Issue No. 861

Somaliland's American Dream

With Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed 'Irro' set to depart for the US at the end of August for a diplomatic visit, speculation has gone into overdrive about what it might yield. Only a few months into his tenure as president, the seasoned Waddani politician has undoubtedly had a busy time in office, wrestling with both domestic and regional turmoil. Principal among these issues has been Mogadishu's concerted efforts-- with the help of China-- to undermine Hargeisa through the Dhulbahante-dominated SSC-Khaatumo administration in Laas Aanood, as well as the continuing perforation of Houthi interests along the Gulf of Aden. Now, with potentially the most important moment of his career ahead of him, Irro travels to the US with a famously mercurial president at the helm but with a penchant for deal-making. What precisely any deal with the US could entail remains to be seen, but speculation surrounding three key elements has been rife-- strategic minerals, resettling ethnically cleansed Palestinians, and a military base on Somaliland's shoreline.

On 8 August, during a peace deal signing between the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders in Washington, Trump was lobbed a question from a reporter about the possible recognition of Somaliland for the exchange of hosting Palestinian refugees, to which he replied, "We are looking into that right now." For the first time, a sitting US president openly acknowledged Somaliland and its possible recognition, sending many supporters of the unrecognised polity into raptures. The Somaliland presidency welcomed the comment, with its spokesperson further stating that Trump's brief remarks "highlight the strategic importance of Somaliland in maintaining security across the Horn of Africa and safeguarding key shipping lanes in the Red Sea." Somali nationalists, meanwhile, either asserted that the episode meant nothing or stated that any such recognition would somehow empower and enable Al-Shabaab. 
 
Further wading into the conversation surrounding Somaliland recognition has been Ted Cruz. Earlier this month, the Texan Republican Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, penned a letter to Trump backing the polity's recognition, citing Hargeisa's shared values with the US and its strategic position on the Gulf of Aden. Cruz, not coincidentally, is one of the best-known anti-China hawks in the Senate. The growing affinity between Taiwan and Somaliland has led Beijing to redouble its support for Mogadishu's active undermining of Somaliland. And in recent days, Mogadishu and Beijing have issued a series of barbed diplomatic statements in response to the increased chatter, with the latter criticising Cruz for a "hegemonic and bullying attitude." Somali politicians, meanwhile, have sought to emphasise years of counter-terror cooperation with the Americans against Al-Shabaab. Much like Mogadishu offering the US control over Bosaaso and Berbera, such calls have rung hollow with Villa Somalia deploying its forces and armaments against Puntland and Jubaland rather than the resurgent jihadists.

Cruz's acknowledgement of Somaliland's key position along the Red Sea speaks to another, broader American interest. Amid the scramble for military assets and commercial bases along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, it has been repeatedly suggested that the US could consider diversifying its military footprint away from Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti and establish another toehold on the strategic waterway. A visit by AFRICOM Commander Gen. Michael Langley to Hargeisa earlier this year did little to dampen such speculation, and Berbera-- the site of a major UAE port-- has been repeatedly touted as a possible location. India, China, Russia, Iran, Israel, Türkiye, the US, and particularly the Gulf are all itching to carve out their own competing and distinct interests along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

Further, the development of any such US base would coincide with the deepening of ties between the Iranian proxies of the Yemen-based Houthis with Daesh in Puntland, Al-Shabaab, and a string of disenchanted clan communities on the Somali peninsula. Further, Al-Shabaab and Islamic State-Somalia have upgraded their military capacity as a result of the Yemenis' sophisticated military training and supplies. Though we have not yet seen Al-Shabaab deploy maritime drones against transiting ships from the Somali peninsula, it is not outside the realm of possibility. Nor is Somalis unaffiliated with either Al-Shabaab or Daesh interdicting maritime vessels, with hundreds having been trained by the Houthis in recent months. For a hard-nosed counter-terror-focused American government, Somaliland has been referred to as a far more stable and genuine partner of the US than Mogadishu in recent months.

Beyond proposing a military base to the Americans, which Irro publicly confirmed again only a few weeks ago, the discovery of a significant lithium deposit appears certain to be further offered to the Americans as another bargaining chip in a deal for recognition. A continuing rush for rare earth minerals and their seismic role in the resource wars between, particularly, the US and China has played a publicly outsized role since Trump returned to the Oval Office. Extraction of such minerals is supposed to anchor another US-backed peace deal in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as with Ukraine. And the UAE-- a close US and Somaliland ally-- has been at the forefront of this 18th-century-esque rush for minerals, including Sudanese gold. Hargeisa is clearly seeking to speak the 'language' of the Trump government, one of economic and security realpolitik that has so far appealed to the administration.

Neither a military base nor a lithium extraction deal with the US is likely to cause outright concern amongst Somalilanders, though the devil is, as always, in the detail, and handing over sweeping economic and geostrategic concessions could come back to bite Hargeisa at some later point. But another speculative issue relates to the unconfirmed rumours of Israel-- with American backing-- resettling ethnically cleansed Palestinians from the devastated Gaza Strip to Somaliland. It remains unclear if this is a topic that Irro's government is contemplating ahead of his visit, but tying Somaliland to Israel's litany of international war crimes and deliberate starvation of the Palestinian people would be extraordinary.

Yet it is not the only African polity that appears to be entertaining the relocation of ethnically cleansed Gazans. South Sudan and Uganda– albeit to different degrees– have also signalled their willingness in recent weeks. International media outlets have reported that Israel is currently in negotiations with cash-strapped Juba to host some resettled Palestinians. Forcibly displacing Muslim-majority Palestinians after nearly two years of brutal violence to a Christian-majority African nation still embroiled in its own simmering conflict is not only morally unconscionable but nonsensical as well. It is a sign of the times in which we live that such a discussion can take place with few batting an eye.

And against all this backdrop and ahead of Irro's visit, Mogadishu continues to amp up its attempts to destabilise Somaliland. It has capitalised on the feelings of marginalisation among the Dhulbahante in Sool, which has culminated in the unconstitutional formation of the North-Eastern State of Somalia-- and the naming of the 83-member parliament. Now, it appears that Mogadishu's interest has turned to exploiting Gadabuursi grievances in Awdal, with the hardline Defence Minister Ahmed Fiqi tweeting the 'Moment for Awdal has come' last week. But the 'Awdal State Movement' is not comparable to SSC-Khaatumo, with no real base, militia or governance structure to speak of. Nor is it physically connected to any part of Somalia– and so is even more isolated than Laas Aanood. But Villa Somalia nevertheless appears to believe it may be able to sow enough doubt and destabilise Hargeisa's control over territory to make recognition less appealing.

In search of recognition, Irro's delegation will have to play its cards well so as not to be overwhelmed by the mercurial Trump-- if they can secure a meeting. Preparation is key, and there have been several missteps in the past months during Irro's regional tour. Moreover, leasing a stretch of coastal territory for a naval base and mineral deals is one matter in today's chaotic political context, but participating in the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian people will not strengthen Hargeisa's hand domestically nor on the international stage. The prospect of any country —let alone a member of the UN Security Council —recognising Somaliland is undoubtedly tantalising for Hargeisa after three and a half decades of unfulfilled striving. More will certainly become clearer in the coming weeks, but regardless of the outcome of the talks —whether positive or not for Somaliland —Irro will have plenty to contend with in the months ahead.

The Somalia Wire Team