From UPD to JSP: Villa Somalia Echoes Erdoğan’s Playbook
Villa Somalia's pale imitation of Turkish politics has stepped up a notch. On 2 May, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's (HSM) ruling Union for Peace and Development Party (UPD) concluded its internal restructuring meetings in Mogadishu, agreeing to overhaul the party and amend its leadership structure. The new party has been dubbed 'Justice and Solidarity Party' (JSP) or Xisbiga Cadaaladda iyo Wadajirka in Somali, seemingly a reference to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's movement, known as the 'Justice and Development Party,' which shares an ideological affiliation with HSM's Damul Jadiid faction in the Muslim Brotherhood. JSP-- rather than a vehicle for realising legitimate one-person, one-vote (OPOV) elections as it will be presented-- is a continuation of HSM's attempts to centralise power and stifle dissent through consolidating Villa Somalia's control over several Federal Member State (FMS) presidents. Coming immediately before the National Consultative Council (NCC) meeting, the reconfiguration of the UPD underscores that the Somali president's overarching priority is securing his own political future into 2026 and beyond.
Unsurprisingly, the proposed structure of JSP awards even greater power to the incumbents, with HSM set to head up the new 'Leadership Council,' while an 'Executive Council' will be chaired by PM Hamza Abdi Barre. But in a sweeping coup, senior federal and regional leaders still attached to the federal government and its tarnished OPOV project have been handed prominent positions within the rebranded party. Proposed members of the leadership council include the regional presidents from Galmudug, South West State, and Hirshabelle, as well as the leader of SSC-Khaatumo, the speaker and deputies from both houses of parliament, the prime minister and the deputy prime minister. And though the party will include a 'General Secretariat' led by MP Abdirahman Mohamed Hussein and a 'General Assembly' to be comprised of 180 delegates picked on clan basis, the JSP represents a far more centralised vehicle than the old UDP. And crucially, the meeting officially endorsed Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as their candidate for the next set of presidential elections, dispelling any hopes that he might step aside and not run for a third term.
It has been reported that JSP will be launched today in a formal ceremony before it is registered by the National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC) as an official political party to contest elections, coinciding with the second day of the NCC meeting. Despite the delay last week, neither Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni nor Jubaland leader Ahmed 'Madoobe' is in attendance in Mogadishu, undercutting PM Hamza Abdi Barre and SSC-Khaatumo leader Abdikadir Aw-Ali 'Firdhiye's' claims to represent broader Darood clan interests. To drive this point home, in a video statement prior to the Hawiye-dominated conference in Mogadishu, Madoobe declared that there is no longer a functioning federal government in Somalia.
While the putative 'national' dialogue was intended to help mend the frayed political settlement, agree on a path forward for feasible elections in 2026, and forge an anti-Al-Shabaab coalition to push out from the capital, HSM has instead ploughed ahead with the NCC as a platform for his own political ambitions. The results of the meeting are yet to be announced, but speculation has been mounting for some time that one of the outcomes will be an incestuous deal in which HSM and his FMS allies agree to mutual term extensions - an ill-judged covenant that risks precipitating major unrest in the capital.
The UPD's reincarnation as the JSP essentially enshrines its Muslim Brotherhood character – particularly the Damul Jadiid (New Blood) faction to which HSM belongs, while blurring the lines between the 'moderate' Islamist factions of Damul Jadiid, al-Islah, and Aala Sheikh. Many within these groups are known to favour a centralised state with a powerful leader, as reflected in Villa Somalia's flagrant disregard for the principles of federalism and the sweeping amendments it has proposed to Chapters 1-4 of the Provisional Constitution. Yet little ideology beyond proposing direct polls with a heavily Islamist tint appears to be attached to JSP. No party manifesto has yet been made public, but when one does, it will no doubt prettify HSM's blatant power grab with language that projects Somali national pride, patriotism, and Islamic values.
