Somaliland president looks to Ethiopia as next stop on regional tour
Somaliland's regional diplomatic blitz continues. Having travelled to Djibouti and Kenya at the end of May, Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi 'Irro' is anticipated to depart for Ethiopia in the immediate future. Barring some minor stumbles in Kenya, Somaliland successfully conducted two diplomatic visits, with Irro meeting both Djiboutian President Ismail Omar Guelleh and his Kenyan counterpart, William Ruto, and securing a range of agreements. Stabilising Somaliland's relationship with neighbouring Djibouti against the backdrop of Mahmoud Youssouf having assumed the African Union Commission Chair was particularly significant. But for Somaliland, with Ethiopia remaining its preeminent trading and diplomatic partner, the stakes of such a visit are far higher, coming in the wake of a complicated few months for the long-standing Addis-Hargeisa ties.
Still, ahead of the planned trip to Ethiopia, there is plenty of goodwill in both Addis and Hargeisa in restoring and resetting the strategic relationship. Ties have been somewhat rocky since the election of Irro in November 2024, who ousted the close Ethiopian ally of Muse Bihi. Irro was perceived as understandably less effusive about the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Ethiopia, which he was not privy to, that offered Addis Ababa the lease of a naval base on Somaliland's coast in exchange for sovereign recognition. Already lagging, implementation of the MoU apparently stalled in the wake of the Turkish-negotiated Ankara Agreement in December, which eased tensions between Addis and Mogadishu and paved the way for Ethiopian troops to remain in Somalia. And deadly skirmishes between Isaaq and Ogaadeen communities on the Ethiopian side of the Ethiopia-Somaliland border in December and January resulted in the deaths of dozens, with the Somali Regional State's Liyu police implicated in the violence. Meanwhile, rather than prioritise elusive international recognition, the Somaliland president has spent the initial months of his administration —also the first for the Waddani party —consolidating his government and focusing on domestic issues, including incorporating thousands of clan militia into the Somaliland army.
Despite these interruptions, there are numerous reasons why both Ethiopia and Somaliland are seeking to renew their relations. For Addis, Somaliland remains its preeminent Somali interlocutor and ally, particularly with Somalia's federal government so beleaguered and intermittently hostile. The rising stock of Somaliland with the US is unlikely to have gone unnoticed by Ethiopia either, with AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley expected in Hargeisa soon. Joint security interests are likely to feature prominently amid Al-Shabaab's heightened activities in Sool and eastern Sanaag regions, and the rapidly expanding presence of the Iranian-backed Houthi militants along the Gulf of Aden. The Yemen-based group that has seized headlines for targeting dozens of international vessels transiting the arterial waterways has been steadily developing ties with Al-Shabaab, Islamic State-Somalia, as well as disgruntled clans in both Somaliland and Puntland to a variety of ends. And so is China's expanding cooperation with Mogadishu, aimed at undermining Somaliland due to its alliance with Taiwan, almost certain to feature.
Returning to the Ethiopia visit, Addis may be disgruntled by Irro having first travelled to Djibouti and Kenya before Ethiopia, but it may actually end up to their mutual advantage. Amidst the broader fallout of the MoU, Guelleh was a prominent thorn in Somaliland's side in 2024, vocally supportive of Mogadishu's claims that Somalia's territorial integrity and sovereignty were being violated. Djibouti also backed the restive Awdal State Movement and SSC-Khaatumo in Laas Aanood, unable to move forcefully against Ethiopia due to its economic dependence on its giant southern neighbour. But Irro appears to have been able to assuage some of Djiboutian concerns surrounding the Hargeisa-Addis alliance and potential diversification of Ethiopian import/export away from the Red Sea state. Further, quietly improving ties between Somaliland and Puntland, another ally of Ethiopia-- which has militarily supported Garowe's anti-Daesh operations-- comes at an opportune moment.
There remains one notable spoiler interested in spiking a successful trip by Irro. Ahead of the Somaliland president's visit to Addis, senior Somali government officials have lobbied Ankara to pressure Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to limit the scope of the Somaliland president's visit — and particularly not to grant an audience to the leader. Mogadishu and its representative in Nairobi, Jabril Ibrahim Abdulle, attempted similar antics in Kenya to derail Irro's visit at the end of May, but the trip was resuscitated by interventions from opposition leader Raila Odinga and the National Intelligence Service Director General Noordin Mohamed Haji. However, Addis's government is far more centralised than Kenya, and attempts by Somalia's federal government to browbeat PM Abiy Ahmed may yet backfire. Abiy is a highly mercurial figure and will pursue his interpretation of Ethiopian interests no matter the pressure from Somalia.
Principal among these interests remains the ill-defined ambition for 'sea access,' which senior Ethiopian officials have highlighted again in recent weeks. Though Ethiopian attention is currently trained on the Eritrean port of Assab, Somaliland-Ethiopia discussions are expected to touch on reviving the MoU or diversifying trade through the DP World-run port of Berbera. For progress to be made on the MoU, however, both Addis and Hargeisa will have to be clear about what they are seeking from one another. One of the central reasons that the MoU ran aground last year was the persistence of misunderstandings about the nature of the accord, as well as the ad hoc manner in which it was announced and executed. Still, construction is now almost complete on a navy headquarters for landlocked Ethiopia with Russian support, and Addis apparently has loftier ambitions for its developing naval assets than to patrol Lake Tana.
US Ambassador to Ethiopia Ervin Massinga's recent comments that his country was "fully committed" to supporting Ethiopia's quest for sea access, peacefully and commercially, have further lent weight to the prospects of Irro's trip. And the Somaliland government intends to follow Irro's Addis visit with a trip to the US in the coming months. The long-awaited prize of recognition from any country, let alone a member of the UN Security Council, remains a tantalising prospect for Hargeisa -- and all Somalilanders. And in recent months, the American reassessment of its Somali political and security partners has undeniably boosted hopes it may be on the cards this year. Somaliland's future remains uncertain, but Irro's diplomatic offensive is pitching the polity as one of the few bright spots in a region mired in crises.
The Somali Wire Team
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