Illiberal Drift, Electoral Poker Game
After months of climbing tensions, Somalia's federal government and the so-called 'national opposition' are now tentatively engaged in dialogue. Last week, the second round of talks took place at Villa Somalia, with renewed hope for a breakthrough on a roadmap for the federal elections scheduled for May 2026. Meanwhile, the newly established National Dialogue Forum should further help diminish the potential for violence on the streets of Mogadishu. Yet, the bonhomie between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the coalition Somali Salvation Forum (SSF), led by former President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, cannot mask the fact that the road ahead will be fraught with hurdles as Villa Somalia continues to press ahead with its destabilising electoral agenda. And on the whole, the prospects for repairing a badly fractured nation and the long-term outlook for Somalia's brand of consensus politics are bleak. The government's resurgent Muslim Brotherhood wing (the Damul Jadiid), buoyed by external alliances, is planning for the long game.
The foundations for a centralised Islamist government, verging on authoritarian, began to be laid in May 2023. Since then, Damul Jadiid has sought to assertively re-centralise the country-- despite the major constraints on the federal government's own power. All subsequent sweeping changes to the country's constitution and electoral systems must be considered through this angle. Villa Somalia is not simply animated by regime survival or another term for the incumbent president, but the consolidation of an Islamist-flavoured authoritarian order in the years to come. And despite their overwhelming dependence on foreign largesse, such a consolidation constitutes a robust counter-reform – a deliberate effort to off-ramp Somalia from its two decades of Western-backed 'liberal state-building' project. Understood thus, a second consecutive term for the incumbent is not just central but existentially imperative for the success of the Damul Jadiid 'project.' And this makes the ongoing electoral dispute a hugely destabilising high-stakes poker game.
The balance of power in the current contestation over the electoral model may appear to be shifting in the opposition's favour. But Villa Somalia's capacity for machinations and guile must not be downplayed, having repeatedly staved off dangerous inflexion points that previous administrations have succumbed to. It has weathered both the splitting of Darood-majority Jubaland and Puntland from the federation as well as the near-collapse of Mogadishu security to Al-Shabaab in recent months. This has come amidst an ever-closer tie-up between Villa Somalia and Türkiye's ruling party, the AKP, though a form of authoritarian learning, with the Turks both supportive of the centralising agenda and inducting Somalis in illiberal tactics of consolidation. Senior Damul Jadiid members openly aspire towards Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as a role model of a successful leader – assertive and proud of his Islamist inclinations, manipulative of the constitution and single-mindedly determined to eviscerate his opponents. However, the cost of Villa Somalia's agenda has been immense, with the social fabric and the country's incomplete political settlement fraying at the seams.
And though talks are underway, there have been few signs of substantial progress. And, so far, the opposition SSF has not spelt out a clear vision of what it is seeking beyond a rolling back of the constitutional and electoral changes and a return of Puntland and Jubaland to the table. But judging from a recent speech made by Sheikh Sharif, some would prefer a 'return to the tent'-- and the highly corrupt negotiated process that brought back Hassan Sheikh for his second term in 2022. In his address last week, the former president Sharif asked the rhetorical question, "Why is he (HSM) afraid of the tent?" By staking their position on a 'return to the tent', the opposition would be handing the president a propaganda victory. President Hassan Sheikh has already sought to exploit such comments by framing himself as the bold reformer facing off against a bunch of washed-out and obstructionist traditionalists. The national opposition will have to be extremely careful not to be co-opted and bogged down in talks that are going nowhere before Villa Somalia claims to have pulled off direct polls-- and the rug from underneath them.
As part of this, two strategies in Villa Somalia's electoral playbook are becoming clearer. The first is to muddy the waters. Villa Somalia is racing against the clock to create an electoral fait accompli in as many pockets of the country as possible, from Gedo to the SSC-Khaatumo-controlled parts of the contested Sool region. This would ensure 'enough' nominal Darood and Rahanweyne representation, though any polls would still be dominated in a handful of Hawiye-majority towns in south-central Somalia. If enough numbers can be registered-- even forcefully-- and a modestly convincing case made for direct polls, Hassan Sheikh estimates he may be able to sow enough doubt in the 'return-to-the-tent' camp. What numbers and figures Villa Somalia is working towards are difficult to gauge, but it is confident it can make the case for direct polls in the coming months if it can pull off the already-delayed elections in the capital.
Villa Somalia is wielding a slush fund and diverting budgets to finance the current voter registration, a campaign already blighted by reports of violence and falsifying the ages of schoolchildren for the electoral rolls. But the fact that the government is proceeding ahead with its OPOV scheme despite no budget speaks to Hassan Sheikh's strong personal will and determination to prevail. He has invested his legacy and clout in the exercise, and will be badly bruised if some direct elections cannot be pulled off.
Second, Villa Somalia is shamelessly wielding patronage and federal influence to hold its shaky alliance within the centralised Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP) together. However, there are major rifts within the swollen and unstable party, which has little ideological basis beyond placing prominent, centralising-inclined Islamists in key posts. Central to the dwindling 'legitimacy' of Villa Somalia's scheme are the presidents of Galmudug, Abdi Kaariye QoorQoor, Hirshabelle's Ali Hussein Guudlaawe, and South West State's Abdiaziz Laftagareen. Last week, QoorQoor and the repressive Laftagareen in Baidoa lined up to register to vote in their respective Federal Member States (FMS), ignoring the security realities that Al-Shabaab is encamped just a few miles from the regional capital of South West. And on 15 July, the government will officially proclaim the SSC-Khaatumo administration in the Sool region a new federal state-- again in contravention of the Provisional Constitution. This is critical for Villa Somalia from an electoral standpoint, as it creates a new constituency in Laas Anood that could support the JSP and reduce support for Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni in the presidential elections. And it would simultaneously undermine Somaliland, more 'red meat' for the government's nationalist base.
Villa Somalia appears bullish and is beginning to flex its muscles, confident it can prevail. But beyond the narrow strip it controls, the situation is murkier than ever. Clans are starting to plot their own electoral paths – sometimes independently, but possibly at the behest of regional leaders. In Balcad, for example, the Abgaal/Waceysle (the president's own clan) defied instructions from State Foreign Minister Ali Omar 'Balcad' on who to elect in the planned local council polls and instead 'pre-emptively' voted for an adversary of Villa Somalia. Balcad-- one of the most stringent campaigners for the government-- accused Guudlawe, a fellow JSP member, of orchestrating a "so-called election." The strains within the government's JSP coalition continue to bubble into the open.
The future of Somalia's consensus politics, incremental 'liberal' state-building and institution-building is perilously at stake. However, while there was always a gulf between what the international community aspired to from Halane and the country's political realities, it is perhaps more extreme than ever before. Further, with the government remaining so dependent on external subsidies, this is effectively an internationally funded authoritarian turn. However, between the protagonists currently locked in the ongoing electoral tussle, one actor – President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud – is seeking to demolish any hard-won gains in reforming and rebuilding the Somali state in the interest of a vague Islamist utopia. And that can only be a depressing realisation for the millions who hailed him as a reformist president in May 2022.
The Somali Wire Team
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The Rahanweyne Resistance Army (RRA) did not emerge from a shir (conference) in October 1995 to defend a government, nor to overthrow it. Rather, the militia —whose name was even explicit in its defence of a unified Digil-Mirifle identity —arose from the ruin of Bay and Bakool in the years prior, and decades of structural inequalities.
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