as a neutral interlocutor between the rival Leysan forces and the Laftagareen government. 

Still, though the Leysan may be gradually reuniting, the situation at the national and regional levels remains far from stable. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP) may present as a unified platform, but it cannot indefinitely paper over the cracks within it. Inside the party, Laftagareen occupies both an influential and unstable position, being the only elected Digil-Mirifle Federal Member State politician, yet is nevertheless distrusted by Villa Somalia, which has vacillated over seeking to remove him. Another JSP member and close ally of Villa Somalia, Speaker of Parliament Aden Madoobe, enjoys particular influence within Bakool and also has had a fraught relationship with the South West president. 

But in the meantime, the reconciliation amongst the Leysan is a positive development, albeit within a much-deteriorated political and security context in South West and Somalia writ large. Removing dozens of well-armed Leysan militia from the blanket of Al-Shabaab's territory is no small feat, particularly with so many spoilers abounding. Laftagareen's own role in the return of these militias has been critical. Yet the broader questions within South West remain-- particularly the future of Laftagareen and the outline of any national or regional elections in the context of the Mogadishu talks having collapsed.

The Somalia Wire Team