In this regard, the JSP can perhaps be likened to another political party closer to home in Ethiopia, where incumbent PM Abiy Ahmed merged several ethnic-based parties under the Prosperity Party in 2019. Much like the JSP, regional presidents and movements were expected to bend the knee to the new party leadership. Only the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) refused, precipitating the calamitous war on Tigray between 2020 and 2022. Today, Ethiopia's ruling party make up the overwhelming majority of the seats within the parliament, and the space for dissent and debate is virtually non-existent. If JSP members are expected to swear fealty to Villa Somalia-- no matter that it is charting a destabilising political and military course for the country-- then the ability to rein in HSM will be even more diminished as he seeks power for a third term.
Still, not all within the new JSP are reported to be satisfied with their positions and clan representation. Several attendees at the conference, including SSC-Khaatumo leader Firdhiye, were apparently unaware that they would be expected to pledge their allegiance. The position of the SSC-Khaatumo administration at the NCC is also unclear, since a statement released by the federal government refers only to the group's participation without awarding it full FMS status. There are also rumblings of discontent within the Digil-Mirifle camp, with only Speaker of the federal parliament Aden Madoobe having been appointed to the executive council. Madoobe– who has overseen one of the most calamitous periods of the parliament and is battling an attempt to unseat him– has been partially appointed as a means to cajole South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen, who reportedly resents the attempts to coerce him into JSP despite attending the NCC meeting. Laftagareen's Hawiye counterparts, Hirshabelle President Ali Hussein 'Guudlawe' and Galmudug's Ahmed Abdi Karie 'Qoorqoor', have little choice but to attend. Both face serious threats to their positions from senior federal politicians and allies of Villa Somalia, including spy chief Abdullahi Mohamed Ali 'Sanbalooshe' and his predecessor, Mahad Salad, respectively.
In the first years of Somalia's independence, the country underwent several peaceful elections and transfers of power, with the country heralded as the continent's youngest democracy. But by the end of the 1960s, the electoral system had become riddled with dozens of clan-based parties contesting for the parliament's seats. Decades later, the precise opposite now appears likely, with the central government attempting to consolidate power into a single party and camouflage this as a consensus-oriented, democratic reshaping of the country. Widespread disaffection with the freewheeling corruption, nepotism, and electoral gerrymandering of the 1960s culminated in a collective sigh of relief when Siyaad Barre seized power in a bloodless coup. Decades later, many of those same elements have been present within HSM's second term as well, but any such overthrow of the incumbent government-- and Barre's would prove disastrous-- appears more likely to come from an Al-Shabaab takeover of Mogadishu today. With the jihadists currently consolidating their grip on Lower Shabelle, the creation of JSP should be called out for what it is-- an undemocratic power grab that makes national reconciliation even more improbable.
The Somali Wire Team
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Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.
A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.
Last weekend, the Murusade, a major sub-clan of the powerful Hawiye clan family, staged one of the largest and most colourful coronations of a clan chief in recent memory in Mogadishu. The caleemasarka (enthronement) of Ugaas Abdirizaq Ugaas Abdullahi Ugaas Haashi, the new Ugaas or sultan of the Murusade, was attended by thousands of delegates from all parts of Somalia. Conducted next to the imposing and magnificent Ottomanesque Ali Jim'ale Mosque, on the Muslim day of rest, Friday, the occasion blended the Islamic, the regal and the customary; a restatement of an ancient tradition very much alive and vibrant.
With all eyes trained on the Strait of Hormuz blockades and their geopolitical convulsions, discussions and concerns, too, have risen about the perils of other globalised chokepoints, not least the Bab al-Mandab. The threats to the stability of the Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea may not arise principally from the escalatory logic that the US, Iran, and Israel have been locked in, but the threats posed from collapse and contested sovereignty offer little relief. Off Somalia's northern coastline in particular, it is transnational criminal networks — expressed in smuggling, piracy, and, less visibly but no less consequentially, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing — that define the character of offshore insecurity. It is this last phenomenon that provides the foundation on which much of Somalia's maritime disorder is built, and which remains the most consistently neglected.
Villa Somalia's triumph in Baidoa may yet turn to ashes. Since the ousting of wary friend-turned-foe, Abdiaziz Laftagareen, in late March, the federal government has ploughed ahead with preparations for state- and district-level elections in South West. Nominally scheduled for next week, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has chosen to reward his stalwart parliamentary ally, Aden Madoobe from the Rahanweyne/Hadaamo, with the regional presidency after some vacillation, naming him the sole Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP) candidate