Issue No. 859

Al-I'tisaam: The Silent Twin of Al-Shabaab

Without Al-Ictisaam b'il Kitaab wa Sunna (Al-I'tisaam), you cannot understand Al-Shabaab. The shadowy neo-Salafist movement is the 'big brother' of the violent Al-Qaeda affiliate, and it is no exaggeration to refer to it as the single most important, least understood force in Somali politics. The legitimate and licit ideological twin to Al-Shabaab, Al-I'tisaam is the silent partner that has peacefully advocated the jihadists' objectives for over two decades. At times, the two movements have clashed —particularly in the early 2010s —but today, they are engaged in a prickly competition for the same end goal: "to establish [in the words of Al-I'tisaam] the Religion of Allah on the earth and to rule by His Legislation." And while Al-Shabaab may have seized the headlines with its armed struggle, it is Al-I'tisaam's version of jihad that has earned the movement its place as the most influential neo-Salafi group in Somalia, operating a vast array of businesses, charities, madrassas, mosques, universities and much more besides. And with such wealth has come legitimacy and influence; Al-I'tisaam's sway extends to Hargeisa, Garowe, Mogadishu, and even Nairobi.

Al-Shabaab and Al-I'tisaam share their beginnings in Somalia's first homegrown Salafi-jihadist group and Al-Qaeda affiliate, known as Al-Itihaad Al-Islaami (AIAI), which was established in 1983 as an underground movement and emerged into the public sphere in the early 1990s. Fusing Salafi reformism with Qutbist revolutionary precepts, AIAI's ideological makeup has endured within its two main descendants, who continue to challenge Somalia's historical blend of Shafi'i Islam and Sufi practices. Although prominent in several areas of the country, including northeast Somalia and Gedo, AIAI was disbanded by 1997, following a series of heavy defeats at the hands of the Ethiopian military. 

By then, a split within the movement had already begun to crystallise into two wings. One group was convinced that conditions in Somalia were not ripe for militarised jihad, and devoted itself to da'wa (proselytism) and tarbiya (education) under the banner of Al-I'tisaam. The other group, committed to armed struggle and inspired by the successes of the Taliban, renamed itself Salafiyya Jihadiyya and dispatched a first cohort of fighters to train in Afghanistan. By 2002, following the American invasion of Afghanistan, the leaders of this group had returned to Somalia and were ready to relaunch their movement as Al-Shabaab. Today, after more than two decades of armed struggle, Al-Shabaab has emerged as the best-known, wealthiest, and most heavily armed affiliate of Al-Qaeda, and can be aptly compared to a 'proto-state' with revenues comparable to Somalia's Federal Member States and its worth measurable in terms of GDP. Meanwhile, since its inception, Al-I'tisaam has come to dominate the country's social and business sectors, with major extraterritorial hubs in Kenya and Djibouti.

Notably, however, Al-I'tisaam has never disavowed the use of armed struggle within its founding texts. And any absence of suicide bombing should not be taken for moderation, with a cadre of senior figures within the movement emerging from AIAI and remaining wedded to the extremist ideology that it sought to impose in the 1990s. Prominent among them is Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, the vice-chairman and military commander of AIAI. An unrepentant neo-Salafist jihadist, he was one of the mentors of spy chief Fahad Yasin, and despite his house arrest in Mogadishu, has continued to influence national politics.

While Al-Shabaab has sought to topple the federal state through force, Al-I'tisaam has steadily and quietly accrued leverage and legitimacy. These parallel paths have brought Al-Shabaab and Al-I'tisaam both into violent competition as well as cohabitation and affinity. In early 2006, the two movements reunited, together with others, to form the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which opposed the Ethiopian-backed Transitional Federal Government. But it did not last, with the Ethiopian army deposing the ICU from Mogadishu and splintering the various Islamist movements once again. When the former ICU leader, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, was elected as interim president as part of the Djibouti peace talks in 2009, Al-Shabaab turned against his government, together with a splinter group of Al-I'tisaam named Hisbul Islaami.

