Issue No. 832

Puntland's Pivot from Lightning to Thunder

 Puntland's kinetic anti-Islamic State-Somalia (ISS) operations in the Al-Miskaad Mountains are nearing their conclusion. Launched in February, 'Operation Hilaac' (Lightning) has sought to degrade the key Daesh node led by Abdulkadir Mumin-- designated by the US as a global leader within the extremist group. Puntland-driven and backed by US and UAE airstrikes, the operations have proven highly successful, seizing significant ISS bases and inflicting considerable casualties on the jihadists, including the Head of Immigration and Foreign Fighters, Ahmed Musa Said, last month. With operations expected to soon begin winding down, Puntland officials have signalled a transition to stabilising the liberated territories, as well as looking ahead to the aptly-named 'Operation Onkod' (Thunder) offensive against Al-Shabaab in the Almadow Mountains.

The transition from an active offensive towards stabilisation and development efforts was always inevitable, with Puntland unable to sustain its cat-and-mouse operations indefinitely against dispersed ISS fighters through the rugged terrain. Having formed a loose seal around the mountains, Puntland forces gradually advanced through the dry valleys and riverbeds in February and March, seizing several key ISS bases at Dhadar, Dhasan, and Shebaab. At the heart of the success of Operation Hilaac has been the impressive cross-clan coalition building led by Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni, which has seen his government reach out to long-marginalised and peripheral clans whose grievances ISS has exploited. Among this number has been the Ali Salebaan, including the Bidyahan Ali sub-clan to which Mumin belongs, and the Ali Jibrahil. But offers of development and integrating clan militias into Puntland's security architecture now must be delivered upon to secure the territory taken from ISS. Notably, Puntland has launched well-drilling efforts in recent weeks in areas such as Dhadar and Iskushuban.

Integrating these militias further offers opportunities for a broader dialogue on Puntland's security architecture. Amassing roughly 3,000 fighters ranging from clan forces to the presidential guard to the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) was no small undertaking, but integrating these militias and de-politicising these forces will be equally important. Here, donors can work with Puntland on crucial security sector reform– rather than continuing to simply throw cash at the hapless Somali National Army (SNA). Simultaneously, establishing what holding forces will be used to secure the mountainous terrain alongside maintaining a strike capacity that can prevent ISS from massing again will be required. Further, Mumin and other senior Daesh leaders remain at large, so Puntland will need both an intelligence network and rapid forces that can respond to any resurgent threats. 

Looking ahead to Operation Onkod, it may be that Deni and the Puntland administration choose to pause before plunging into another complex military offensive. Some time will be required to take stock of Operation Hilaac, as well as lay the necessary groundwork to replicate its successes against Al-Shabaab, who are primarily situated in the Almadow Mountains. Once again, this will necessitate concerted political outreach to the peripheral non-Majerteen clans to bring them on board, alongside further promises of development and representation. Principal among these are the Warsangeli, a Harti/Darood sub-clan that straddles the eastern Sanaag region that is claimed by both Somaliland and Puntland. Similar to their Darood counterparts of the Dhulbahante, the remote Warsangeli have long been marginalised by both the Isaaq-dominated Hargeisa and Majerteen-majority Garowe administrations.

The Warsangeli are politically split, however, and Puntland's attempts at outreach may be somewhat curtailed by the sub-clans' simultaneous courting by the SSC-Khaatumo administration based in Laas Aanood and, by extension, Mogadishu. Since PM Hamza Abdi Barre's visit to the contested city in April, SSC-Khaatumo has increasingly formed a central plank in Villa Somalia's electoral agenda by including some nominal Darood representation within the centralised Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP). Whether these self-serving entreats to the Warsangeli from Mogadishu will undermine Puntland's own outreach to the sub-clan remains to be seen.

