Issue No. 809

No More Blank Cheques

Last Friday, the head of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM), General Michael Langley, testifying to the US Senate Armed Services Committee, confirmed that Islamic State-Somalia (ISS) had relocated its global command hub to Puntland. Emphasising how ISS was developing its "global footprint" from Somalia, he warned that if left unchecked, the jihadist group could pose direct threats to US national security. This acknowledgement by the head of AFRICOM was a mark of just how consequential ISS, led by Emir Abdulkadir Mumim, has become within Daesh's architecture. And while perhaps bad news for the counter-terror fight in Africa, Langley's statement on ISS and the subsequent offers a glimmer of hope for an embattled Mogadishu, which fears that the new American administration may be inclined to turn its back on Somalia. 

Since Donald Trump returned to the White House in early 2025, Somalia's federal government has laboured to formulate a coherent response to the 'America First' administration, and what it might mean for Mogadishu. The Trump White House has yet to delineate a clear position on Somalia – or even for Africa writ large - but one might anticipate another radical change in posture for several reasons. Washington-- by some distance-- has been the largest provider of direct security bilateral assistance to the federal government, yet the evisceration of USAID has signalled a much more hard-edged transactional approach towards geopolitics. With billions of USD having been ploughed into Banaadir's sands with little to show for it, and Trump ostensibly interested in ending America's 'forever wars,' Mogadishu may struggle to justify such a high level of expenditure. Still, the US has emphasised that counterterrorism will remain one of its major foreign policy priorities. 

Though anti-US sentiment is reportedly peaking within senior echelons of Somalia's federal government, American military and developmental largesse has been too significant to be rejected out of hand. The uptick in US airstrikes in remote parts of central Somalia have already killed dozens of Al-Shabaab fighters in recent weeks, proving one of the few effectual tools defending Mogadishu. But Villa Somalia has vacillated between empty promises of US control over ports in Somaliland and Puntland (both of which are beyond its control) and President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's (HSM) public chastising of the US embassy warning of Al-Shabaab attacks in the capital as "foreign propaganda." Neither approach has convinced the Americans that Villa Somalia is a serious interlocutor. And behind closed doors, Washington and other international partners continue to push the recalcitrant federal government to make urgent concessions to defend Mogadishu from Al-Shabaab's encroachment.

There are other reasons that the US may be less than convinced by the Hassan Sheikh administration, including theatrical foot-dragging by Villa Somalia over removing the inept and deeply corrupt Defence Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur' Jama' from his post. Other senior Somali politicians have taken contrary positions to the US foreign policy, such as PM Hamza Abdi Barre voicing support for Hamas. Further, Mogadishu has appeared more enticed by relations with other partners in recent months, such as Türkiye and China, than by ties with the US. The intimate relationship between Türkiye and Somalia may chafe less with Washington, considering that Ankara is a NATO ally and Trump seemingly views Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as a leader cut from a similar cloth. But well-known China hawks within the Trump administration, particularly Secretary of State Marco Rubio, are unlikely to look as favourably on Mogadishu's courting of Beijing.

With the federal government struggling to make much headway with Washington, Langley's comments suggest Somalia-- or at least Puntland-- retains some strategic significance as the location of ISS's global headquarters. So, at first glance, it offers an opportunity for Villa Somalia to leverage an AFRICOM priority in fighting ISS. But there remain a number of important caveats. First, Washington is all too aware that the fight against Da'esh in Puntland's Al-Miskaad mountains, christened Operation 'Hilaac', has been spearheaded by the Said Abdullahi Deni administration. After months of careful planning, several thousand massed Puntland forces have steadily pushed into the ISS territory, backed by UAE and US airstrikes, scattering the jihadists into the mountains. Support for the offensive from Mogadishu has been conspicuous only by its absence, although Villa Somalia has repeatedly attempted to claim credit for Puntland's military successes, and even for AFRICOM airstrikes. 

Puntland has ridiculed such attempts, which follow over two years of concerted efforts by the federal government to undercut Somalia's oldest and most stable Federal Member State (FMS). And Villa Somalia seems determined to add insult to injury by dispatching PM Hamza Abdi Barre to Laas Aanood in Sool region, a clear affront to Puntland, which lays claim - alongside Somaliland – to Dhulbahante clan loyalties. If HSM wants the US government to take his government seriously, he needs to grit his teeth and throw his weight behind Deni, offering financial and military support for Puntland's anti-ISS campaign. But HSM has given no indication that he is prepared to mend fences with Deni and lend a hand to a political rival who is likely to contest the 2026 federal presidential elections. 

Langley has not described Al-Shabaab in such stark terms as ISS, and it is not yet clear whether Washington views Al-Shabaab as a strategic threat on par with ISS. Perhaps not explicitly, Langley was also defending the purpose and existence of AFRICOM to the US Senate following reports in late February that the Trump administration was mulling its closure. But whether Al-Shabaab is considered a strategic threat will likely be motivated by security considerations beyond Somalia, particularly the cross-border threat that the jihadists pose to Kenya and Ethiopia, as well as their relationship with the Houthis in Yemen, which senior US officials have previously spotlighted. Mogadishu's pretence of pursuing a liberal state-building project, symbolised by Villa Somalia's disingenuous goal of one-person, one-vote elections next year, is unlikely to find as much sympathy in Washington today as it has under previous administrations. 

Even if Washington does decide that Al-Shabaab is a significant threat, it is unclear whether the US considers USD 1bn a year in security assistance to fight Al-Shabaab a good return on investment, amidst the slashing and burning of foreign aid. Relatedly, Washington has repeatedly rebuffed requests that the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) be funded through UN Security Council Resolution 2719. The next question is whether the US decides that Villa Somalia should remain its principal conduit to engage with issues of security and counter-terrorism in Somalia.

Langley's comments should be read by Villa Somalia not as a return to the kind of blank cheque diplomacy that Mogadishu has enjoyed in the past but rather as a roadmap to retaining some degree of American goodwill if HSM is willing to do more to prove his credentials as a credible ally in the fight against ISS and Al-Shabaab. That, in turn, will require significant political concessions to domestic opponents, renewing ties with Puntland and Jubaland and co-ordinating a unified national campaign against Al-Shabaab and Da'esh. It'sno longer enough for Villa Somalia to let others do the fighting, while HSM cynically attempts to claim the credit.

The Somali Wire Team