The Enemy Gets A Vote
"Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative…"
2nd Principle of War, US Army FM 3-0
In war, as former US Secretary of Defence James Mattis, a decorated four-star Marine Corps general, was fond of saying: "the enemy gets a vote." His point was that, however careful and calibrated a plan is, its execution and outcome will be determined in part by your adversary's actions.
In Somalia today, the flailing federal government not only lacks a lucid military strategy to combat Al-Shabaab, but it has also utterly ceded the initiative on the battlefield to the jihadists. Since its much-vaunted offensive in the Hiiraan region petered out in early 2023, the federal government's military effort has been incoherent, unfocused and mainly reactive. In turn, jihadist forces tied down much of the Somali National Army (SNA) in a painful and essentially pointless struggle for Middle Shabelle and southern Galmudug, leaving Al-Shabaab's headquarters and strongholds in Lower Shabelle and the Juba Valley undisturbed. Apparently oblivious to the SNA's corrosion, Villa Somalia even demanded that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) be reduced – over AU objections - to less than 12,000 strong. When Al-Shabaab subsequently tightened its cordon around the capital earlier this year, Mogadishu desperately dispatched untrained police and prison guards to the front lines, and now has entreated for a 'surge' of 8,000 new AU troops, so far to no avail. Today, there remains little to prevent Al-Shabaab from seizing Mogadishu at a time and in a manner of its own choosing.
For months, anxious international partners, including AUSSOM Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and security assistance providers, have remonstrated and pleaded with Villa Somalia to rise to the occasion, mending fences with its domestic opponents and forging a new national consensus against Al-Shabaab. Instead, the president has doggedly attempted to consolidate his personal power, most recently through the formation of a new patronage platform-- the Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP). With Al-Shabaab poised to sweep the capital, Somali and international observers alike are openly questioning President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's (HSM) precarious relationship with reality.
HSM clearly fails to appreciate the danger to which he has exposed his country, but he has so far been right about one thing-- that the international community has been unwilling to abandon him and his feckless government by cutting off budgetary and military support. But donor patience is finally wearing thin, and there are growing rumblings in some quarters that budgetary financing could be suspended if Villa Somalia does not acknowledge and adequately respond to the scale of the crisis. Further, foreign capitals – and by no means only the United States – are beginning to query the value of maintaining embassies behind Halane's Hesco barriers and razor wire. Even if Al-Shabaab continues to procrastinate about seizing Mogadishu, donor patience with HSM may well expire before his term of office does.
Al-Shabaab's posture amidst these bewildering dynamics remains impassive and largely impenetrable. Certainly, they seem to enjoy, and even exacerbate, the prevailing 'fog of war.' But despite vast amounts of information being known about – inter alia - the extremist group's organisation, ideology, capabilities, tactics, and finances, its intentions are far harder to divine. Most crucially, while the jihadists today are closer to seizing Mogadishu than for several years, their anticipated time frame for doing so remains a mystery. Al-Shabaab is no doubt preparing to cast its vote on how this chapter of Somalia's civil war unfolds, but when and how it may choose to do so are much murkier.
It's a fair assumption that Al-Shabaab would prefer not to engage in a bloody battle for the capital, but it is an equally fair inference that – given the yawning deficit of international confidence in HSM's government - the group knows that fighting may be unnecessary. Al-Shabaab is, after all, a far more sophisticated organisation than many give it credit for, and its leadership are keen observers of the international landscape.
Earlier this year, for example, the militants waited until the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) "drawdown" was complete before launching their latest offensive in Middle Shabelle and advancing closer to Mogadishu. This month, Al-Shabaab will undoubtedly be watching for the UN Security Council's decision on funding for AUSSOM – and especially whether the US blocks the proposed use of assessed contributions through Resolution 2719. If AUSSOM suffers further cuts or is entirely terminated, Al-Shabaab may well be counting on what remains of the SNA and National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) losing the will to fight. The jihadists may also be waiting for an indication from Washington as to whether the US will withdraw its roughly 500 military personnel from Somalia and end its support for the elite Danab brigade, one of the few forces capable of conducting kinetic operations against Al-Shabaab. While the US military presence is largely immaterial to the defence of Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab is likely eager to avoid any actions or provocations that could invite US retaliation in the form of airstrikes.
On the other hand, the jihadists will also be sensitive to any significant new military assistance for Villa Somalia. Al-Shabaab is a highly dynamic force, and facing the prospect of Turkish troops or T-129 ATAK helicopters from Ankara, the militants may decide that they have to bite the bullet and accelerate their efforts to capture Mogadishu – or face a retreat to the Somali hinterland and an uncertain future.
Somalia's federal government and many of its international partners are labouring under the impression that there is still time for them to shape the outcome of the war against Al-Shabaab, and that they collectively possess the agency to do so. But it is currently Al-Shabaab that possesses the strategic initiative, shaping the battlefield and, for the most part, choosing where and when to fight.
While the jihadists' serpentine constriction of Mogadishu continues without any sign of relief, foreign allies of Somalia are apparently still unwilling or unable to exert sufficient pressure for Villa Somalia to abandon its political parlour games and focus on the existential challenge at hand. Time is slipping away, and with each day that passes, the enemy casts another vote in its own favour. Unless HSM can be persuaded to urgently step aside to enable a concerted counter-offensive against Al-Shabaab, then it will no longer be a matter of who will cast the final vote in this war, but when.
The Somali Wire Team
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