Across the intervening decades and away from the frontlines, Al-I'tisaam has been at the forefront of aggressively promoting a more conservative strain of Islamist society and ideology. Social and economic capital are the roots of Al-I'tisaam's power and have been at its core of helping establish the 'complicit surround' of support or acceptance for Al-Shabaab. Financed through Al-I'tisaam's immense wealth, Islamist charities and development organisations such as the 'Al Karam Awareness & Development Organisation' have built the sparkling new mosques and madrasas dotted throughout major cities in the Somali peninsula. This is not to say that there do not remain tensions between Al-I'tisaam and the other myriad Islamist movements in Somalia, particularly those affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, but the movement's substantial wealth invested into social and economic clout has certainly put the others at a disadvantage.

Al-I'tisaam has been able to finance its ideological vision by taking root in the gaps of the Somali state and free-for-all economy. Along with substantive business links to the Middle East, individuals affiliated with Al-I'tisaam dominate some of the most profitable industries in Somalia, including banking, telecommunications, real estate, and money transfer companies. This is true in both southern Somalia, as well as in Puntland and Somaliland, two polities where the political sway of Al-I'tisaam has been increasingly felt in recent years. In Somaliland, for example, eye-wateringly expensive energy costs can be partially attributed to the monopolistic, cartel-like business practices employed by energy enterprises affiliated with Al-I'tisaam. And with such cash on hand, politicians of all clans and political creeds find it immensely challenging to deny Al-I'tisaam when it comes knocking.

Yet Al-I'tisaam remains an amorphous group, not easily defined nor with distinguishable members or political ambitions. Sheikh Bashir Ahmed Salad chairs Somalia's 'Ulema Council', but for the most part, the movement prefers to remain in the shadows, engineering the social, political, and economic conditions for an Islamist state. Nevertheless, there are several known senior politicians and religious leaders affiliated with the group who routinely pontificate on a range of issues, such as the firebrand government cleric Sheikh Ali Wajis. What is evident is that much of the movement is antithetical towards constitutional and democratic governance and opposed to federalism, preferring a centralised, autocratic, and Islamist state.

It was not until 2017, however, that the group tasted direct power in the halls of Villa Somalia through Fahad Yasin. The right-hand man of Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo, Yasin is a former AIAI member, a self-professed member of Al-I'tisaam and a close ally of Doha. Under the auspices of Villa Somalia, it was Fahad-- with the support of Qatar-- that relaunched dialogue between Al-I'tisaam and Al-Shabaab. The two movements were eventually unable to be reconciled, having come to regard each other as competitors. But under Fahad, Al-I'tisaam became far more assertive and coalesced from a more general religious movement into a direct political force. Although initially diminished by the return of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who belongs to the Damul Jadiid (New Blood) faction of the Muslim Brotherhood, it has remained consequential as a kind of 'deep state' within the government, holding key positions in government and security. And in particular, since the collapse of relations between Villa Somalia and Jubaland last year, individuals associated with Al-I'tisaam have returned to the forefront, once again advocating for the dismantling of Somalia's federal system. The ideological convergence between the current occupants of Villa Somalia and Al-I'tisaam is hard to miss.

While attempts by Qatar to reconcile Al-Shabaab and Al-I'tisaam have previously failed, that does not mean they are irreconcilable —and particularly not in the context of any collapse or capitulation of the federal government. Despite their rivalries, the ideological convergence of the two neo-Salafist groups regarding federalism, Islam's role in the state, and democracy could end up proving critical in any peace talks between the federal government and Al-Shabaab. Al-I'tisaam is naturally positioned as a 'silent partner' of Al-Shabaab, and may well bring its influence and resources to bear to support any demands of the jihadist group in such talks. Still, a likely arm-wrestle for supremacy in forming any neo-Salafist government would ensue, with Al-I'tisaam aspiring to relegate their jihadist counterparts to a principally military role-- sure to be resisted by Mahad Karatey and others. In the meantime, though, while the federal government's incompetence and myopic, self-serving politics may yet deliver the keys of the kingdom to Al-Shabaab in the coming months, it is Al-I'tisaam that is likely to be the one holding the door.

The Somalia Wire Team