Issue No. 842

Published 04 Jul 2025

A Qatari Cold Shoulder

Published on 04 Jul 2025 13:23 min

A Qatari Cold Shoulder

This week, Somaliland President Abdirahman 'Irro' travelled to Qatar for what was billed as a "historic visit," the first sitting leader of the unrecognised polity to be received in Doha. It certainly proved historic, but unlikely in the way that the Waddani administration hoped for, with the Qatari PM and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani springing a chastening press release following their meeting. The last lines of the Qatari PM's statement were particularly toe-curling for Hargeisa, asserting that "Qatar's belief that Somalia's future is built through openness and constructive communication among all its components, to ensure respect for the sovereignty and national unity of the Federal Republic of Somalia." Though the Somaliland government has tried to brush it off, it may prove a wake-up call for the complexities of navigating relations with Doha and others.

Irro's trip has sparked significant consternation and hand-wringing among the Somaliland opposition, who have criticised the trip as misguided and an embarrassment. It does appear that the Qatari PM deliberately sought to discomfit Hargeisa by welcoming Irro as a genuine statesman before referring to him as a "regional leader" in the subsequent statement. With the senior delegation having returned on Wednesday, the Irro government has since attempted to save face, both emphasising its sovereign credentials and downplaying the Qatari PM's comments as "diplomatic formalities." And responding to levied criticism about the wisdom of the trip, Information Minister Ahmed Yasin Sheikh Ali Ayanle made several astute comments, including that "politics means engaging even with your enemy if it serves your interests." As the president of Somaliland, Irro is justified-- and arguably should-- be making the case for independence in countries where it can expect resistance. Talking only to one's friends and allies often cannot move the needle alone in international politics. Still, it was always unlikely that the intractable Doha would be significantly influenced by a first visit from a Somaliland president, given its consistent foreign policy. 

It does appear that there was a degree of naivety amongst the delegation, with several advisors and ministers hoping that their own relationships with Qatar-- dating back to their time in opposition-- would smooth the enduring gulf between Doha and Hargeisa. In particular, financing and development projects were to be sought after, with the Irro administration still badly saddled by the debt of the previous government. There is little doubt that Somaliland requires far greater developmental and humanitarian assistance, being essentially under international sanctions and receiving a fraction of the support that Mogadishu receives. But personal, patronage-based relationships between Somaliland cabinet ministers and Doha are no serious alternative for a functioning, transparent, and bilateral dynamic. 

And despite their shared faith, the absolute monarchy of Qatar has never been a natural bedfellow of Somaliland, one of the few regional bright spots for its democratic maturity and civic engagement. Rather, Qatar's foreign policy is perhaps the most consistent of its Gulf counterparts in the Horn of Africa-- persistent in its quiet attempts to elevate Islamist actors and engage as a 'peace mediator' with extremist groups, including Al-Shabaab. It has also remained one of the staunchest allies of Somalia's federal government, though perhaps has not penetrated the incumbent administration to the degree it did during Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo's tenure. Another undercurrent of the Irro trip was Hargeisa's close and profitable relationship with the UAE, which operates the arterial Berbera Port, and is one of Doha's principal geostrategic competitors. It is improbable that Hargeisa did not communicate its intentions for Irro to travel to Qatar without the go-ahead from Abu Dhabi, its closest ally, barring Ethiopia.

Though Somaliland is in dire need of greater budgetary, developmental, and humanitarian assistance, certain types of support from Qatar should be regarded as a Trojan Horse. Health support and food aid are one issue, but the Irro government should carefully examine any aspect related to civil society from Qatar, and whether it aligns with Somaliland's lofty democratic and developmental ambitions. Simultaneously, the growing economic and political tendrils of the Salafist Al-I'tisaam movement into Hargeisa are hard to miss, particularly with a spate of new schools and mosques that have been built. Such concerns about the perforation of the shadowy Islamist movement, with strong roots in Mogadishu and Nairobi as well, have been widely aired on social media in recent days.

It appears that as a self-proclaimed negotiator, Qatar may want to attempt to relaunch dialogue between Mogadishu and Hargeisa, but relations are at a particularly low ebb-- and nor is Doha regarded as a neutral interlocutor. Across multiple years, 10 rounds of negotiations in four countries, Mogadishu has repeatedly proven itself unwilling to make either federation or reunification an attractive prospect, wielding sovereignty and juridical recognition to undermine Somaliland time and again. With Villa Somalia preparing to unconstitutionally launch the SSC-Khaatumo administration in the Sool region as a fully-fledged Federal Member State in July, it would be political suicide for Hargeisa to renew any serious talks at this current juncture, not least with Al-Shabaab having advanced so close to Mogadishu.

Irro's commitment to the cause of Somaliland independence should absolutely not be in doubt after his first months in office. There are genuine questions and concerns, however, about the competency of the Foreign Ministry, which appears nigh-incapable of organising diplomatic visits. Qatar is not the first diplomatic screw-up in recent months, with the Kenya trip nearly entirely derailed by sabotage from Mogadishu until last-minute interventions from long-serving opposition politician Raila Odinga and Kenyan spy chief Noordin Haji. Similar serious mistakes appear to have been made in the visit to Addis, which was originally supposed to have been led by Irro.

Simply turning up in a capital will not open the necessary doors for Somaliland, particularly with the amped-up hyper-nationalist government of Somalia ready to splurge cash to undermine any of its engagements. The president's office has understandably sought to steer foreign policy from its own docket, but such a series of blunders should perhaps trigger a rethink about how and who is best to handle diplomatic affairs. With a visit by Irro to the US anticipated in the coming weeks and with so much at stake, such mistakes can be ill-afforded.

The Somali Wire Team

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