Clashes from Mogadishu to Gedo as talks collapse
On the eve of Eid al-Adha, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) addressed the nation. With a resurgent Al-Shabaab bearing down on Mogadishu and under intense domestic and international pressure, the president begrudgingly agreed to open dialogue. The Somali National Army (SNA) had proven itself badly inept, and the impetus for Villa Somalia to retreat from its centralising and autocratic agenda was considered not just political but essential for the country's national security. But the president was never serious. And in the weeks that followed, HSM has weaponised the painstaking talks with the National Salvation Forum (NSF) to stave off international scrutiny, while further consolidating his rigged direct electoral plan through his Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP) and carving out clan enclaves in Sool and Gedo. Though the imminent danger to the capital-- from Al-Shabaab-- has passed for the time being, with fighting erupting in the streets of Mogadishu and violence simmering in the Mareehaan-dominated region of Jubaland, the talks appear to have finally broken down.
In the meantime, barring the Ugandan-led operations in Lower Shabelle, Al-Shabaab has been left to its own devices-- namely seizing a host of towns in Hirshabelle. In turn, the government is fomenting violence by its own accord, deploying forces against displaced persons yesterday near the Horseed market in the Tarabuunka area as part of its clearance campaign to flog off public land. Reports have emerged that part of the land had been seemingly promised to one of Villa Somalia's key Rahanweyne allies, the Speaker of Parliament, Aden Madoobe. And in turn, heavily armed Turkish-trained Haram'ad police forces clashed with clan militia resisting the demolition of their area, with several killed and wounded in the ensuing violence. Deploying anti-aircraft weaponry into civilian areas as part of a scheme to enrich the president and his allies is beyond the pale.
Against this backdrop of the continuing Mogadishu land clearances, the unconstitutional formation of North-East State of Somalia in Laas Aanood, and the violence in Gedo, the talks with the 'national opposition' had stumbled on for weeks. It had become increasingly apparent that the president was willing to promise the rolling back of the rewriting of Chapters 1-4 of the Provisional Constitution behind closed doors, but that he would not be dissuaded from his 'one-person, one-vote' (OPOV) agenda. Earlier this week, HSM, ahead of the last-ditch talks and in a snub to the opposition, even registered as a voter in the capital, standing defiantly beside the head of the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission-- and his former campaign chair-- in a photo-op. With several members of the NSF likely aspirants for the presidency next year, it was always improbable that ex-President Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed and others would agree to the Villa Somalia's closed-list, single-constituency model, which would squarely deliver the presidency for HSM a third term through his JSP allies. By insisting on the model, the president was well aware that this would sabotage the talks, allowing him to continue painting his opposition as obstructionist and anti-democratic. And without presenting an alternative model for hybrid elections, the NSF was arguably on the back foot for much of the negotiations.
The question is, where do we go from here? With talks having broken down-- and there still remains a possibility that the NSF could return to the table-- the likelihood of further violence in the streets of Mogadishu has risen. Prominent within the opposition coalition are several influential Hawiye political leaders involved in Badbaadho Qaran (National Salvation) movement in 2021, where predominantly Hawiye militias and communities nearly overran Villa Somalia and forced Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo to abandon his electoral extension plans. For months, the incumbents of Villa Somalia — ironically part of mobilising the opposition against Farmaajo's own attempts at state capture and electoral rigging — have been seeking to undermine the emergence of a possible Badbaadho Qaran 2.0. This has included refusing to arm particular Abgaal sub-clan ma'awiisley fighting Al-Shabaab, as well as seeking to cleave off Hawiye opposition politicians. In recent days as well, the government has deployed yet more clan militia from Galmudug to the capital as a possible deterrent against any larger-scale protests or resistance to Villa Somalia's agenda. Notably, these forces were trained by Sudanese military advisors, perhaps signalling a developing relationship between Port Sudan and Mogadishu, tying the federal government into a broader constellation of Gulf-Horn alliances.