That is not the only challenge presented by Operation Onkod, with the Almadow Mountains now having provided sanctuary for Al-Shabaab's northern presence in Somalia for well over a decade. It appears unlikely that the jihadists will lightly cede the territory, with it offering strategic access to arms trafficking and smuggling routes through Yemen. In recent months, ahead of the anticipated offensive and taking advantage of the diminished presence of ISS, Al-Shabaab has also redeployed significant militants and materiel into these mountains, including from near Laas Aanood in the Sool region. Far more severe and vertical terrain than Al-Miskaad, this range may be relatively straightforward to approach from the south, but it remains harsh territory which favours the defenders. Maintaining effective logistical supply lines may prove a challenge for Puntland forces, even though a single ridgeline offers a more straightforward line of advance. And Puntland will further require the continued support of the US and UAE strikes that have proven so successful against ISS, with mortars rendered far less effective by the Almadow’s composition of boulders and caves. 

The presence of Al-Shabaab in the Almadow Mountains stretching all the way down to Laas Aanood presents a threat to Somaliland as well. Though repeatedly denied by SSC-Khaatumo, both the town and the Dhulbahante-majority administration include a number of dangerous Al-Shabaab elements, including those responsible for the killing of an Ethiopian official in April. Garowe and Hargeisa are tentatively restoring critical ties, though much more needs to be done. As Puntland's presence does not extend as far as Erigavo, if Al-Shabaab fighters attempt to withdraw towards the city in Sanaag, Hargeisa should be well-prepared to intercept fleeing militants. Still, the prospects for the consolidation and stabilisation phase of such an operation are much more complex because of divided Warsangeli loyalties between Puntland and Somaliland, as well as attempts by SSC-Khaatumo to appeal to unitarist elements within the clan. 

Another element to contend with will be the growing presence of Houthi-backed Warsangeli militias near Laas Qoray, the historic base of piracy in Sanaag. Credible reports suggest that the Yemen-based Houthi militants are developing local maritime militia capabilities, both as a means of protecting their commercial activities and supply chains, as well as to possibly interdict or attack vessels transiting through the Gulf of Aden.

Though Deni has done an excellent job of maintaining Puntland's internal stability, there remain a number of spoilers that could yet undermine the future operations. Central is Villa Somalia, which has continued to weaponise humanitarian and development assistance against the northernmost Federal Member State, as well as stoke tensions amidst Operation Hilaac. One of these tools has been the Diyano family, historically based out of Bosaaso, which has dominated the US-established Puntland Security Forces (PSF) since its inception. Last year, Villa Somalia appointed Asad Diyaano as federal police commissioner, who further accompanied PM Barre to Laas Aanood. And last month, the Puntland Governor of Mudug complained that the PSF– whose presence has been diminished in Bosaaso amidst Operation Hilaac– were attempting to stir tensions within Galkacyo, where the force historically has held a base. 

Another Mogadishu stalking horse appears to be Guled Barre, a prominent Puntland opposition figure who hails from the Isse Mahmoud sub-clan of the Majerteen. Having finished second in last January's indirect Puntland presidential election to Deni, Barre is preparing to reignite his political ambitions, launching the Council for Justice and Democracy opposition movement on Monday. Barre's new opposition coalition may well be quietly financed by Villa Somalia as an attempt to undermine Puntland, with Deni continuing to reject the federal government's rigged constitutional and political agenda. However, it is not just the Isse Mahmoud who currently feel sidelined from government, but the third major 'brotherly' clan of the Majerteen, the Omar Mahmoud, as well. Based in southern Puntland, the Omar Mahmoud dominates the city of Galkacyo, and there may be elements among this influential sub-clan that could be accessed by Villa Somalia. It is readily apparent that it is not solely SSC-Khaatumo that could be wielded against the Puntland administration in the coming months as it prepares for Operation Onkod, as well as Deni's rumoured run for the federal presidency in 2026.

Operation Hilaac has arguably been Deni's finest hour. Ensuring these successes, however, presents another set of challenges in the coming weeks as the Puntland government shifts focus. Subsequently, it is high risk for Puntland to immediately plunge into operations against Al-Shabaab without consolidating its hold over the Al-Miskaad Mountains and allowing for some rest, recuperation and refit of its military forces. Despite the urgency in confronting Al-Shabaab’s growing presence, Puntland can ill-afford to fight conflicts on two separate fronts.

The Somali Wire Team