From UPD to JSP: Villa Somalia Echoes Erdoğan’s Playbook
Villa Somalia's pale imitation of Turkish politics has stepped up a notch. On 2 May, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's (HSM) ruling Union for Peace and Development Party (UPD) concluded its internal restructuring meetings in Mogadishu, agreeing to overhaul the party and amend its leadership structure. The new party has been dubbed 'Justice and Solidarity Party' (JSP) or Xisbiga Cadaaladda iyo Wadajirka in Somali, seemingly a reference to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's movement, known as the 'Justice and Development Party,' which shares an ideological affiliation with HSM's Damul Jadiid faction in the Muslim Brotherhood. JSP-- rather than a vehicle for realising legitimate one-person, one-vote (OPOV) elections as it will be presented-- is a continuation of HSM's attempts to centralise power and stifle dissent through consolidating Villa Somalia's control over several Federal Member State (FMS) presidents. Coming immediately before the National Consultative Council (NCC) meeting, the reconfiguration of the UPD underscores that the Somali president's overarching priority is securing his own political future into 2026 and beyond.
Unsurprisingly, the proposed structure of JSP awards even greater power to the incumbents, with HSM set to head up the new 'Leadership Council,' while an 'Executive Council' will be chaired by PM Hamza Abdi Barre. But in a sweeping coup, senior federal and regional leaders still attached to the federal government and its tarnished OPOV project have been handed prominent positions within the rebranded party. Proposed members of the leadership council include the regional presidents from Galmudug, South West State, and Hirshabelle, as well as the leader of SSC-Khaatumo, the speaker and deputies from both houses of parliament, the prime minister and the deputy prime minister. And though the party will include a 'General Secretariat' led by MP Abdirahman Mohamed Hussein and a 'General Assembly' to be comprised of 180 delegates picked on clan basis, the JSP represents a far more centralised vehicle than the old UDP. And crucially, the meeting officially endorsed Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as their candidate for the next set of presidential elections, dispelling any hopes that he might step aside and not run for a third term.
It has been reported that JSP will be launched today in a formal ceremony before it is registered by the National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC) as an official political party to contest elections, coinciding with the second day of the NCC meeting. Despite the delay last week, neither Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni nor Jubaland leader Ahmed 'Madoobe' is in attendance in Mogadishu, undercutting PM Hamza Abdi Barre and SSC-Khaatumo leader Abdikadir Aw-Ali 'Firdhiye's' claims to represent broader Darood clan interests. To drive this point home, in a video statement prior to the Hawiye-dominated conference in Mogadishu, Madoobe declared that there is no longer a functioning federal government in Somalia.
While the putative 'national' dialogue was intended to help mend the frayed political settlement, agree on a path forward for feasible elections in 2026, and forge an anti-Al-Shabaab coalition to push out from the capital, HSM has instead ploughed ahead with the NCC as a platform for his own political ambitions. The results of the meeting are yet to be announced, but speculation has been mounting for some time that one of the outcomes will be an incestuous deal in which HSM and his FMS allies agree to mutual term extensions - an ill-judged covenant that risks precipitating major unrest in the capital.
The UPD's reincarnation as the JSP essentially enshrines its Muslim Brotherhood character – particularly the Damul Jadiid (New Blood) faction to which HSM belongs, while blurring the lines between the 'moderate' Islamist factions of Damul Jadiid, al-Islah, and Aala Sheikh. Many within these groups are known to favour a centralised state with a powerful leader, as reflected in Villa Somalia's flagrant disregard for the principles of federalism and the sweeping amendments it has proposed to Chapters 1-4 of the Provisional Constitution. Yet little ideology beyond proposing direct polls with a heavily Islamist tint appears to be attached to JSP. No party manifesto has yet been made public, but when one does, it will no doubt prettify HSM's blatant power grab with language that projects Somali national pride, patriotism, and Islamic values.
In this regard, the JSP can perhaps be likened to another political party closer to home in Ethiopia, where incumbent PM Abiy Ahmed merged several ethnic-based parties under the Prosperity Party in 2019. Much like the JSP, regional presidents and movements were expected to bend the knee to the new party leadership. Only the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) refused, precipitating the calamitous war on Tigray between 2020 and 2022. Today, Ethiopia's ruling party make up the overwhelming majority of the seats within the parliament, and the space for dissent and debate is virtually non-existent. If JSP members are expected to swear fealty to Villa Somalia-- no matter that it is charting a destabilising political and military course for the country-- then the ability to rein in HSM will be even more diminished as he seeks power for a third term.
Still, not all within the new JSP are reported to be satisfied with their positions and clan representation. Several attendees at the conference, including SSC-Khaatumo leader Firdhiye, were apparently unaware that they would be expected to pledge their allegiance. The position of the SSC-Khaatumo administration at the NCC is also unclear, since a statement released by the federal government refers only to the group's participation without awarding it full FMS status. There are also rumblings of discontent within the Digil-Mirifle camp, with only Speaker of the federal parliament Aden Madoobe having been appointed to the executive council. Madoobe– who has overseen one of the most calamitous periods of the parliament and is battling an attempt to unseat him– has been partially appointed as a means to cajole South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen, who reportedly resents the attempts to coerce him into JSP despite attending the NCC meeting. Laftagareen's Hawiye counterparts, Hirshabelle President Ali Hussein 'Guudlawe' and Galmudug's Ahmed Abdi Karie 'Qoorqoor', have little choice but to attend. Both face serious threats to their positions from senior federal politicians and allies of Villa Somalia, including spy chief Abdullahi Mohamed Ali 'Sanbalooshe' and his predecessor, Mahad Salad, respectively.
In the first years of Somalia's independence, the country underwent several peaceful elections and transfers of power, with the country heralded as the continent's youngest democracy. But by the end of the 1960s, the electoral system had become riddled with dozens of clan-based parties contesting for the parliament's seats. Decades later, the precise opposite now appears likely, with the central government attempting to consolidate power into a single party and camouflage this as a consensus-oriented, democratic reshaping of the country. Widespread disaffection with the freewheeling corruption, nepotism, and electoral gerrymandering of the 1960s culminated in a collective sigh of relief when Siyaad Barre seized power in a bloodless coup. Decades later, many of those same elements have been present within HSM's second term as well, but any such overthrow of the incumbent government-- and Barre's would prove disastrous-- appears more likely to come from an Al-Shabaab takeover of Mogadishu today. With the jihadists currently consolidating their grip on Lower Shabelle, the creation of JSP should be called out for what it is-- an undemocratic power grab that makes national reconciliation even more improbable.
The Somali Wire Team
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