Issue No. 837

Who is Disarming Whom? Peacebuilding Lessons from Puntland and Somaliland

Disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) in Somalia has long been a politically fraught and contested process. With more guns than people and dozens of militias operating outside any formal chain of command, DDR presents one of the more pressing stabilisation challenges. While Somalia’s federal government struggles to establish a modicum of control over its own weapons and ammunition, and the international community has invested countless millions trying to disarm and demobilise Somalia’s armed factions from the top down with little success, Somaliland and Puntland demonstrate that effective demobilisation and sustainable peace are possible if they are locally driven and preceded by a political settlement.

When the Siyaad Barre regime collapsed in 1991, north-west Somalia –now known as Somaliland– was left in ruins. The Somali National Movement (SNM) inherited an apocalyptic landscape. Entire towns, villages, and water wells had been obliterated. Much of the territory, including the capital, Hargeisa, had been systematically mined; some of the minefields encircled mass graves to hamper the discovery and investigation of war crimes. And though many veterans of the victorious SNM chose to demobilise voluntarily and return to civilian lives, Somaliland’s demilitarisation was undermined by the proliferation of irregular militias formed by ex-combatants and unemployed youth seeking opportunity. Instead of immediately embarking on disarmament efforts, the Isaaq-based SNM focused on resolving political issues first by making peace with other clans. This led to a preliminary conference in Berbera, followed by a larger, all-clan conference in Bur’o in May 1991. These gatherings brought together former adversaries – some of whom had been aligned with the previous regime – to conclude a ceasefire and the establishment of a common administration. On May 18, 1991, Somaliland declared independence, and SNM chairman Abdirahman Ahmed Ali ‘Tuur’ became its first president. Only once that political foundation was established could the formal disarmament process begin. 

Initial attempts in 1991 foundered due to the lack of trust amongst the clans and unresolved factional rivalry within the SNM itself. It was not until 1993, after a second round of peace talks, that the newly elected Somaliland president, Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, introduced a new, community-based approach which assigned clan elders the responsibility of peace and disarmament. The elders oversaw the transfer of heavy weapons and battle wagons away from clan control to the newly established national army, which was marked by public ceremonies in 1994. A National Demobilisation Commission (NDC) was created to ensure the disarmament process was voluntary and locally implemented to prevent any single group from dominating others. With the help of grassroots campaigns like “Peace and No Guns”, public opinion further pressured the militias to disband. A ‘mutual threat reduction’ approach ensured no clan felt threatened by providing for simultaneous and transparent disarmament with its rivals and neighbours. This bottom-up, inclusive approach was central to Somaliland’s success in disarming militias and restoring a degree of security in the area. 

Despite such progress, Somaliland’s disarmament and demobilisation were still very fragile and incomplete. Clan militias in some parts of the territory retained control of their weapons, and in 1994, clashes over control of Hargeisa airport escalated into almost two years of civil war – particularly between the Garhajis – who felt underrepresented – and the Habar Awal clans. This conflict eventually ended through negotiations that led to the political reintegration of the Garhajis, the nationalisation of their militia forces, and an enduring peace. Somaliland’s disarmament process was imperfect, but it demonstrated the importance of a negotiated, consensus-based and inclusive process in order to build trust and lay the foundation for long-term stability. 

Puntland’s internal peace and stability are the product of a similar process. After the fall of Siad Barre in early 1991, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) faced immediate challenges from both external and internal threats. In February 1991, Habar Gidir militia of the United Somali Congress (USC) led by General Mohamed Farah Aydiid attacked Gaalka’yo, briefly capturing the southern part of the town and its nearby airport before an SSDF counteroffensive took them back. In 1992, the Islamist group Al-Itihaad Al-Islaami staged a short-lived uprising, seizing key towns and capturing dozens of SSDF leaders, but was quickly defeated by a combination of SSDF and clan militias. Hostilities between the USC’s Habar Gidir and the SSDF’s Majerteen forces eventually ended with the Mudug Peace Accord in 1993. However, the SSDF was then confronted with the problem of demobilising its war veterans. While some ex-fighters reintegrated into civilian life or found work in private security, others resorted to banditry and illicit roadblocks to make a living. Internal power struggles within SSDF leadership impeded any coherent response to the problem, and security in the region continued to decline.

In July 1998, facing mounting public pressure, clan leaders of north-eastern Somalia, including the SSDF, declared the Puntland State of Somalia. The new administration established state security institutions, including a police force, a ‘border protection force’ (Daraawiish), and a demobilisation body called the Rehabilitation, Disarmament and Resettlement Directorate (RDRD). By 1999, over 1,000 recruits had joined the police and Daraawiish, and hundreds of militia at road checkpoints were disarmed or absorbed into official security units. Weapons control improved with the support of clan elders, demonstrated by the largely peaceful enforcement of the rule of law. As in Somaliland, however, complete disarmament was never achieved as many clans and businesses retained their own militias.

The experiences of Somaliland and Puntland illustrate how disarmament processes can succeed when they are rooted in local ownership, community trust, and a bottom-up approach. Their relative success was driven by grassroots negotiations, clan involvement, and a deep commitment to political compromise – not by foreign intervention or by the overweening desire of incipient governments to impose their authority in the absence of a political settlement. Ironically, the lack of international attention and funding in these regions may have been a key factor in allowing organic, locally driven processes to take root. 

In contrast, southern Somalia has remained entangled in centrally imposed, externally funded interventions that seek to circumvent the need for negotiation and typically ignore or undermine traditional clan structures, fuel corruption, and escalate inter-clan rivalries. Villa Somalia and its foreign partners routinely try to defend such approaches with the largely empty mantra; “Somali solutions to Somali problems.” Such platitudes deftly avoid core questions of ownership: which Somali interests are invested in such putative solutions and which are excluded. In short, who is disarming whom? The lessons from Somaliland and Puntland are clear: peacebuilding must come from within, not be imposed from above.

The Somali Wire Team