Autism in Somalia
In recent years, an increasingly sophisticated understanding of the nuances of autism has emerged across much of the world. Advanced ways of identifying and supporting those with neurodivergence have materialised, particularly in education and in the job market. That has not been the case in Somalia, however, even though medical studies have revealed disproportionately high diagnosis rates amongst Somali children in some Western countries. Instead, traditional Somali understandings of mental health and neurodivergence continue to operate in a rigid binary, centred around the concept of waali (insanity). Within Somali culture, there is limited room for developmental or neurological differences that do not fall within these expectations of either psychosis or normalcy.
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is classified as a broad spectrum of neurodevelopmental disorders that vary significantly in terms of communication abilities, social interaction, sensory processing, and behaviour. It can range from those entirely non-verbal and requiring intensive daily support to individuals with less distinguishable struggles with social interactions, but who may possess particular intellectual capabilities. Formerly described as Asperger's Syndrome, this latter group is now considered within the autism spectrum disorder, without intellectual impairment. Globally, around 1% of children are estimated to have autism, but accurate medical data in Somalia is nigh-impossible to come by, and this is notably the case regarding autism, which is routinely misdiagnosed.
There are also critical gendered dimensions of autism, particularly amongst less severe cases, with autistic girls and women routinely overlooked due to their abilities to 'mask' neurodivergence. And this is greatly accentuated in cultural contexts such as Somalia's, where girls are raised to be demure and obedient. This camouflaging can mean that autistic girls are simply considered shy or well-behaved, even while wrestling with significant distress. Conversely, within traditional Somali family structures, where male children are considered the future heads of households and bearers of the family name, developmental differences in boys may attract greater attention.
That does not mean, however, that there is a broad acceptance or understanding of autism and neurodivergent differences in Somalia; quite the opposite. Within the Somali language, there is no word for 'autistic' or those with developmental differences, with terminology historically disparaging. Labels such as qof kala dhiman (incompetent), maangaab (slow-minded), qof jiran (sick), and qof waalan (crazy) reflect the misunderstanding and profound social stigma attached to both autism and mental health challenges, such as PTSD and depression, as well. The harsh binary between 'sane' and 'insane' in Somali culture and lexicon radically reduces the space for understanding, let alone treatment and support. This is compounded by prevailing spiritual interpretations, in which mental and developmental conditions are routinely attributed to possession by jinn, the so-called 'evil eye,' or divine punishment for wrongdoing.
But underpinning much of this is the cultural architecture of shame (ceeb) and honour (sharaf) in Somalia's clan-based culture. The complex social currency which determines access to marriages, job opportunities, political influence, and community systems is not kind to those with non-verbal autism. Having a neurodivergent child who is unable to verbally communicate is often regarded as a moral indictment, a source of shame to be concealed, and associated with bad luck that can bring misfortune, such as drought. Consequently, many families prefer to interpret their child's behaviours as a temporary phase that will be resolved through patience and faith.
It is then little surprise that support for those with all strands of autism is virtually non-existent in Somalia. Decades of civil war and conflict have decimated the country's healthcare system, leaving only a handful of mental health practitioners remaining in the country. Combined with a lack of culturally adapted diagnostic tools, autism is commonly misdiagnosed or entirely missed. In one case, an autistic boy was misdiagnosed with epilepsy in Mogadishu until his relatives in Kenya identified autistic traits. Further complicating diagnosis is that roughly 60% of Somalia's population is under 25, and having grown up amidst perennial conflict and the collapsed state, many of their formative years have been highly traumatic. Research on childhood experiences suggests that this kind of prolonged exposure to trauma can produce cognitive and behavioural patterns that closely resemble autism, making it difficult to disentangle developmental disorders from the psychological impacts of war. Even amongst those who have heard of autism, misinformation is also rife, and-- as is commonplace in many countries-- associated with vaccinations, particularly the measles jab that happens for 9-10-month-old babies.
But even when a child has been diagnosed-- improbable for those living in Al-Shabaab-held and impoverished rural areas-- there is rarely follow-up support. And this extends to education, with no government-supported autism-centred schooling in the country, and the only speech and occupational therapists concentrated in Somalia's major cities. Thankfully, some specialist centres do exist, such as the Autism Somalia Centre, based in Garowe, which was founded in 2019 to support youth with developmental disabilities. But the majority of support for mental health, under which autism is routinely misclassified, comes under a network of informal private facilities. Known as Ilaaj (healing in Arabic), these unregulated practices emerged in the aftermath of the collapse of the state, with many still run by faith healers who wield 'traditional' practices to somehow heal those displaying autistic traits. Falling far below any level of clinical support, some can veer into abusive, with one 2015 report by Human Rights Watch citing examples of patients held in chains and subjected to exorcism-related physical abuse." Assistance for autistic adults is even more limited, with those requiring full-time care from their families for years-- nearly entirely without diagnoses. Impoverished families do their best with what they can source, sometimes with non-governmental assistance, but mostly without.
