Somalia's Last Chance Saloon
At the 11th hour, with Al-Shabaab literally at the gates of Mogadishu and only under immense international pressure, has Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud reluctantly reached out to the national opposition. On 30 March, exactly one year after forcing sweeping constitutional amendments through parliament that all but eviscerated the federation, the president called – through gritted teeth - for a national conference to forge "unity" in the face of looming defeat and possible state collapse. Villa Somalia has pushed the country's fragile, transitional political model to the brink, with the jihadists having taken ready advantage of the chaos. But while the prospects of talks have been tentatively welcomed in some corners, their parameters remain unclear. What is apparent, though, is that the federal government will have to abandon its monopolistic constitutional and electoral agenda if it is to stall Al-Shabaab's advance and begin patching up Somalia's elite political consensus.
On 28 March, US Ambassador Richard Riley and his UK counterpart Michael Nithavrianakis met with President Hassan Sheikh at Mogadishu's airport upon his return from Türkiye to urge him to negotiate and, among other issues, restore the National Consultative Committee (NCC) as a platform for political consensus. While Villa Somalia was clearly indifferent to the mounting domestic opposition, the growing pressure from foreign allies appears to have finally pushed Hassan Sheikh to accept the necessity for talks. In the past, chronic divisions within the international community have repeatedly undermined such efforts, and numerous opportunities have been missed to prevent the extreme breakdown of Somalia's political and security dynamics. By all accounts, the president has become increasingly isolated in recent months, refusing to listen to the counsel of both close international allies and his domestic advisors. In large part, Somalia has reached the most severe crisis of the federal era because of this refusal to work within the parameters of the negotiated political settlement, best epitomised by the government slogan of "Loo Joojin Maayo" (Not stopping for anyone).
In a statement released last week, Hawiye opposition led by former President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, former PM Hassan Ali Khaire, and Abdirahman Abdishakur have welcomed the president's invitation but demanded more specifics about the agenda, timeline, and participation. Others, including former Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo and ex-PMs Mohamed Roble and Abdi Farah Shirdon, have also endorsed the call for talks to unify against Al-Shabaab. But for Villa Somalia to prove that the incumbent president's gesture is more than just window-dressing to placate its international partners, key questions will need to be addressed, including who will oversee the negotiations and what precisely will be up for debate. Importantly, it appears that the unworkable plan for one-person, one-vote (OPOV) elections will be discarded, necessitating negotiations on a transitional arrangement for the federal presidential elections in May 2026. Removal of the profoundly unpopular PM Hamza Abdi Barre in favour of a more consensual political figure would also signal Villa Somalia's seriousness. But perhaps the most critical concession ahead of national dialogue – arguably even an indispensable one – would be for the president himself to announce that he will not seek another term of office.
Restoring relations with both Puntland and Jubaland will also be essential. Although Jubaland President and elder statesman Ahmed Madoobe has welcomed the president's offer of dialogue, the long-serving leader still bears the brunt of Villa Somalia's most virulent attacks, including an attempt to overthrow him by force late last year and persistent attempts to unsettle the Gedo region. PM Barre, a former Madoobe ally, has bizarrely accused the Jubaland leader of collaborating with Al-Shabaab, and in November 2024, the federal government triggered an Interpol Red Notice for Madoobe's arrest. At a minimum, Villa Somalia will have to drop charges against the Jubaland president if he is to attend any talks in Somalia's capital.
Similarly, there are some early signs that Puntland is not at this stage inclined to join Villa Somalia's proposed national forum. In Garowe yesterday, Puntland VP Ilyas Osman Lugatoor slammed the failures of the federal government, laying the blame squarely at their door for the advance of Al-Shabaab. He further stated, "We feel sorry for you, but Puntland won't be coming to your aid as we are focused on dealing with our own tasks." The third phase of Operation Hilaac (Lightning) against the Islamic State-Somalia militants in the Al-Miskaad mountains is currently ongoing, entirely without the support of Mogadishu. Tensions may be further aggravated by the planned visit of PM Barre to Laas Aanood - an affront to both Puntland and Somaliland, which both lay claim to the town. Moreover, Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni's presumed aspirations for the federal presidency in May 2026 might also make him reticent to rejoin the NCC and offer any concessions that could lend momentum to Hassan Sheikh's own re-election campaign.
With relations between the centre, opposition, and peripheral administrations so severely deteriorated, two components are now likely requisite to generate sufficient trust for parties to negotiate urgently and in good faith. The first is Hassan Sheikh announcing he will not seek a third term in 2026-- a major declaration that could allow for a consensual pathway to be negotiated for the next federal elections. It would likely go far in assuaging the opposition's concerns, allowing the talks to focus on a transitional political arrangement without the destabilising electoral ambitions of the president looming over.
By The Somali Wire Team
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