Issue No. 818

The Wolf Turned Warrior

Last week, Ahmed Moallim Fiqi took charge as Somalia's new Defence Minister, replacing Jibril Abdirashid, who had served just a month in post. While the reshuffle marked little more than rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic, the placing of the combative former Islamic Courts Union (ICU) leader at the helm of Somalia's flagging fight against Al-Shabaab is being hailed by many-- and not just regime supporters. Some hope that the 'hard man' of Somali politics may be able to slow the jihadists' seemingly inexorable advance towards Mogadishu. And at his official inauguration, Fiqi was in fighting form – "I know these youngsters well and I was involved in the campaign to dislodge them from Mogadishu (in 2011)," he boasted. But just a few days in, Fiqi has been caught up, again, in a nationalist diplomatic firestorm, this time by banning individuals using Taiwanese passports from entering the country.

Since Xi Jinping rose to become general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012, Beijing has increasingly sought to flex its considerable diplomatic and economic muscle. For instance, while mobilising developing nations to join its infrastructure Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing instructed its diplomats abroad to be proactive and robust in defending China's rise and ambitions. The term 'Wolf Warrior,' named after a popular Chinese film franchise, was later coined to justify Beijing's more confrontational foreign policy. And much like his Chinese counterparts, Fiqi performed well as Somalia's 'wolf warrior-in-chief' as Foreign Minister last year. Somalia's inept enclave government cannot be judged by service delivery; it offers no education, healthcare or employment.

Instead, Fiqi's favour rests on his theatrical performances –- the constant menacing growl against Somalia's 'enemies', the fearsome snarl at 'wayward' foreign diplomats and the invectives against Somaliland and Ethiopia. Even Fiqi's lack of charisma has fed the popular perception that he is 'genuine.' And, unlike many within the federal government, Fiqi does not need to feign outrage, entirely subscribing to the hardline Islamist and nationalist script offered up by the federal government. The Daljir party leader stands out as a hero of the Islamist far-right – consistent, resolute and unapologetic. 

Villa Somalia has given Fiqi latitude to push its most extreme talking points on the international stage, particularly regarding Ethiopia. In late December 2023, Fiqi accompanied Hassan Sheikh to Djibouti for a meeting with then-Somaliland President Muse Bihi in a nominal attempt to restart the stalled Hargeisa-Mogadishu dialogue. In fact, it marked little more than an attempt to browbeat Bihi to accept a diminished negotiating position, which the former Somaliland president staunchly rebuffed. Not yet Foreign Minister, Fiqi contributed little to the proceedings but was brought along as an apparent attempt to boost the confidence of his own president and as a kind of nationalist talisman.

Then, in early 2024, when the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) saga threw bilateral relations into a tailspin, Fiqi termed Ethiopia an existential enemy. But the defence minister's consistent anti-Addis position should be understood in his history as a former ICU leader and his involvement in the armed resistance against the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in late 2006. Arguing that Somalia should sever ties with Ethiopia until the MoU was renounced, Fiqi made a series of extreme claims, including that the Ethiopian National Defence Forces killed 20,000 Somali civilians – a figure not supported by any independent research. Simultaneously, Fiqi pushed for a deepening of ties with Egypt and Eritrea, while pressuring Somalia's allies to publicly condemn the Somaliland-Ethiopia accord. In August 2024, during the second round of Ankara-negotiated talks with Ethiopia, he even refused to meet with his Ethiopian counterpart despite pressure from the Turks.

Fiqi's headline-generating obscured a more mixed record at the Ministry, and divisions with State Foreign Minister Ali Omar 'Bal'ad.' The latter represented Mogadishu in late 2024 when Fiqi refused to join the 'confidence-building' with Ethiopia post-Ankara Declaration. Fiqi was praised for cancelling thousands of diplomatic passports to well-connected individuals and, arguably, slowed nepotistic hiring. But these minor reforms generated differences with his number two and a plot to table a no-confidence motion against him in parliament late last year, apparently orchestrated by Bal'ad and his supporters.

More concerningly, the new Defence Minister has been at the forefront of attempts to destabilise Somaliland. Last year, Fiqi convened a series of meetings in Mogadishu with officials from the SSC-Khaatumo administration and the dissidents from the Awdal State Movement in western Somaliland. Fiqi has repeatedly agitated against foreign diplomats who have engaged with Hargiesa, while his aggressive commentary on the unrecognised polity has made him something of a hate figure in Somaliland. Just last week at his inauguration, Fiqi actively called for violent insurrection-- "I am telling the people of Awdal: Drop the pen and pick up the guns." One of his last acts as Foreign Minister was to ban those travelling on Taiwanese passports from travelling or transiting through Somalia.

In a speech justifying the ban, Fiqi railed against Hargeisa, arguing that the planned visit of the Taiwanese Foreign Minister to Somaliland was "pushing [Mogadishu] to take new measures" and that the federal government's strategy was to "isolate and strangle Somaliland by any means necessary." However, the ban has already generated backlash amongst anti-China Republican circles in Washington, further undermining attempts by Villa Somalia to ingratiate itself with the new Trump government. 

While Fiqi denied that Villa Somalia was a "Chinese Communist Party vassal state," his strong 'One Somalia' credentials and active meddling in the Taiwan-Somaliland relationship have endeared the minister to Beijing. In response to the Taiwan ban, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun stated, "China highly commends Somalia's commitment to the 'One China' principle." In the past year, China, particularly, has amped up its 'One Somalia' rhetoric, with the Chinese embassy hosting a 'One China, One Somalia' event in May 2024, for instance. And Beijing has been further accused of surreptitiously backing the active destabilisation of Somaliland by Mogadishu. Upon his return from Laas Anood in late April, Fiqi debriefed the Chinese ambassador to Somalia, which was interpreted as proof by some that Beijing and Mogadishu were closely coordinating. But with Al-Shabaab having seized such significant territory in recent weeks, picking yet another spat with Somaliland, Taiwan, and, by extension, the US is a muddling of priorities. 

How Fiqi will fare as Defence Minister is hard to ascertain, but it is conceivable that his abrasive persona could antagonise commanders and undermine already poor morale. And while Fiqi has influence over somema'awiisley units in Hiiraan and Galmudug, it will prove difficult to improve the situation across the board-- without the federal government convening a genuine reconciliatory forum that can mobilise a coalition against the jihadists. While Abdulkadir Nur 'Jama' removal was long overdue, Fiqi's picking new fights with Somaliland and reportedly dispatching weapons for SSC-Khaatumo does not suggest that Villa Somalia has had a Damascene conversion on the continued need for a devolved and federated security architecture-- nor sober military strategy beyond myopic optics. Fiqi has proved himself a rhetorically ferocious wolf, but can he become an able warrior against Al-Shabaab? Only time will tell, but it's far from an auspicious start.

The Somali Wire Team