Meanwhile, to the south-west of Mogadishu, the bloody stand-off in Gedo has escalated further. On Monday morning, a fresh bout of fighting between Jubaland forces and SNA troops led by Abdirashid Janan erupted once again in the strategic border town of Beledhawo. Tipping the scales in favour of the federal government in the town, two key Mareehaan sub-clans-- the Reer Ahmed and Ali Hussein-- have fallen behind the federal government, coming after promises of yet more cash and development. But a third influential sub-clan, the Hawrarsame, remains aligned with Kismaayo, which has allowed Jubaland to continue massing reinforcements for an attempted retake of Beledhawo. The regional administration has amassed hundreds of troops and dozens of technicals in anticipation of further clashes in Gedo, while continuing to collaborate with the US-backed Danab forces in clearance operations near Kismaayo.
While the SNA emerged victorious in the latest skirmish, the situation remains far from calm, with Jubaland unwilling to cede further ground that would allow Villa Somalia to conduct its sham polls and establish a parallel administration. Still, the federal government has consolidated its hold on several Gedo towns, including Garbahaarey, where the administration is likely to be based. But in what may prove decisive, Ethiopia appears increasingly to be casting its lot with Kismaayo and Jubaland President Ahmed Islam 'Madoobe.' It has not wholeheartedly thrown its forces into the melee in Gedo-- which it considers vital for its strategic border interests against Al-Shabaab-- since the Ethiopian military participated in the raid in Doolow. That may yet change, with the Ethiopian army issuing an ultimatum for the National Intelligence and Security Agency regional chief Janan and his SNA forces to leave Beledhawo at the beginning of August.
Patently ignored by Villa Somalia, a video of federally-aligned former Gedo Governor Abdullahi Shimbir stating that Ethiopian 'interference' would not be tolerated circulated on 5 August. But with Ethiopian troops in Garbahaarey, Luuq, Baardheere, and Doolow, the situation is ripe for further escalation between Addis and Mogadishu. In control of the airport in Garbahaarey, the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) contingent has banned most flights into the town, including a contingent of SNA troops there last week. Enduring concerns about Mogadishu flirting with the notion of deploying Egyptian troops into Gedo have further made Addis wary. Again, any further clashes between Jubaland, with or without Ethiopian support, and Mogadishu open the door for Al-Shabaab, which appears to be simply lying in wait as they tear chunks from each other.
Though Villa Somalia may have sabotaged the opposition talks, it is still feeling the heat with a mounting vote of no-confidence against PM Hamza Abdi Barre in the federal parliament. One of the senior architects of the Gedo debacle and the hardline policies implemented against Jubaland, Barre's star has waned in recent months and remains deeply unpopular among the country's Darood constituencies. Such impeachment motions against the PM have faded away before under pressure from Villa Somalia, but the extent of the government's obstinate policies in Gedo, Sool, and in Mogadishu has badly hurt the federal government's hand. And though the leadership of the House of Representatives may be JSP members, over 100 MPs signed an open letter this week condemning the political sabotage of Villa Somalia. A successful impeachment of Barre would offer the opportunity for a more neutral, transitional figure to be appointed, akin to former PM Mohamed Hussein Rooble, one who could fulfil his constitutional duties and help negotiate an electoral settlement.
That would require, of course, a president who is cognizant of the damage he is wreaking on the country. Undoing the litany of crises he has fomented, from auctioning off Somalia's natural resources to Turkiye for a pittance to creating another Federal Member State through cleaving apart Puntland, will be no small task. With talks ongoing, perhaps parts of the international community felt that HSM would miraculously come to his senses and return to the country to a more consensus-oriented political path-- and focus his efforts and the SNA against Al-Shabaab rather than his domestic opposition. But with the talks having now collapsed, any pretence that Villa Somalia was somehow repentant and ready to negotiate should fall away.
The Somalia Wire Team
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