There are some efforts within the diaspora to bring about a more sophisticated response within the Somali context to autism. In Minnesota, for instance, Somali parents and healthcare workers have sought to introduce terms such as maangaar (unique mind) in an effort to reframe autism in a less stigmatising light. There are comparatively higher rates of autism within the Somali diaspora, a 2023 study by the US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention in Minnesota – home to the largest Somali population in North America – found that one in 16 Somali four-year-olds had been diagnosed with autism, compared to one in 53 among their non-Somali peers. Even so, these findings have been met with scepticism by many diaspora families, who have frequently dismissed it as a 'western disease' – believing autism does not exist in Somalia.
Greater and more diverse support for the broad array of autistic people is clearly needed in Somalia, but with such limited government infrastructure, it is grassroots organisations and some international non-governmental organisations that have assumed the burden. Beyond the occasional oasis of autism-focused centres, it is the pervasive stigma and misinformation around autism and other neurological differences that remain the most significant barriers to supporting those with autism and their families. Breaking down the binaries surrounding sanity/insanity is no small feat, but establishing some greater regulations concerning the Ilaaj centres is eminently possible. And perhaps as a first step, greater research could be invested into neurodivergent and mental health issues in Somalia towards understanding, awareness raising and the development of support systems for individuals and families struggling to come to terms with such disorders.
The Somali Wire Team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
Today marks exactly two months since Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) unveiled his unilateral one-year term extension. While it is too early to draw definitive conclusions, HSM has evidently survived, rebounded, and consolidated power in ways that defy earlier predictions. A leader whom many had been wont to dismiss as too tarnished to retain executive power beyond May 2026 remains firmly in the saddle, holding the political initiative and dictating terms. His opponents, meanwhile, are in deep disarray. Their cohesion is fracturing, they lack a coherent, unified strategy, and they are locked in a dialogue of attrition designed to wear down their will and force their capitulation.
The Somaliland–Ethiopia Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was hailed as a historic breakthrough. In reality, it was a strategic gamble built on contradictions—and its apparent failure may prove to be a blessing in disguise for Somaliland and Ethiopia.
For the first time in over six decades, Somalia has overhauled its foundational criminal law - the 1962 Law No. 5. Now awaiting parliamentary and presidential approval, the Draft Somali Penal Code (SPC) nonetheless struggles with multiple hurdles and will likely face significant objection, not least, from Somalia’s Western partners and liberal-minded younger generation of Somalis disappointed with the new text’s failure to break away from its historical illiberal roots.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has published a new Draft Somalia Penal Code (SPC) - marking its first comprehensive legal overhaul in 64 years. The 136-page draft was first submitted to Parliament in January 2026 and underwent its first reading but the process of endorsing it became entangled with the escalating electoral and constitutional dispute, forcing the government to shelve it. The changes aim to update the 1962 Law No. 5 Penal Code and codify Islamic criminal law (uqubat). If endorsed by parliament and approved by the President, they will formally embed the three pillars of the Sharia punitive framework into the statute - fixed punishments (hudud), retributive justice (qisas), and statutory judicial discretion (ta'zir).
Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro’s trip to Israel in June (from 14-17) was far more than symbolism. Not only was it a calculated strategic diplomatic play, and a chance for Somaliland to appear on the world stage, but also an opportunity for Somaliland to present itself as a fully-functional state, able to conduct foreign relations and cut bilateral deals. Irro, a seasoned former diplomat, navigated the intricate demands of state protocol with remarkable ease - cutting an immaculate, regal figure in his navy-blue suit. Accorded full head-of-state honours, he laid a wreath at the Theodore Herzl mausoleum, engaged in high-level talks with President Isaac Herzog and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, opened the new Somaliland embassy in Jerusalem and convened meetings with Knesset members, senior officials, and business leaders. For Israel, hosting President Abdirahman Irro in Jerusalem functioned to signal its strong commitment to deepening strategic ties while also countering perceptions of waning diplomatic momentum.
Never interrupt your enemy when they are making a mistake. Napoleon Bonaparte’s classic rule of combat seems to be the guiding doctrine behind Al-Shabaab’s sudden, uncharacteristic radio silence as Mogadishu’s political elite tear themselves apart. As the ‘government-in-waiting’, one would have assumed the militants would take full advantage of its adversaries’ internal divisions, maximising the propaganda opportunities this offers, and campaign for their own cause. Typically quick to weaponise any intra-Somali division, the militant group's decision to sit out the latest intra-Somali fracturing is intriguing. By withholding its usual blitz of propaganda, the group is playing a longer, quieter game - waiting for the federal house to implode further before stepping in.
While much international attention is on Mogadishu – understandably so - another electoral crisis is brewing in the regional state of Galmudug. Historically unstable, prone to Al-Shabaab violence and destabilisation and wracked by chronic inter-clan frictions and periodic armed hostilities, the looming vote appears likely to aggravate the situation and foment more divisions.
Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.